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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FAMILY, GENDER, AND EDUCATIONAL CHANGE ACROSS LOW- 
AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 
Luca Maria Pesando 
Hans-Peter Kohler 
Over the past half century, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have undergone profound 
transformations in the realm of the family, accompanied by shifts in gender norms and practices, and 
dramatic increases in schooling. Rising educational attainment has in turn been a by-product of micro-
level behavioral changes on the part of families, alongside macro-level socio-structural factors such as 
industrialization, urbanization, and targeted educational policies. This dissertation advances the field 
of social demography by exploring the interrelations between family, gender, and educational dynamics 
across LMICs. Although the three essays represent self-contained articles, they all trace linkages 
between these three dimensions with a focus on LMICs, thus contributing new empirical knowledge 
on policy-relevant population processes in contexts that have to date received less scholarly attention. 
The first chapter provides a macro-level overview on the changing nature of families across multiple 
domains with advances in socio-economic development. Its focus is on family change, yet gender 
features in the type of indicators considered, some of which are computed separately for men and 
women – showing vastly divergent patterns – while others capture men and women’s bargaining power 
within the couple. Educational expansion features throughout the discussion as one key driver of family 
change and one component of the Human Development Index (HDI) proxying for socio-economic 
development. The second chapter provides an overview on trends, variation, and implications of 
educational assortative mating for inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Mating patterns are vital to 
understanding the demographic makeup of households, such as family formation, composition, and 
breakdown. The focus on education and gender is inherent in the type of question raised (educational 
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homogamy/heterogamy) and perspective adopted (couple). The third chapter explores the effect of a 
cash-transfer intervention given to parents on children’s schooling and unpaid work in rural Morocco. 
As such, the family focus is tied to a parental investment perspective, while the educational focus comes 
from the policy considered – a cash transfer promoted by the government – and the outcomes analyzed 
– school dropout and grade progression. Lastly, gender features throughout the discussion as analyses 
consider heterogeneity by gender, and unpaid care dynamics show striking gender differences.  
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PREFACE 
Over the past half century, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have undergone profound 
transformations in the realm of the family, partly driven – or at least accompanied – by shifts in gender 
norms and practices, and dramatic increases in schooling. Rising educational attainment has in turn 
been a by-product of micro-level behavioral changes on the part of families, alongside macro-level 
socio-structural factors such as industrialization, urbanization, and targeted educational policies. This 
dissertation seeks to advance the field of social demography by exploring the complex interrelations 
between family, gender, and educational dynamics across LMICs. The dissertation follows a three-
chapter format. Although the essays represent self-contained, independent articles, they share the 
commonality that they all – more or less directly – trace linkages between these three dimensions with 
a specific focus on LMICs, thus contributing new empirical knowledge on policy-relevant population 
processes in contexts that have to date received less scholarly attention.  
Chapters 1 and 2 adopt a cross-country macro-level perspective, while Chapter 3 adopts a 
country-specific micro-level approach. Chapter 1 provides a macro-level overview on the changing 
nature of families across multiple domains with advances in socio-economic development. Its focus is 
primarily on family change, yet gender features in the type of indicators considered, some of which are 
computed separately for men and women – showing vastly divergent patterns – while others capture 
men and women’s relative position and bargaining power within the couple. Educational expansion 
features throughout the discussion as one key driver of family change and one of the three components 
of the Human Development Index (HDI) used as proxy measure for socio-economic development. 
Chapter 2 provides a macro-level overview on trends, variation, and implications of educational 
assortative mating for inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the past three decades. Assortative 
mating patterns are vital to understanding a whole set of dynamics in the demographic makeup of 
households, such as family formation, composition, and breakdown. The focus on education and 
gender is inherent in the type of research question raised (partners’ educational 
homogamy/heterogamy) and perspective adopted (couple-level). Chapter 3 explores the effect of a 
cash-transfer intervention given to parents on children’s schooling and unpaid care work outcomes in 
rural Morocco. As such, the family focus is tied to a parental investment perspective, while the 
education focus comes from the policy considered – a cash transfer promoted by the government – 
and the type of outcomes analyzed – school dropout and timely grade progression. Lastly, gender 
features throughout the discussion as all analyses consider heterogeneity by gender and unpaid care 
dynamics – the latter showing striking patterns by gender.  
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Moving to the specifics of each chapter, Chapter 1 builds on the idea that tracking family 
transformations in LMICs constitutes a first step towards providing a quantum leap in the study of the 
shifts in family forms and dynamics that are unfolding globally. Three are the guiding research 
questions: (i) How have families across LMICs changed with advances in development over the past 
30 years? (ii) Which family domains have been changing the most? (iii) Is there evidence of cross-
country convergence in family domains over socio-economic development? The paper uses pooled 
micro-level data from 293 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) across 84 low- and middle-income 
countries to provide cross-national evidence on the association between the HDI and a series of 
indicators spanning multiple family domains such as fertility, timing of life-course events, union 
formation (marriage and cohabitation), household structure (inter-generational relationships), and 
within-couple decision-making dynamics (intra-generational relationships).  
The motivation behind the study relies on two fundamental premises. First, family change in 
LMICs is unlikely to be a simple extension of patterns observed in high-income countries (Furstenberg 
2013). Second, the shift in focus onto understanding global social change requires endorsement of the 
idea that changes in families matter independently of changes in fertility (van de Walle 1993), despite 
family formation remains a precondition for fertility in some contexts. The analysis proceeds by means 
of descriptive graphical associations between 18 family indicators and HDI – both globally and 
regionally – complemented by more formal statistical tests of convergence (beta- and sigma-
convergence) borrowed from the growth convergence literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Sala-i-
Martin 1996).  
Findings support the aforementioned premises. First and foremost, while advances in 
development are associated with declines in fertility across all low- and middle-income regions, other 
domains such as marriage and inter-generational relationships move at a far slower pace, showing 
widespread cross-regional heterogeneity. While fertility, intra-couple decision-making, and women’s 
life-course timing indicators are strongly associated with HDI, cross-country convergence is limited to 
the latter domain. Marriage, cohabitation, household structure, and men’s life-course timing indicators 
show a weaker association with HDI and span a broad spectrum of convergence dynamics ranging 
from divergence to modest convergence. We describe this scenario as “persistent diversity with 
development.” The remarkable persistence of the family in several domains suggests that its centrality 
is not going to fade anytime soon and urges to move beyond the common narrative that ties fertility 
and family change together.  
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The nature of these findings enriches the literature on global family change by engaging with 
previous attempts at conceptualizing family change such as Goode’s “convergence hypothesis” 
(Goode 1963), Therborn’s “five family systems” (Therborn 2004), and Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa’s 
Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory (Lesthaeghe 2010, 2014). Our analysis suggests a more 
nuanced and contextualized understanding of family change that helps account for patterns of 
convergence, divergence, and persistent differences. Lastly, the paper devotes ample space to 
discussing regional idiosyncrasies, and highlights the role of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as the region 
most lagging behind in dimensions of development, hence most likely to experience swift 
transformations in family domains in the near future with socio-economic progress.  
Chapter 2 picks up on this SSA “uniqueness” – not backed by enough comparative research 
within the region – to explore how educational change interacts with union/marriage formation 
dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. For this study, I use micro-level data from 126 DHS surveys across 
39 SSA countries to provide a closer look at changing patterns of educational assortative mating in the 
region. The study seeks to: (i) highlight patterns of mating by marriage cohort, sub-region of SSA 
(Western, Central. Eastern, and Southern), and household location of residence (rural/urban); (ii) 
compare observed patterns of mating with those that would prevail under random mating and 
investigate the extent to which the observed trends are driven by changes in compositional factors 
versus partners’ actual preference for spousal educational resemblance; (iii) assess implications of 
mating for between-household wealth inequality – measured through the International Wealth Index 
(IWI) provided by the Global Data Lab. To address these questions, I rely on graphical analyses of 
associational measures, contingency tables, log-linear models, and counterfactual simulations. To assess 
implications for wealth inequality I ask the following counterfactual questions: what would have 
happened to the wealth distribution if mating within each cohort was random instead of assortative? 
What would have happened to wealth inequality if couples in the latest marriage cohort matched as 
those in the earliest one? 
The paper builds on the premise that never has the assortative mating literature focused 
exclusively on patterns of mating within SSA, while research is more extensive in other low- and 
middle-income contexts such as Latin America (Esteve and McCaa 2007; Esteve, McCaa, and López 
2013; Ganguli, Hausmann, and Viarengo 2014; Gullickson and Torche 2014; Torche 2010) and South-
East Asia (Borkotoky and Gupta 2016; Hu and Qian 2015; Park and Smits 2005; Smits and Park 2009) 
– not to mention high-income societies such as Europe and the US. Also, existing studies on declining 
hypergamy throughout the world (Esteve, Garcia, and Permanyer 2012; Esteve et al. 2016) might not 
suffice to assess whether we observe increasing educational resemblance of spouses net of shifts in 
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marginal distributions, and how trends vary by sub-region and location of residence within SSA – a 
vastly heterogeneous region that has followed different urbanization trajectories and retains context-
specific socio-cultural repertoires. As documented in Chapter 1, SSA is undergoing rapid changes in 
the realm of union formation – such as delays in mean ages at life-course events – together with 
increases in female educational attainment and labor force participation rates (Bongaarts, Mensch, and 
Blanc 2017). Yet the gender gap in education has not reversed yet, and the region remains the only one 
where the share of households in which the husband is the sole decision-maker reaches up to 40 per 
cent (Chapter 1). Therefore, there is reason to believe that trends towards increasing assortative mating 
documented globally, often unfolding along with reversals in gender gaps in education and increases 
in women’s empowerment, might occur differently in SSA. Also, no study has yet assessed the validity 
of the competing theoretical hypotheses (general openness hypothesis, status attainment hypothesis, 
inverted U-curve hypothesis) relating socio-economic development and educational homogamy in the 
SSA context. 
My results show that mating in SSA has followed rather different trajectories by sub-region 
and location of residence. While there is evidence of positive educational assortative mating throughout 
SSA – i.e., men and women with the same level of education marrying more frequently than what 
would be expected under a marriage pattern that is random with respect to education – mating has 
increased over subsequent cohorts in Western, Central, and Eastern Africa, yet it has flattened out and 
somewhat decreased in Southern Africa. Heterogeneity is also evident in levels and relative growth, as 
mating was lower in Western Africa for early cohorts, yet the sub-region has witnessed the steepest 
increase in the marital sorting parameter. Additionally, findings show that increases in mating have 
been largely driven by rural areas – where the trend for SSA as a whole is consistent with the status 
attainment hypothesis – while mating in urban areas has shown a mild increase followed by an incipient 
decline – consistent with the inverted U-curve framework and the increasing applicability of the general 
openness hypothesis. Overall, the documented heterogeneity – and, foremost, the diverging trends 
between Western and Southern Africa – is consistent with the economic (e.g., urbanization), socio-
demographic (e.g., changes in families), and cultural specificities (e.g., patriarchal norms) of each sub-
region. As for the inequality analysis, I find that mating accounts for a non-negligible share (3 to 12 
percent, varying by sub-region) of the cohort-specific inequality in household assets, yet – in line with 
the literature from high-income societies – changes in mating over time hardly move the time trends 
in wealth inequality.  
Chapter 3 focuses on one single country in Northern Africa, Morocco, and builds on 
experimental data from a randomized policy evaluation – a cash-transfer intervention called “Tayssir” 
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– implemented throughout the country in rural areas between 2008 and 2010. The paper aims to shed 
new light on the interplay between household inequality – as driven by differential parental 
investments, gender, and unpaid care work dynamics – and children’s schooling. Specifically, I assess 
the impact of the cash transfer on school progression outcomes, defined as progressing through grades 
in a timely fashion, allowing for heterogeneity of the treatment along socio-demographic lines such as 
the gender of the child and the amount of time spent by children on unpaid care work prior to 
intervention implementation. As unpaid care work emerges as a negative predictor of school 
progression, the analysis concludes with an examination of whether the cash transfer had any effect on 
lessening the care burden itself. The data are publicly available from the online platform of the World 
Bank and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action (J-PAL) Lab.  
The study builds on the premise that girls in low-income contexts – such as rural settings in 
Middle-East and North-African countries – are often at higher risk of not completing primary 
education due to rooted traditions and moral and religious beliefs that perpetuate gender inequalities 
since young ages. These inequalities affect the role girls play within the household, the distribution of 
activities, and the amount of time spent on them, leading to unequal allocations of care tasks. In this 
work I bring a gender lens to the analysis of the effects of a cash transfer to investigate whether these 
household-level dynamics shape the effectiveness of the policy implemented. By assessing whether the 
impacts of the transfer on school progression differ by gender of the child and burden of unpaid care 
work prior to intervention implementation, I evaluate whether the disproportionate care burden 
affecting girls may – at least partly – explain differential educational outcomes among heterogeneous 
groups of children.  
My results show that a cash transfer explicitly tied to an educational purpose affected school 
progression on top of enrolment and attendance by stemming dropout (extensive margin of school 
participation) and increasing the likelihood of timely grade progression (intensive margin of school 
participation). While the former effect operated similarly for boys and girls, the latter was null for boys. 
In other words, the cash transfer was effective in reducing boys’ dropout, though it did not alter their 
grade progression path. Furthermore, while the effect of the intervention on dropout operated equally 
for children who performed unpaid care work versus those who did not, the beneficial effect of the 
treatment on timely grade progression was cut by a half to a third for girls overburdened by household 
chores. Therefore, as a result of the treatment girls engaged in unpaid care tasks were staying in school 
more but were less likely to progress on time. This claim lends itself to two implications. First, it points 
to the need to design policy interventions with the potential to help children attend and progress 
through school in a timely manner, as a monetary “nudge” might not be sufficient to simultaneously 
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achieve both goals. Second, it stresses the importance of tackling rooted gender inequalities within the 
household by directing policies to vulnerable children that may need ad hoc targeting.  
Besides dealing with family, gender, and educational dynamics, the proposed chapters share 
some other commonalities. First of all, they all center on LMICs, with a key focus on Africa. Chapters 
1 and 2 are very much related in other respects, as they are comparative in nature and aimed at 
understanding cross-country and/or cross-regional and inter-temporal variation in family dimensions 
in contexts that are undergoing rapid socio-economic change. Also, they both rely on micro-level DHS 
data to get at population-level processes. Not least, the two papers devote particular attention to the 
demographic nature of the phenomena under investigation by disentangling purely compositional 
factors from broader socio-demographic and behavioral considerations underlying the changing nature 
of families. For instance, in Chapter 1 we age-standardize age-sensitive indicators to ensure that 
comparisons identify the extent to which basic demographic trends – such as changing age structures 
– account for differences within/across countries versus more fundamental social processes that are 
arguably driving family changes. In a similar spirit, in Chapter 2 I am interested in determining whether 
mating patterns are driven by “mechanical” changes that result from proportionally faster increases in 
women’s education, versus behavioral responses related to the shifting value of education and spousal 
preferences for educational resemblance. In Chapter 1 we also compute indicators for fertility, 
marriage, and cohabitation that incorporate information on mortality (Net Reproduction Rate and life 
expectancies in the married and cohabiting states using the Sullivan method), claiming that bringing 
mortality into the picture is key in contexts that are experiencing rapid increases in life expectancy. 
These “demographically savvy” considerations interacting family domains with basic demographic 
forces such as fertility and mortality are essential when conducting comparative analyses, yet mostly 
overlooked in existing research.  
Indeed, there are numerous differences between the chapters. First is the scope of the research 
questions raised. Chapter 1 sets the stage for a whole research agenda on global family change by 
assessing changes across multiple family domains, while Chapter 2 focuses on a specific facet of family 
change, i.e., educational assortative mating, and Chapter 3 focuses on parental investments, educational 
policies, and children’s outcomes. Second is the geographical scope. While Chapter 1 is “global,” 
Chapter 2 is regional as it focuses on SSA, and Chapter 3 is country-specific as it focuses on Morocco 
only. Third are the data sources. While for Chapter 1 we use DHS combined with HDI data from the 
Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and 
official life tables from the World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision, for Chapter 2 I combine 
DHS with data on the International Wealth Index (IWI) from the Global Data Lab. For Chapter 3 I 
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use publicly available (World Bank/J-PAL) data from an existing randomized experiment. Lastly, 
throughout the dissertation I combine a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches from 
demography, sociology, and economics. Methodologies range from simple correlation coefficients and 
data visualization techniques to ordinary least squares – adapted to fit the growth convergence 
framework – contingency tables, log-linear models, counterfactual simulations, and more causally-
oriented approaches such as policy evaluation and quasi-experimental techniques (e.g., difference-in-
differences). 
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Chapter 1. Global Family Change: Persistent Diversity with Development 
 
1.0 Abstract 
This paper provides a broad empirical overview of the relationship between family change and socio-
economic development drawing on 30+ years of Demographic and Health Survey data from 3.5 
million respondents across 84 low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). We conduct two sets of 
analyses. First, we document global and regional-level associations between the Human Development 
Index (HDI) and novel indicators reflecting multi-dimensional family change. Second, we use methods 
from the growth convergence literature to examine whether – and in which domains – there is evidence 
of cross-country convergence in family indicators over levels of development. We show that families 
in LMICs have transformed in multiple ways, changing differently across domains, world regions, and 
genders. Fertility, intra-couple decision-making, and women’s life-course timing indicators are strongly 
associated with HDI, yet cross-country convergence is limited to the latter domain. Marriage, 
cohabitation, household structure, and men’s life-course timing indicators are more weakly associated 
with HDI, and span a broad spectrum of convergence dynamics ranging from divergence to modest 
convergence. We describe this scenario as “persistent diversity with development,” and shed light on 
the underlying regional heterogeneity – driven primarily by sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.1 Introduction  
The family remains a fundamental building block of human societies, affecting health, reproduction, 
and well-being of both present and future generations. Decades of sweeping demographic, economic 
and social change have radically transformed forms, gender roles, power relations, and 
intergenerational bonds of families worldwide (Bianchi 2014; Furstenberg 2014) – initially in high-
income countries (HICs), and more recently in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). At the 
global level, however, the process of change in families and family domains is inadequately understood 
(Ruggles 2012; Therborn 2014). This gap in knowledge about Global Family Change (GFC) is striking 
when compared to discrete socio-demographic events such as fertility, mortality, migration, and 
education, for which high-quality data exist across most world regions (e.g., UN World Population 
Prospects, Global Bilateral Migration Database, and Global Human Capital Project). No equivalent 
data resource exists for GFC. This paucity of comparable data capturing variation in family patterns 
over time and across space has limited scholars’ capacity to evaluate theories of GFC and its driving 
forces, and assess the interactions between GFC and broader social and economic development.  
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Transformations in families are a late-comer in social and economic changes occurring during 
the demographic transition, as declines in fertility and mortality are often preconditions for substantial 
systemic change that is associated to alterations in the life course of family members. While a lack of 
focus on family change might have been acceptable during the initial stages of the demographic 
transition, this is no longer the case. The preconditions for fundamental transformations of the families 
exist globally, and GFC has emerged as a central aspect of global social change. An improved 
understanding of GFC therefore constitutes a critical step in social scientists’ research on global 
change.  
Several potential drivers of GFC have been identified during recent decades, all of which are 
particularly relevant in LMICs: the largest-ever cohort of youth currently entering adulthood; dramatic 
technological change; rising economic uncertainty; longer lives and lower fertility; narrowing gender 
gaps in schooling and the labor market; globalization forces affecting the flow of information, goods 
and people across the globe. Families have adjusted in diverse and sometimes surprising ways to these 
forces (Therborn 2004). Arguably, the transformation of the family that has occurred across high-
income countries since the 1960s is currently entering its peak in LMICs. But GFC in LMICs is unlikely 
to be a simple extension of patterns observed in high-income countries (Furstenberg 2013). 
Heterogeneity in social, institutional, cultural and legal contexts, and differences in roles and functions 
of families may result in a diversity of GFC patterns that far exceeds the divergences in family 
trajectories that have been documented to date (Breen and Buchmann 2002).  
This paper provides a broad empirical overview of the relationship between family change and 
socio-economic development drawing on 30 years of Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data 
from 3.5 million respondents across 84 LMICs. We seek to advance the understanding of the changes 
in families that are occurring in many economically less developed nations by focusing on a set of 
agreed-upon domains that are key to the notion of the “family,” namely fertility, timing of life-course 
events, union formation (marriage and cohabitation), household structure, and intra-couple decision-
making.1 To this end, we first document global and regional-level associations between the Human 
Development Index (HDI) and novel indicators reflecting multi-dimensional family change. Second, 
we examine whether there is evidence of cross-country convergence in these indicators over levels of 
                                                           
1 We acknowledge that family change stems from the combination of complex, multiple, and concurrent 
processes that operate at different levels of analysis and cannot be fully captured through DHS data (e.g., 
coresidence with elderly). Yet we aim in this paper to measure change in some core dimensions that are well-
understood and agreed-upon as being central to the functioning of families. By focusing on these family domains, 
we by no means claim that these provide an exhaustive picture of the phenomenon – family change – under 
investigation, yet we claim that they provide a good starting point.  
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development and, if so, in which family domains. Our analysis draws on a growing literature on whether 
fertility is converging across contexts (Casterline 2001; Dorius 2008; Wilson 2001, 2011), and extends 
this literature to broader domains, such as timing of life-course events, union formation (marriage and 
cohabitation), household structure, and intra-couple decision-making.   
Our focus on GFC in this study takes the perspective of women (and men, partly) in young- 
and primary-adult (i.e., reproductive) ages, rather than old ages. The motivation is threefold. First, 
family change at these ages is tied to socio-economic considerations relating to household production 
and investments in children that are of particular relevance for LMICs. Second, existing paradigms of 
family change, such as the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory, have generally focused on 
young- and primary-adult ages. Third, our aim to consider multiple dimensions of GFC in the largest 
possible universe of countries requires the use of DHS data, which are generally restricted to ages 15–
49. We also focus on country-level analyses, as no similar comparative GFC studies exist to-date, and 
sub-national analyses will be addressed in subsequent GFC research.  
Our analysis makes three important contributions. First, we extend the literature to LMICs, 
where comparatively less is known about cross-country patterns in family transformations. Second, we 
rely on a wealth of micro-level data to compute innovative indicators accounting for key sources of 
demographic variability such as changing age distributions and increasing life spans. Third, we extend 
the fertility convergence literature to look at convergence trends in multiple family domains. In so 
doing, we move beyond most of the attempts at conceptualizing convergence in families, which have 
so far been embedded into fertility-related discussions (Casterline 2001).  
Our framework of analysis is summarized in the stylized graph below, along with a general 
overview of the findings (Figure 1.1). The plane is comprised of four quadrants defined by different 
combinations of weak/strong associations with HDI (x-axis, from left to right) and 
divergence/convergence patterns over HDI (y-axis, from bottom to top). Our diagrammatic 
representation points to each quadrant being occupied by at least one family domain, suggesting that 
families in LMICs are distinct in many possible ways, and changes in families with development occur 
differently across domains. A strong association with HDI is observed for fertility, intra-couple 
decision-making, and women’s life-course timing indicators, yet cross-country convergence over HDI 
is limited to the latter domain (top-right quadrant). The remaining domains are more weakly associated 
with HDI, and cover a broad spectrum of convergence dynamics ranging from divergence (marriage) 
to modest convergence over HDI (men’s life-course timing, cohabitation, and household structure 
indicators). We refer to this heterogeneity as “persistent diversity with development.” In what follows 
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we further describe and categorize this diversity, shedding better light on the underlying regional 
heterogeneity and the key role of sub-Saharan Africa in departing from the overall trends.   
1.2 Background 
Global families, quo vadis? 2 
More than fifty years ago, Goode’s World Revolution and Family Patterns predicted that, as a 
consequence of industrialization, family patterns would globally converge to a prevalence of the 
“conjugal family form” of the West (Goode 1963). He concluded that individuals had become less 
dependent on extended family groups during the industrial revolution in the West, and hypothesized 
that other societies would go through the same family changes as they, too, went through the 
industrialization and urbanization processes. According to a 50-year analysis of global family change, 
Goode’s prediction about the convergence of family systems in high-income countries and the rising 
prevalence of conjugal families has not been realized (Cherlin 2012). Over the second half of the 
twentieth century the Western family became complex in ways that Goode did not anticipate (e.g., the 
rise in cohabitation, single-parent families, and stepfamilies). Furthermore, Goode’s implicit 
assumption that all developing countries would follow the same path to industrialization did not come 
to fruition (Ruggles and Heggeness 2008). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been largely left behind due 
to economic crises and the AIDS epidemic that stressed the SSA family; the Middle-East and South 
Asia have struggled; progress in Latina America and Southeast Asia has been uneven, and only in East 
Asia has consistent economic growth occurred, along with changes in families consistent with Goode’s 
hypothesis of declining family control (Cherlin 2012).3  
More recently, scholars argued that changes in families are driven by a diffusion of new ideas 
about family forms via social networks, language and culture-based networks, and global 
communication networks (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011). The idea of change in families being driven by 
the interaction of socioeconomic development and ideational change has manifested itself in the theory 
of “developmental idealism,” i.e., the notion that in many societies around the world the Western 
family is associated with a higher form of development (Thornton 2001, 2005). Thornton demonstrates 
that the developmental paradigm included the belief that Western Europe had transitioned from a 
predominantly extended-family system to a predominantly nuclear family system during its progression 
through the stages of development (Cherlin 2012). A central tenet of this framework posits that 
                                                           
2 “Quo vadis” is a Latin expression meaning “Where are you heading?”. 
3 Goode did not really focus on Latin America, where signs of a Second Demographic Transition (SDT) can be 
seen even before the first transition is complete (Cherlin 2012).  
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modern social structures and modern family behaviors have reciprocal causal influences. Convergence 
in family systems is an implication of developmental idealism, in that one of the central values of the 
framework is the desirability of a modern family – compatible with the needs of an industrialized 
society – along the lines of the nuclear Western family form. 
However, the past half century has shown that there is not a singular pattern of family 
behaviors that constitutes “the modern family,” and thus the potential endpoint of converging family 
systems. Rather than convergence, scholars are increasingly emphasizing the continuity of long-
standing differences in family patterns, functions and behaviors across the world. At least in the area 
of fertility, divergent demographic trajectories have started to characterize high-income societies (Billari 
and Wilson 2001; Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016). Such persistent heterogeneity is also 
predicted by Therborn (2004, 2014), who postulates that two aspects of family change are certain: 
‘First, the family pattern will look different in different parts of the world, and the future will offer a 
world stage of varying family plays. Second, the future will not be like the past’ (2014, p. 3). Therborn 
argues that three social phenomena drive family change differently in different parts of the world – 
namely the decline of patriarchy, changes in marriage forms and prevalence, and fertility decline – 
thereby producing seven family systems that differ by different combinations of these factors.4 
The emerging hypothesis of a “convergence to divergence” in global family systems is not 
adequately reflected in other conceptual frameworks that are often invoked for guiding analyses of 
family change, including the two dominating lines of family research starting from work on the West: 
Becker’s New Home Economics (Becker 1981; Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977) and Lesthaeghe 
and van de Kaa’s SDT theory (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 2010, 2014). Both 
frameworks predict a weakening of the family due to women’s pursuit of career and ideational changes 
valuing individual autonomy and self-fulfillment. According to the SDT, ideational change triggers 
declines in fertility, which set in motion other life-course transformations such as less and later 
marriage, a multitude of living arrangements, a disconnection between marriage and procreation, and 
increased women’s independence inside and outside of unions. The SDT theory correctly anticipated 
the unfolding of different patterns of partnership formation, the shift in value orientations that 
emerged as driving forces in childbearing decisions – such as attitudes about politics, sex, religion, and 
education – and the emergence of sub-replacement fertility as a lasting feature of advanced societies. 
Albeit starting as a Western theory, it has been recently expanded to other regions such as East Asia 
                                                           
4 These are the Christian-European family, the Islamic West Asian/North African family, the South Asian family, the 
Confucian East Asian family, the sub-Saharan African family, the Southeast Asian family, and the Creole family.  
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(Lesthaeghe 2010) and Latin America (Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and López-Gay 2012), and broadened to 
account for the role of path dependency and geo-historical legacies (Esteve and Lesthaeghe 2016). 
Whether the theory applies to other regions that still lag behind in the demographic transition (e.g., 
SSA), or where religion protects and reinforces patriarchal kinship organizations (e.g., Islam) is still an 
open question (Cherlin 2012).   
Lastly, a very recent line of family research (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider, 
Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015; McDonald 2000) has theorized a new phase of family life 
characterized by a profound “gender revolution” that leads men and women to not only participate in 
the public sphere in equal terms, but also to share household and childrearing tasks more equitably 
than in the past. This theoretical foundation posits a long-run return to “more family” as gender 
egalitarianism gains increasingly normative status, and the predictions of fewer marriages, children, and 
greater couple instability show signs of reversal. Again, while the theory has proved applicable to some 
European countries, it is unclear whether it extends beyond European borders. If this theory has any 
applicability to LMICs, we will likely observe changes over the next decades. As of now, most LMICs 
might still be undergoing the “first half” of the gender revolution, characterized by dramatic growth in 
female labor force participation rates which bring challenges to family formation and union stability 
(Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). As trends are still underway, it might thus be 
premature to theorize a new “rosy” future for family life, especially at the global level (Cherlin 2016; 
England 2010).  
Convergence in a demographic perspective 
As the foundations of the convergence concept were initially developed within a demographic 
transition framework (Chesnais 1992), scholarly research to date has mostly dealt with mortality 
(Goesling and Firebaugh 2004; Janssen et al. 2016; McMichael et al. 2004; Montero-Granados, de Dios 
Jiménez, and Martín 2007; Neumayer 2003, 2004) and, to a lesser extent, fertility studies of convergence 
(Casterline 2001; Coleman 2002; Crenshaw, Christenson, and Oakey 2000; Dorius 2008; Wilson 2001, 
2011).5 Combined with modernization theory, this framework postulates that fertility and mortality 
rates vary overtime in a predictable and uniform manner, and less developed countries would follow a 
                                                           
5 The formal assessment of convergence trends in demographic behaviors is a fairly recent development, with 
some of the most influential contributions dating back to the early 2000s. For studies of convergence in health 
and life expectancy, see Goesling and Firebaugh (2004), Janssen et al. (2016), McMichael et al. (2004), Montero-
Granados, de Dios Jiménez, and Martín (2007), and Neumayer (2003, 2004). For studies of convergence in 
fertility, see Casterline (2001), Coleman (2002), Crenshaw, Christenson, and Oakey (2000) Dorius (2008), and 
Wilson (2001, 2011). For studies of convergence in broader living standard indicators such as wealth, educational 
enrolment, literacy, and television availability, see Jordá and Sarabia (2015), Kenny (2005), and Neumayer (2003). 
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path of economic and social progress similar to the one observed in more developed countries, thereby 
eventually converging in their fertility and mortality rates. The gradual transition from a high fertility 
and mortality scenario to one characterized by low vital rates would hence constitute the clearest 
example of demographic convergence (Salvini et al. 2015), pushing the world towards a new 
“demographic equilibrium” (Wilson 2001). 
Despite clear theoretical predictions, the most puzzling aspect of existing studies of global 
demographic convergence is the ambiguous nature of their findings. In the area of mortality, global 
convergence has been modest throughout the past half century, and has been replaced by divergence 
since the late 1980s (Goesling and Firebaugh 2004; Moser et al. 2005), due in large part to declining 
male life expectancy in Eastern Europe, and the spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 
area of fertility, research points towards high levels of inter-country and intra-regional variation in the 
pace of fertility decline (Casterline 2001). The only conclusive statistical evidence for convergence in 
fertility is found after the mid-1990s, about two decades after the onset of the decline in world mean 
fertility (Dorius 2008).  
Most important from the perspective of this paper, the demographic literature on convergence 
– with its heavy focus on the drivers of the demographic transition – shows evident gaps when it comes 
to embedding additional family dimensions in the picture.6 Most of the attempts at conceptualizing 
family change to date have been incorporated into broader discussions of fertility dynamics (Casterline 
2001; Ram 2012; Skinner 2014). For instance, it is undisputable that domains such as union formation 
and fertility are closely tied, and union formation remains a precondition for fertility in several contexts. 
Yet the shift in focus onto understanding global social change requires endorsement of the idea that 
changes in multiple domains of the family matter independently of changes in fertility (van de Walle 
1993). For instance, the changing frequency of the types of unions that occur in a society – customary 
or civil marriages with full social recognition versus informal or temporary unions – may influence the 
prevalence of female-headed households and the economic environment of children. Similarly, delays 
in the age at which men and women marry has implications for the organization of family life and for 
gender relations within society (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2005). 
Scholars have recently attempted to assess convergence in family dimensions such as marriage, 
cohabitation, divorce, though rarely has the focus been comparative and LMICs-oriented. For instance, 
Lundberg, Pollak, and Stearns (2016) documented diverging patterns in marriage, cohabitation, and 
childbearing over the last 60 years, but their focus is on comparing within-country trends among 
                                                           
6 A similar claim could be made for convergence studies in the area of migration. 
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population subgroups – more versus less-educated in the United States – rather than countries or world 
regions. Conversely, Billari and Wilson (2001) and Billari and Borgoni (2002) carried out cross-country 
comparative analyses of convergence in family dimensions and transition to adulthood markers such 
as early home leaving, timing of first union, total first marriage rate, and total divorce rate, but their 
focus is on European countries exclusively. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first 
comparative study to formally assess convergence in family indicators across multiple domains in 
LMICs. Our motivation is not to provide a further rejection of Goode’s model of family convergence, 
but to identify which domains have been converging and which have not, in order to build a more 
comprehensive and theoretically robust framework for understanding GFC in LMICs.  
1.3 Data and measures 
Data 
This paper uses repeated cross-sectional DHS data from 84 LMICs across five world regions (Figure 
1.2), namely Americas, Asia, Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). For the countries included, their regional 
classification, and the number (and year) of survey waves per country, see Appendix Table A1.1.7  
Our analyses include micro-level information from 293 DHS survey waves – on average five 
waves per country – collected between 1985 and 2016. We combine socio-demographic information 
from these surveys with HDI time series provided by the Human Development Report Office of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2015). The HDI is a summary measure of average 
achievement in three key dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life (“health 
and life expectancy”), being knowledgeable (“human capital”), and having a decent standard of living 
(“wellbeing”).8 The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions, 
and it ranks countries into four tiers of development, namely “very high” (>0.8), “high” (0.7- 0.799), 
                                                           
7 DHS samples are nationally representative cross-sections of the population selected via a two-stage procedure 
in which the primary sampling units most often correspond with census enumeration areas. Households are then 
randomly selected within each primary sampling unit, and all women aged 15-49 residing in the selected 
households are invited to participate. In some countries, a sample of men between the ages of 15 and 59 are also 
interviewed. DHS are collected by ICF Macro in collaboration with host country governments, and collect 
detailed information on fertility and marriage histories, population health, family planning, and anthropometrics. 
Standardization of survey questionnaires allows for comparability across countries and survey waves (ICF Macro 
2009).  
8 There is by now consensus that development is a multidimensional concept, which, in addition to income, also 
should consider social indicators. This line of argumentation has gained prominence among academics over the 
last decades, thus resulting in many attempts to synthesize different aspects of well-being, in a composite index 
which offers a more comprehensive perspective of such a process than per capita income alone (Jordá and Sarabia 
2015). 
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“medium” (0.550-0.699), and “low” (<0.550), thus providing a standardized measure of well-being 
across diverse contexts.9 We acknowledge that the composite nature of the HDI makes it less obvious 
to appreciate which socio-economic factors are more closely associated with family indicators, yet we 
rely on the HDI as the primary index used by the UNDP to monitor broadly-defined development 
goals (UNDP 2015). In doing so, our work aligns with a long stream of scholarly tradition in sociology, 
demography, and economics (Bijwaard and van Doeselaar 2014; Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Bystrov 
2014; Harttgen and Vollmer 2014; Kreidl and Hubatkova 2014; Jordá and Sarabia 2015; Myrskylä, 
Kohler, and Billari 2009; Tanaka and Johnson 2016). In the Appendix, we provide ancillary analyses 
using the three HDI-components separately, most of which support the conclusions reached using an 
HDI-based approach. 
In sum, our work encompasses all available DHS surveys 1985-2016, drawing information 
from about 3.5 million respondents, and representing the most comprehensive dataset for which these 
analyses are possible. By relying on high-quality surveys that provide comparable measures for a well-
defined universe of countries – such as the DHS – we face an obvious trade-off between country 
coverage and data quality. This resulted in the exclusion of important LMICs for which no DHS is 
available, such as China. We acknowledge that this is a limitation of our study, and we aim to extend 
GFC-analyses to China and other excluded LMICs in subsequent research. Yet we show in Appendix 
Figure A1.1 that the sample of DHS countries included in the analysis well covers the complete range 
of the development spectrum of LMICs.  
GFC-indicators 
We focus on five family domains: fertility, timing of life-course events, union formation (marriage and 
cohabitation), household structure (vertical, or inter-generational relationships), and intra-couple 
decision-making (horizontal, or intra-generational relationships). This multifaceted conceptualization 
reflects the complexities and interrelatedness of global family change, with 20 indicators classified along 
three conceptual axes of analysis (Figure 1.3): Family Events and Behaviors (FEB), Linked Lives (LL), 
and Life-Course Patterns (LCP). Best documented to date have been changes in indicators of family 
events and behaviors, such as increases in unmarried cohabitation prevalence, and delays in the timing 
of marriage and/or onset of sexual intercourse (Bongaarts, Mensch, and Blanc 2017; Hayford, Guzzo, 
and Smock 2014; Manning, Brown, and Payne 2014). Indicators of linked lives (Elder 2001) illustrate 
the extent to which GFC transforms social relations, both within and across generations. Life-course 
pattern indicators combine measures of fertility, marriage, and cohabitation with information on 
                                                           
9 We imputed missing values on the HDI for specific years using linear interpolation. 
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mortality conditions to capture the average number of years spent in different family “constellations” 
across the adult life-course. The rationale behind this latter group lies in the premise that many LMICs 
have experienced increases in life expectancy during the last three decades (UN-DESA Population 
Division 2017), driven in part by declines in young- and adult-age mortality. These mortality changes 
are important for understanding family change, for instance, because the person-years spent married 
by individuals can increase despite a delay in entering marriage and/or increased rates of marriage 
dissolution. Similarly, the number of surviving children decreases less than fertility, or might even 
increase, if development is also associated with declines in infant mortality. Prior studies of family 
change have not extensively featured the role of mortality on life-course family patterns (Bianchi 2014; 
Hagestad 1988). Overall, this multidimensional framework permits us to enrich the GFC literature by 
looking at global changes in domains other than fertility, and constructing indicators that have seldom 
been emphasized in previous scholarship. 
Indicators of family events and behaviors include the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), marriage and 
cohabitation prevalence, and a set of sex-specific timing indicators measuring mean ages at three critical 
life-course events – first sex, first marriage, and first birth – commonly used in prior analyses 
(Bongaarts, Mensch, and Blanc 2017). Following prior studies (Bongaarts and Blanc 2015; Clark and 
Brauner-Otto 2015), timing indicators are estimated using singulate mean ages (SMAFS: Singulate 
Mean Age at First Sex; SMAFM: Singulate Mean Age at First Marriage; SMAFB: Singulate Mean Age 
at First Birth), a methodology first developed for mean ages at first marriage (Hajnal 1953), and then 
adapted to the estimation of mean ages at first birth in contexts that lack accurate vital statistics 
(Bongaarts and Blanc 2015; Casterline and Trussel 1980; Booth 2001). The SMAFB relies on age-
specific proportions childless, and is defined as the average length of life with no children among those 
who have children before age 50. Analogous definitions and data requirements apply for the SMAFS 
and SMAFM.  
Indicators of linked lives are constructed combining information from the women’s file with 
information from the household roster. Intra-generational indicators are obtained from the women’s 
file and include the share of households in which the husband is the sole decision maker on women’s 
health, household purchases, and women’s visits to family and friends. Conversely, inter-generational 
indicators include the share of children living with both parents, and a set of three indicators measuring 
the share of women living in a nuclear (a household where only one couple resides, either with or 
without kids), three-generation (a household where at least one member of the household roster 
reports that his/her relationship to the household head is one of grandparent or grandchild), and 
complex household (a household where at least one member of the household roster reports a lateral 
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relationship with the household head). While the former indicator is obtained from the household 
roster only, the latter three are computed following a multi-step process that draws information on 
women’s living arrangements from both a woman and a household-level perspective. Essentially, in 
instances in which the household roster does not provide conflicting or additional information with 
respect to the categorization based on the woman’s perspective, the latter categorization is kept. 
Otherwise, both perspectives are combined to come up with a more precise categorization.10 By 
computing these indicators, we do acknowledge that our aim in this paper is not to capture coresidence 
patterns in society, but rather to capture the household context of women in reproductive ages – which 
may significantly differ from broader coresidence patterns in society described, for instance, in Ruggles 
(2009, 2010) and Ruggles and Heggeness (2008). For instance, we acknowledge that our indicators are 
a poor measure of coresidence with the elderly, which would require data on individuals aged 65 or 
older – which the DHS does not provide by design.11 
Life-course pattern indicators – comprising the Net Reproduction Rate (NRR), marital 
expectancy at age 15, cohabitation expectancy at age 15, and marital and cohabitation expectancy at 
age 15 – are constructed using mortality information from the UN Population Division’s World 
Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. We combine every DHS survey wave with available life 
tables from the year closest to the survey. We compute marital and cohabitation expectancies at age 15 
using the Sullivan method (Imai and Soneji 2007), widely used to estimate healthy life expectancy, yet 
rarely applied to the family realm. State-specific life-expectancies (or person-years spent in marriage, 
cohabitation, etc.) are obtained via  =  ∑ 	
   where 	
  are age-specific proportions in a 
certain state  computed from a survey (e.g., proportion of married women between ages 25 and 30), 
                                                           
10 In terms of household classifications, if the household includes more than one couple, then it is not classified 
as nuclear but complex. Households classified as complex are essentially those that deviate from the nuclear case. 
Note that a three-generation household can also be complex, and vice versa. The multi-step process followed to 
reach the above categorization combines information on women’s living arrangements obtained from both a 
woman and a household-level perspective. It proceeds as follows: (i) We first classify women in categories based 
on the information provided in the women’s file; (ii) We identify the household context using information on 
household members from the household-level file; (iii) We combine the woman and household-level perspectives 
in such a way that the categorization based on the woman’s perspective is kept if there is no additional or 
conflicting information provided in the household roster (otherwise the two are combined); (iv) We merge back 
to the woman-level to obtain estimates at the individual level (e.g., share of women living in nuclear households), 
rather than at the household level (e.g., share of nuclear households).  
11 It is not clear that the patterns that pertain to the 65+ population extend to the younger population, which is 
the focus of our paper. Actually, almost certainly the patterns are quite distinct. Therefore, the likely divergence 
of our findings to those in Ruggles is due to a focus on different parts of the life-course (broadly reproductive 
ages in our case, ages 65+ in Ruggles’ case), and the different patterns are not necessarily contradictory. In short, 
we acknowledge that we are likely to miss a considerable amount of co-residence by relying on DHS data, yet we 
can get some other relevant information from the perspective of women in reproductive ages.  
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and  and   are period life-table quantities. Expectancies are computed at age 15 as the DHS 
provide no data below 15.  
Our indicators are age-standardized to eliminate influences resulting from age-structure 
differences across countries.12 Age-structure differences can affect many indicators, such as the 
proportion married or the share of women living in a specific type of household, because age-groups 
are differentially weighted in country-averages. Age-standardization is thus critical – yet rarely adopted 
in comparative family studies – to ensure that comparisons identify the extent to which observed 
differences in indicators across countries are due to social processes underlying the changing nature of 
families, rather than driven by demographic considerations such as changing age structures. Age-
standardized indicators are computed by combining age-specific proportions from DHS micro-data 
with national age-structure data provided by the UN Population Division’s World Population 
Prospects: The 2015 Revision. All indicators are standardized to the 2000 age distribution for less 
developed countries excluding the least developed (2000 is the average survey year in the sample). 
Supplemental analyses show that age-standardization significantly shifts the observed distribution of 
age-sensitive indicators. For instance, cross-regional differences in marriage prevalence are narrower 
after age-standardization (Figure A1.2 in the Appendix), suggesting that findings based on crude 
indicators could lead to overstate (understate) the role of behavioral (compositional) factors underlying 
family changes. Descriptive statistics of GFC-indicators are shown in Table 1.1.13 All indicators and 
analyses will be made publicly-available. 
1.4 Associations between GFC-indicators and HDI 
Analytical strategy 
Our methodological approach proceeds in two stages. First, we conduct a series of descriptive analyses 
of family change indicators over levels of socio-economic development – as measured by HDI – in a 
spirit similar to Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2009) and Anderson and Kohler (2015). These 
exploratory investigations – purely descriptive and associational – are crucial to highlight comparative 
                                                           
12 Some indicators are already age-standardized, such as the TFR. Others were age-standardized by us. Age-
standardization was the main reason why we delved into the micro-data to compute our estimates, rather than 
simply borrowing aggregate information from online platforms such as the DHS StatCompiler.   
13 We would like to caution the reader that the number of observations (country-years) varies by indicator (as 
also mentioned in the note to the table), hence there might be some country-year observations included in the 
computation of, for instance, the SMAFB but not in the SMAFM. It follows that the comparison of the averages 
between indicators needs to be interpreted with caution. For instance, the Table shows that in MENA the 
SMAFM (23.49) is much higher than the SMAF (19.85). However, once the same set of country-year observations 
are retained the SMAFB increases to an average that is almost the same as the SMAFM.  
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macro-trends in family patterns, such as the clustering of countries or regions in specific domains. We 
plot each indicator against HDI, and assess whether a linear approximation summarizes the association 
reasonably well. To ease visualization and enable comparability across measures, we summarize the 20 
scatter plots in a single graph that reports standardized associations (slopes) from a linear regression 
of each indicator on HDI. Indicators and the HDI are standardized on the pooled sample so that 
coefficients reflect changes in indicators measured in standard deviation (SD), per one SD change in 
HDI. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, and estimates are weighted for the number of 
survey waves by country to account for the fact that some countries have repeated observations (e.g., 
11 waves in Peru) while others do not (e.g., one wave in Myanmar).  
Although avoiding any claims of causality, we test the robustness of the associations using 
both contemporaneous and lagged values of HDI (the latter reported in the Appendix) to – at the very 
least – assuage endogeneity concerns due to reverse causation. Also note that throughout the study we 
provide both global and regional evidence. Whenever we provide regional evidence, we remove one 
region at a time rather than running separate analyses by region, as for some regional groupings the 
number of country-years would be too limited to warrant an adequate sample size. By excluding one 
region at a time we are able to preserve sample variability and appraise the contribution that each 
excluded region provides to the overall association/coefficient. This approach is similar to Dorius 
(2008). 
Results 
Figure 1.4 summarizes the association between HDI and the 20 GFC-indicators. Indicators are 
grouped by color and shape, following the three-way conceptual classification in Figure 1.3. 
Corresponding scatter plots are provided in Appendix Figure A1.3. Note that the indicators in this 
graph – reported on the vertical axis – have been rephrased in terms of “trends,” as we are interested 
in comparing the strength of the positive association of the indicators with HDI. For instance, as the 
TFR is negatively associated with HDI, we rephrased the indicator “TFR” as “Reduction in TFR”. 
Each marker corresponds to the coefficient of a regression of the respective GFC indicator on HDI. 
Filled markers refer to statistically significant estimates (p-value<0.05), and larger markers indicate 
more precisely estimated associations. The detailed regression estimates are provided in Appendix 
Table A1.2 (panel [a]), along with robustness checks using lagged HDI values (panels [b] and [c]). 
Our analyses corroborate the well-established finding that increased socio-economic 
development is associated with lower fertility (Bryant 2007; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). A one 
SD increase in HDI – corresponding to approximately a 10-point increase in HDI on a 0-100 scale – 
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is associated with a 0.65 SD reduction in TFR. Accounting for mortality as reflected in the Net 
Reproduction Rate (NRR) weakens the association by about 0.1 SD, suggesting that reductions in 
infant mortality make the number of surviving children to decline less than overall fertility levels. The 
association of fertility with HDI is the strongest among those considered in this study, followed by 
decision-making indicators (horizontal linked-lives indicators) – in areas as varied as women’s health, 
freedom of movement, and purchases for the household – and timing indicators measured by the 
SMAFS, SMAFM, and SMAFB. For the latter, important gender differences emerge: statistically 
significant associations between timing indicators and HDI are found for women, while the 
relationship is weak and statistically insignificant for men. SMAFM is associated most strongly with 
development, followed in turn by SMAFB and SMAFS. This divergence is likely due to (mostly first) 
births increasingly occurring outside of marriage.  
Coefficients on indicators of family events and behaviors are aligned with SDT predictions of 
lower fertility, delayed markers of adulthood, and increased women’s autonomy associated with 
increases in HDI. As a complement to the SDT, which is mostly silent on gender convergence in the 
transition to adulthood, we also provide evidence of reduced gender differences: as women tend to 
have earlier ages at first sex, first marriage and first birth than men, the stronger association with HDI 
for women as compared to men is suggestive of a trend towards converging gender patterns in the 
transition to adulthood. This diminishing sex discrepancy is consistent with global trends towards 
women’s increasing commitment to education and labor force participation (Esteve et al. 2016). 
Vertical linked-lives indicators are more weakly associated with HDI than the above family 
events and behaviors and horizontal linked-lives indicators. While a one-SD increase in HDI is 
associated with a 0.2 SD gain in the share of children living with both parents, there is no significant 
association between HDI and the share of women living in nuclear and three-generation households. 
This finding somewhat departs from theories postulating an inverse association between household 
complexity and socioeconomic development (Goode 1963; Le Play 1884), yet it is consistent with the 
stability in traditional family forms found in analyses of intergenerational coresidence across 15 
developing countries by Ruggles and Heggeness (2008). We caution, though, that results are not fully 
comparable with census data from IPUMS, as with DHS we can only capture the living arrangements 
of women in reproductive ages.  
 Marital status indicators show that higher HDI is associated with a decline in marriage 
prevalence (0.2 SD reduction per 1 SD increase in HDI), while there is no statistically significant 
association with prevalence of cohabitation. Yet, once we account for period mortality conditions by 
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computing person-years (PY) lived married, marriage shows remarkable persistence, as the association 
with HDI turns insignificant and its magnitude is reduced by more than 50 per cent (0.08 SD). 
Conversely, differences between prevalence of cohabitation and the average number of years spent 
cohabiting are minimal, due to the fact that increases in cohabitation are driven by coresidence at 
relatively young ages, where the mortality effect is weakest. Summing the number of PY spent in 
marriage and cohabitation delivers an even clearer finding: increases in HDI are not associated with 
declines in the number of years adults spend in unions. This finding is due to reduced adult mortality 
and the increased person-years lived as adults that have occurred in LMICs in recent decades. When 
seen through the lens of life-course pattern indicators (rather than family events and behaviors) such 
as person-years in marriage or cohabitation, our descriptive analysis therefore suggests that during the 
development process, families in LMICs have not been characterized by dramatic shifts in patterns of 
union formation. Overall, the associations are robust to replacing contemporaneous HDI with 2-year 
and 5-year lagged HDI values (Appendix Table A1.2, panels [b] and [c]), and to substituting HDI with 
its components (Appendix Table A1.4 and Figure A1.4).14 
 Figure 1.5 expands our analyses in Figure 1.4 to consider heterogeneity by region. 
Following the same approach, each line in Figure 1.5 reports five (rather than one) markers that 
correspond to the coefficients of a linear regression of the respective indicator on HDI, excluding one 
world region at a time (e.g., the red circle in the NRR line captures the association between the NRR 
and HDI on the pooled sample excluding the Americas). The cross (x) locates the global association 
provided in Figure 1.4. Filled markers indicate statistically significant estimates (p<0.05). Detailed 
regression estimates are provided in Appendix Table A1.3. For each line, markers that are clustered 
near each other indicate cross-regional homogeneity in the estimated association between the indicator 
and HDI. Close markers suggest that removing regions does not affect the association to a significant 
extent, i.e., no particular region is driving the association in either direction. This is the case for the 
TFR, with the association with HDI robust to the exclusion of each region, and stable around 0.6-0.7 
SD. The case of the NRR is similar, although excluding SSA here results in a stronger association with 
HDI (0.63 SD versus the 0.54 SD shown in Figure 1.4). This is reasonable, as SSA has experienced 
substantial mortality declines along with increases in HDI in recent decades. Figure 1.5 reveals varying 
degrees of cross-regional homogeneity in women’s timing and decision-making indicators. 
Homogeneity is particularly pronounced for women’s SMAFM and intra-household decision-making 
                                                           
14 Note that in panel [b] of Appendix Table A2 the HDI is lagged by two years – rather than one – because some 
demographic estimates are obtained from DHS surveys which were collected over two years. Therefore, by taking 
the HDI value two years before we make sure we are not taking any contemporaneous value.  
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on women’s visits to family and friends, while for decision-making on women’s health, excluding SSA 
would result in a stronger positive association with HDI (0.72 SD versus 0.55 SD shown in Figure 1.4).  
The regional picture for vertical linked-lives indicators is complex, as the Americas contribute 
to making the positive association between HDI and the share of children living with both parents 
smaller than it would be, while the null or weak associations between HDI and the share of women 
living in nuclear and three-generation households is mostly driven by SSA and Asia. The case of SSA 
is also interesting in that the share of women living in a three-generation household is positively 
correlated with HDI Although further research (beyond the scope of this paper) is needed to untangle 
why this is the case, we suspect this is due to rapid demographic changes in the region, such as fastest 
mortality declines which increase young generations’ opportunities to reside with parents or have a 
living grandparent (Ruggles and Heggeness 2008). The influence of the HIV epidemic and differential 
patterns of migration might also play an explanatory role. Lastly, consistent with prior findings on 
heterogeneous trends in men’s ages at reproductive transitions (Bongaarts, Mensch, and Blanc 2017), 
the highest cross-regional heterogeneity in the associations is observed for men’s timing indicators. 
Overall, it is worth noting that coefficients excluding SSA are most often at the lower or upper 
extremes of each line (with Former USSR at the opposite end, yet somewhat less distal from the 
average), suggesting that SSA is the region that contributes the most to the observed heterogeneity. 
Excluding SSA, regional trends would depart less from global trends in the associations between HDI 
and family domains. For instance, in the absence of SSA we would observe stronger associations 
between HDI and NRR reduction, delay in mean ages at first birth, women’s empowerment, decline 
in the share of women living in complex households, and decline in years spent in marriage or 
cohabitation.  
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 combined suggest strong associations between women’s family events and 
behaviors and horizontal linked-lives indicators and human development, with little cross-regional 
variability. Conversely, men’s family events and behaviors, vertical linked-lives, and life-course pattern 
indicators are more weakly associated with HDI, and the associations show widespread heterogeneity. 
However, associational evidence of this kind provides little guidance to understand how change 
unfolds over advances in development. Specifically, it does not tell us whether LMICs are becoming 
more “similar” as HDI improves, and whether the extent of intercountry variability in family indicators 
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narrows as countries move along the development path.15 In what follows we carry out formal 
assessments of the convergence hypotheses outlined in the background section.   
1.5 Convergence in GFC-indicators over HDI 
Analytical strategy 
To delve into dynamics of change, we complement the previous cross-sectional investigation with 
formal statistical analyses of whether there has been convergence in family indicators over HDI using 
approaches pioneered by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1996), and Dorius (2008) – see 
also Gächter and Theurl (2011), Jordá and Sarabia (2015), Salvini et al. (2015), and Janssen et al. (2016) 
for more recent applications. Differently from previous related scholarship (e.g., Dorius 2008), we 
explore whether convergence has occurred over levels of socio-economic development rather than 
time. Specifically, we test for convergence over HDI, and report parallel analyses for convergence over 
HDI per unit of time (“pace of development”) in the Appendix (Table A1.6). 
Our analysis tests for beta-convergence (), that is, the catching-up of countries “lagging 
behind” in specific indicators. In line with Dorius (2008), we estimate -convergence following 
equation 1, where ln is the natural log, subscript  refers to the jth country,   is the value of the 
demographic indicator observed in survey year i+n,  is the value of the same demographic indicator 
observed in survey year i, (, − ,) is the difference in the value of the HDI between two 
repeated cross-sections (  and  !) for the same country ,  is the convergence coefficient, " is the 
constant, and  is the error term for the jth country.16  
#$,% − #$,%(, − ,) = " + $,% +                                                      (1) 
For every country, each previous cross-sectional survey forms the base measurement for the 
calculated growth rate. Hence, if a country has three repeated cross-sections, two growth rates are 
calculated over the corresponding periods. It follows that the set of country-years included in this 
second stage of the analysis is reduced (henceforth, “convergence sample”), as countries with only one 
survey are automatically excluded (i.e., 26 countries – and 26 survey waves – are excluded, resulting in 
                                                           
15 We acknowledge that this study does not focus on within-country inequalities, which may contribute to 
explaining some of the outlined trends, yet further GFC research will pick up on this point.  
16 When we test for convergence over HDI per unit of time (“pace of development”), the denominator (, − ,) is replaced with (, − ,)/n , where n is the number of years between the 
two repeated cross-sections.  
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a sample of N=267 country-year combinations and 58 countries). For an overview of the countries 
with only one DHS survey, see Appendix Table A1.1. In Appendix Table A1.5 we show that averages 
of the GFC-indicators between the overall sample (N=293) and the convergence sample (N=267) are 
quite aligned. As the DHS countries with one survey are primarily from the Former USSR region, some 
differences emerge for the TFR and NRR (higher in the convergence sample) and the timing indicators 
(lower in the convergence sample). Differences are, however, small, and unlikely to invalidate our 
findings. If anything, the convergence sample is more representative of the low-income (rather than 
low and middle-income) world.  
A negative sign on the -convergence coefficient indicates that lagging countries are catching 
up with leading countries, i.e., they are converging; a coefficient not significantly different from zero 
indicates that differences between countries are maintained, while a positive coefficient indicates that 
lagging countries are falling farther behind, i.e., they are diverging. Applied to fertility, for instance,  -
convergence occurs when the rate of decline among countries with high fertility is greater than the rate 
of decline among countries with low fertility. In line with the literature, we complement tests for -
convergence with analyses of sigma-convergence ()), the reduction of between-country variability – as 
measured by the coefficient of variation (CV) – in indicators over HDI levels.17 Sigma-convergence 
analyses are reported in the Appendix.  
There is much debate in the literature on the appropriateness of using population weights in 
these types of analyses. Early studies of inter-country dynamics treated each country equally as the 
principal units of interest were economies. Subsequent scholarship suggested that whenever the 
research focus is on individuals, then countries should be weighted by population size/shares 
(Firebaugh 1999; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997). In this study country-years are the main units of 
analysis, hence we opt for the former approach. Doing so ensures that a change in Y for a large country 
like India does not disproportionately affect the estimates as compared to a similar change for a smaller 
country like Malawi.18   
                                                           
17 We assess trends in the repeated cross-sectional coefficient of variation (CV) for each family change indicator. 
The CV is the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean of each indicator at the country level. While 
there is no “cut-off point” for the CV to define high or low variability, this approach permits to comparatively 
assess which indicator displays more heterogeneity. A negative trend in the CV implies a decline in the variability 
relative to the mean, i.e., convergence; a flat trend implies differences are maintained; and a positive trend implies 
increasing heterogeneity, i.e., divergence. Sigma-convergence analyses are a natural complement for -
convergence analyses in that the latter is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the former to hold (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Young, Higgins, and Levy 2008). 
18 In line with Neumayer (2004), Kenny (2005), and Dorius (2008), weighted and unweighted estimates differ 
significantly. As our focus is on country-years, we do not report the former (results available upon request).  
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Results 
Table 1.2 reports results from a -convergence model where the growth rate of each indicator over 
HDI is regressed onto its initial level.19 Panel [a] provides global estimates, while panel [b] provides 
estimates on the sample excluding one region at a time, in an effort to isolate the contribution that 
each region provides to the overall global convergence coefficient. The left column of panel [a] reports 
coefficients from an unconditional  -convergence specification, while the right column controls for 
region-specific dummies to account for within-region heterogeneity, thereby providing conditional -
convergence estimates (Lall and Yilmaz 2001).20 Conditional -convergence estimates imply that 
pathways of convergence hinge upon the structural specificities of each region.  
Despite the majority of coefficients are negative in sign – thereby pointing to convergence – 
statistical evidence of global convergence (panel [a]) is limited to a narrow subset of indicators, namely 
women’s timing indicators (SMAFS, SMAFM, and SMAFB) and the number of person-years spent in 
unions (marriage plus cohabitation). Unconditional -convergence estimates offer no evidence of a 
catching-up process in fertility (TFR and NRR), thereby aligning with Dorius’s (2008) analysis of global 
convergence in fertility over time, which shows that knowing the initial value of the TFR for the 
average country tells little about subsequent fertility decline over a 50-year time span (except for limited 
periods such as the 1995-2005 decade). Controlling for regional dummies provides some evidence of 
within-region convergence for the NRR and, in line with Dorius (2008), our estimates align with the 
idea that sub-Saharan African countries exert a braking effect on the global -convergence coefficient. 
The regional counterfactuals (panel [b]) indicate that, without these countries, the sign of the -
coefficient would turn from null/positive to negative, leading to a 1.3 per cent decline in the growth 
rate of the NRR over HDI in response to a one-unit increase in initial NRR. Conversely, excluding any 
other region would leave the global convergence coefficient virtually unchanged.  
The idea that family change trajectories may follow different patterns by gender – suggested 
in Figure 1.3 – is confirmed by strong cross-country convergence in women’s (but not men’s) 
postponement of first sex (SMAFS), first marriage (SMAFM), and first birth (SMAFB). For instance, 
a one-year increase in initial SMAFM for women reduces the average growth rate over HDI by about 
0.1 per cent. This gender discrepancy is likely to lead to growing similarities in transition to adulthood 
                                                           
19 The computation of growth rates over HDI yields extreme values due to small changes in the HDI between 
survey waves (∆, i.e. the denominator of the rate). In our preferred specification, we exclude outliers that 
fall outside the first quartile (Q1) minus three times the interquartile range (IQR), and the third quartile (Q3) plus 
three times the IQR.  
20 With the addition of region fixed-effects we are assuming different intercepts for each region, but common 
speed of convergence (i.e. same slope).  
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patterns between the sexes, thereby affecting couple-formation strategies and patterns of assortative 
mating by age and education (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2005). Again, panel [b] provides some 
evidence for the unique role of SSA yet, differently from above, excluding SSA would result in weaker 
– rather than stronger – convergence coefficients. SSA countries are therefore seemingly speeding up 
the convergence process in women’s timing indicators.  
Horizontal and vertical linked-lives indicators show negative yet non-significant coefficients, 
hinting at persistent differences with development. In a way that parallels fertility indicators, LMICs 
would be more strongly converging with development in intra-household decision-making in the 
absence of SSA, suggesting that countries in SSA are lagging behind other regions when it comes to 
improvements in intra-household bargaining. Similarly, coefficients on vertical linked-lives indicators 
indicate that heterogeneity within MENA and Former USSR drives results away from convergence in 
the share of women living in nuclear and three-generation households, while heterogeneity within SSA 
drives results away from divergence in the share of children living with both parents. 
Lastly, marriage prevalence is the only domain in which clear evidence of divergence over HDI 
is observed, implying that countries where marriage prevalence is high have experienced a relatively 
slower decline in marriage as compared to countries where marriage prevalence is low. Note that these 
divergence trends are driven by the Americas, and findings excluding these countries would be 
consistent with a scenario of persistent differences with development. Combined with the observation 
that women across the world are converging in their mean age at first marriage – and in cohabitation 
practices, at least within regions – these findings suggest that in the realm of union formation we are 
likely to observe the emergence of heterogeneous clusters of countries varying by different 
combinations of marriage prevalence and timing. 
Beta-convergence estimates over HDI per unit of time – reported in Appendix Table A1.6 – 
fully confirm our evidence of (i) global convergence in women’s (but not men’s) timing indicators and 
person-years spent in unions, (ii) global divergence in marriage prevalence, (iii) within-region 
convergence in fertility and cohabitation, and (iv) the peculiar role of regions (mostly, SSA) in slowing 
down or speeding up global convergence patterns.  
Analyses of )-convergence over HDI – reported in Appendix Figure A1.5 – show a good 
degree of consistency with -convergence coefficients except for timing indicators, which display too 
little variability to detect meaningful trends. The linked-lives decision-making indicators follow an 
inverted-U shape, confirming that sub-Saharan African countries – with mean HDI around 0.45 – 
contribute the most to divergence patterns in these family domains. These findings align with the idea 
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that in the absence of countries in the lowest HDI tiers, LMICs would converge towards more equal 
intra-household dynamics. Moreover, while variability is increasing in the share of married women, it 
is unambiguously decreasing for cohabitation indicators, confirming trends towards convergence in 
cohabitation practices. 
1.6 Conclusions and discussion  
This paper has provided a comprehensive empirical assessment of the relationship between family 
change and socio-economic development drawing on 30 years of survey data from 3.5 million 
respondents across 84 LMICs. We conducted two sets of analyses. First, we documented – in a 
descriptive and cross-sectional way – global and regional-level associations between HDI and novel 
indicators reflecting multi-dimensional family change. Second, focusing on this same set of indicators 
we explored whether – and in which domains – families in LMICs have converged over levels of 
development. In this second effort, our analysis built on Dorius (2008), and extended his focus to 
domains other than fertility, thereby becoming the first study to expand the GFC literature to cross-
country analyses of convergence across multiple family domains in LMICs.  
We documented strong associations between HDI and women’s indicators of family events 
and behaviors and horizontal linked lives, with little cross-regional variability. Conversely, HDI is more 
weakly associated with men’s family events and behaviors, vertical linked-lives, and life-course pattern 
indicators, exhibiting regional idiosyncrasies that call for a more contextualized understanding of GFC. 
Although the emerging picture is complex and opens several research avenues, this simple analysis has 
value in that it questions the narrative that fertility and family change are closely synchronized during 
the demographic transition. Moreover, the conceptualization of family change adopted emphasizes the 
importance of interacting multiple axes of analyses – such as measures of both prevalence and timing, 
horizontal and vertical dynamics, and person-years in diverse constellations – with underlying 
demographic considerations such as increasing life expectancy and changing age structures. While in 
contexts like Europe or the United States neglecting mortality trends in studies of family change is 
likely to distort analyses to a minimal extent, our life-course pattern indicators point to a significant 
and oft-neglected role of mortality in shaping family trends across LMICs, particularly in SSA where 
recent mortality declines have been fastest. The “mortality effect” is most pronounced for union 
formation, where the combination of delays in marriage timing and increases in life expectancy suggest 
that the overall number of years spent in unions has remained unchanged across wide ranges of 
development.  
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Looking at the findings from a general theory of convergence, we provided evidence of global 
convergence in some dimensions of families over HDI, such as the timing of women’s life-course 
events and person-years spent in unions (mainly driven by cohabitation), accompanied by persistent 
differences and/or divergence in other domains, such as marriage prevalence. With reference to the 
timing indicators, we identified clear gender differences whereby countries are converging towards 
delayed first sexual intercourse, first marriage, and first birth for women, but less so for men. Whether 
these changes are purely structural, because more women live in cities and have gained schooling – 
factors that tend to delay the passage into adulthood – or whether they represent a profound 
transformation in the patterns of early and universal marriage that affect the entire population is a 
question that cannot be convincingly settled through this initial analysis (though we expect to pursue 
this and related questions in future GFC papers). The changes are certainly linked with deep family 
transformations and are accompanied by, or perhaps in part caused by, increasing female independence 
inside and outside of unions.  
Overall, our results combined suggest that families in LMICs have transformed in multiple 
ways, with changes occurring differently across domains, world regions, and sexes. The picture that 
best conforms to our findings is one of persistent diversity with development. Also, a point that is clear 
from the analysis is that development is not a powerful driver of convergence for all outcomes, 
suggesting the need to take into account additional factors that might contribute to explaining the 
observed heterogeneity. Among these, GFC scholars need to better consider geo-historical legacies 
and long-standing differences in social and economic institutions (Esteve and Lesthaeghe 2016), which 
play a role in shaping how globalization impacts upon life-course patterns. The main institutional 
considerations that might enlighten the understanding of the demography of adult life in LMICs are 
those which pertain to the education system, and the housing and labor markets (Furstenberg 2014; 
Grant and Furstenberg 2007). Some of these factors are embedded in indicators of human 
development, yet these macro-measures miss deeper elements underlying global social change, such as 
the path-dependent nature of institutions, institutional and cultural constraints, social norms, and the 
intangible role of diffusion processes in promoting or hindering change.  
Our study has implications for theorization on global family change. First, our results engage 
with the convergence hypothesis advanced by Goode (1963) by suggesting a more nuanced 
categorization of convergence dynamics whereby convergence is “partial” and limited to specific 
domains. The idea that convergence towards the nuclear family type of the West has not occurred is 
not new and has been widely accepted by scholars over the past decades (Cherlin 2012, 2017). This 
paper enriches existing knowledge by providing further evidence of which domains are experiencing 
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cross-country convergence. Second, our findings of a positive association between HDI and women’s 
family events and behaviors and horizontal linked-lives indicators align with the SDT theory, reflecting 
the so-called “postponement” (i.e., the upward shifts in ages at marriage and first births) and “non-
conformist” (i.e., the growth of alternative family formation strategies and the rise of individualization) 
transitions (Lesthaeghe and López-Gay 2013). However, the SDT proponents claim that the weakening 
of the institution of marriage is one of the main features of the SDT (Zaidi and Morgan 2017). Our 
focus on life-course pattern indicators accounting for mortality (PY) suggests that this conclusion is 
less likely to hold in the context of LMICs.21 Third, our findings provide an empirical assessment of 
Therborn’s postulated diversity of global “family systems” (2004). Although in this paper we do not 
deal with family systems – and we are hence not able to conclude that there are seven persistent family 
systems worldwide – our findings align with Therborn’s idea that families are ‘on the whole not 
converging and in some respects rather diverging; they will also characterize the world in the 
foreseeable future’ (Therborn 2014, p. 3). Lastly, our findings on reduced imbalances in intra-couple 
decision-making and sex-discrepancies in timing of life-course events engage with the “gender 
revolution” framework predicting an increasing role of men in sharing household and childrearing 
tasks more equitably – which in turn translates into more gender-equal marriages and partnerships 
(Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). 
The emerging picture of persistent diversity with development – along with the GFC patterns 
that stem from the computation of innovative life-course pattern indicators – have important 
implications for understanding the social and economic consequences of global development and 
globalization, and should be considered in the policy for sustainable development and for increasing 
individual and family well-being. For instance, although development is associated with declines in 
fertility and delays in marriage, which in turn unfold along with more gender-equal dynamics within 
couples, unresolved remains the question of whether, globally, higher empowerment within the 
household translates into increasing female independence outside of unions, and how existing 
institutional support enhances female agency by reconciling family life and labor market opportunities. 
Given the heterogeneity of institutional, cultural, and policy contexts across LMICs, further research 
is required to investigate the extent to which gender equity in individual-oriented institutions combines 
with gender-equity in family-oriented institutions to sustain or hinder these trends (McDonald 2000). 
Other considerations stem from implications of family change for child wellbeing during development.  
                                                           
21 Also, the SDT is rather silent on dimensions of household composition, such as our vertical linked-lives 
indicators.  
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Closely related to these policy considerations is the role of sub-Saharan Africa that emerges 
from this study. Countries in SSA – the region with the lowest levels of HDI – turn out to be those 
that contribute the most to the observed global heterogeneity, both in terms of associations of GFC-
indicators with HDI and of -convergence patterns. Figure 1.6 reproduces Figure 1.1 showing how 
the framework modifies if we exclude SSA from the convergence analysis. After removing SSA 
countries we move from covering the whole plane (i.e., four quadrants) to two polarized quadrants 
(bottom-left and top-right), thereby suggesting a significant decrease in “persistent diversity with 
development.” The peculiar nature of SSA is apparent in the area of fertility (Bongaarts and Casterline 
2013; Shapiro and Hinde 2017) and intra-couple decision-making, where detailed estimates show that 
the world would converge towards lower fertility and increased women’s empowerment in the absence 
of SSA. We take this evidence as suggesting that further advances in dimensions of development such 
as education, literacy, income, and health within SSA might contribute to reducing disparities across 
regions and put the developing world on a more defined convergence trajectory. Although a 
convergence trajectory in these domains is not desirable per se, it is deemed beneficial to the extent 
that it is also conducive to longer human capital investments, higher female labor force participation 
rates, and increased compatibility between family life and economic success.  
This study has important limitations that lay the ground for subsequent research. First, we 
acknowledge that in various world regions differentiating factors other than those captured in the UN 
HDI are at work. We recognize that the HDI may be subject to criticism for its “narrowness” and 
inadequacy in capturing all possible dimensions of development. The HDI has also been criticized on 
the grounds of construction (Kelley 1991), selection of variables (Srinivasan 1994; Alkire 2002), 
arbitrary weighting scheme (McGillivray and White 1993), and redundancy with its components 
(Cahill 2005; McGillivray 1991; Ravallion 1997). Yet our study is cross-country and comparative in 
scope and, as such, it encompasses multiple family dimensions across a wide range of countries. This 
inevitably requires reliance on a set of summary measures that are well-known and broadly 
understandable. Second, the synthetic-cohort nature of some of our indicators relies on the stationarity 
assumption, which may not hold when different cohorts undergo changes in family domains at 
different times and under different conditions. Although using age-specific proportions may be an 
alternative option, we believe there is no better measure a priori.22 Third, it is likely that the quality of 
data pertaining to cohabitation and household composition might not be fully reliable, and the variables 
used might not be measured in exactly the same way and/or attributed the exact same meaning across 
                                                           
22 Actually, if measurement error is not correlated with age, these all-age (15-49) measures might be more reliable 
than age-specific proportions.  
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time and space (Ruggles 2012; van de Walle 1993). DHS data were collected in a comparable manner 
in all countries, yet the differing cultural norms and practices regarding formation and dissolution of 
unions can affect the way in which respondents report their marital status (Shapiro and Gebreselassie 
2014; Westoff, Blanc, and Nyblade 1994). This is particularly so given the well-documented multiplicity 
of conceptualizations and definitions of marriage (which has a direct effect on the definition of living 
together or cohabiting) in SSA (Hertrich 2002; Mokomane 2006). Similarly, some studies – mostly 
from the African context – have shown that survey data may be problematic when measuring 
household structure due to the country-to-country variability in the definition of households (Randall 
and Coast 2015; Randall et al. 2015). These concerns pose a threat to the validity of the estimates and 
suggest that findings in these areas need to be handled with care. Nevertheless, we embrace the view 
that for data quality to be improved in the future, presently available information ought to be used to 
produce comparative research, despite its flaws. Lastly, this study does not adequately incorporate the 
idea that countries are not independent entities but are part of an international system or network that 
extends across international borders which, by means of peer influence and concerted efforts (e.g., 
family planning programs), is likely to shape some family domains more than others (Cherlin 2012). 
Future GFC analyses will pick up on these important points.   
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1.8 Tables 
Table 1.1: Summary statistics on HDI and GFC-indicators, by region 
 
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of survey waves available per country. N refers to the number of 
country-year combinations. As the actual number of observations is indicator-specific (i.e., not the same set of 
country-years is included in the computation of each indicator), the reported N refers to the maximum number 
of observations per group across all indicators. FEB: “Family events and behaviors”, LL: “Linked lives”; LCP: 
“Life-course patterns”. Information on cohabitation, sexual intercourse, and timing indicators for men is not 
available for MENA countries.  
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division. 
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Table 1.2: Beta-convergence over HDI, global (panel a) and regional (panel b) analysis. Beta-
convergence coefficients reported 
 
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of survey waves available per country. Note that MENA countries 
report no indicators for SMAFS (women and men), SMAFM (men), SMAFB (men), prevalence of cohabitation, 
average number of years spent cohabiting, and average number of years spent married and cohabiting. Therefore, 
the regional coefficient corresponding to MENA for those indicators is equivalent to the pooled ‘global’ one. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level. Estimates weighted by the number of survey waves per country. 
Contemporaneous values of HDI used. Regional dummies not included in panel b.  
Sig: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
No 
controls
Regional 
dummies
Americas Asia
Former 
USSR
MENA SSA
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Net Reproduction Rate (NRR) 0.003 -0.021* 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.008 -0.013+
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
SMAFS, women -0.001* -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SMAFS, men -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SMAFM, women -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SMAFM, men -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
SMAFB, women -0.001* -0.002** -0.001* -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SMAFB, men -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Husband decides about women's health (prop. HH) -0.000 -0.063 0.039 0.086 -0.046 -0.010 -0.442+
(0.091) (0.092) (0.088) (0.102) (0.086) (0.095) (0.255)
Husband decides about household purchases (prop. HH) -0.040 -0.131 -0.002 -0.030 -0.047 -0.037 -0.541*
(0.075) (0.118) (0.061) (0.103) (0.081) (0.074) (0.202)
Husband decides about women's visits (prop. HH) 0.064 -0.103 0.036 0.095 0.033 0.068 -0.321+
(0.088) (0.124) (0.099) (0.101) (0.089) (0.087) (0.179)
Children living with both parents (prop.) -0.012 -0.010 -0.016 -0.012 -0.008 -0.024+ 0.038**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Women living in a nuclear  household (prop.) -0.073 -0.064 -0.069 -0.065 -0.082+ -0.071 -0.054
(0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.051)
Women living in a three-gen . household (prop.) -0.098 -0.110 -0.097 -0.093 -0.108 -0.132+ -0.013
(0.064) (0.073) (0.067) (0.074) (0.072) (0.066) (0.084)
Women living in a complex  household (prop.) -0.054 -0.061 -0.053 -0.040 -0.062 -0.066 0.009
(0.040) (0.074) (0.046) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) (0.065)
Prevalence of marriage (prop.) 0.042* 0.017 0.025 0.036* 0.043* 0.041* 0.068**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
Marital expectancy at age 15 (yrs) 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Prevalence of cohabitation (prop.) -0.086 -0.168+ -0.097 -0.081 -0.153+ -0.086 0.136
(0.091) (0.097) (0.111) (0.097) (0.086) (0.091) (0.195)
Cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) -0.001 -0.005+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.005+ -0.001 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Marital and cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
a. Global b. Region excluded
Indicator
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1.9 Figures 
Figure 1.1: Framework of analysis and general overview of findings 
 
Notes: This is a stylized diagram that builds on pooled (i.e., all LMICs combined) associations and coefficients 
presented throughout the paper. The horizontal axis measures the association of indicators of family change with 
HDI. Note that the association of family change indicators with HDI can be negative (e.g., fertility is negatively 
associated with HDI), yet the above graph summarizes the strength of association, i.e., it abstracts from the signs 
of the coefficients. The vertical axis measures convergence over HDI (specifically, beta-convergence, as defined 
later in the paper). The gray line that cuts the plane horizontally corresponds to a null beta-convergence 
coefficient, pointing to persistent differences, i.e., neither convergence (above the gray line) nor divergence 
(below the gray line).  
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Figure 1.2: Map of countries included in the analysis. 293 DHS survey waves available for 84 
LMICs, grouped into five regions: Americas, Asia, Former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), Middle-East and North Africa (MENA), and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
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Figure 1.3: Conceptual axes of analysis and indicators of Global Family Change (GFC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family Events and Behaviors (FEB)
(Total Fertility Rate, % women married, % women living in a cohabiting 
union, singulate mean age at first sexual intercourse by gender, singulate mean 
age at first marriage by gender, and singulate mean age at first birth by gender)
Linked Lives (LL)
(Vertical: Children living with both parents (%), share of women 
living in nuclear, three-generation, and complex households 
Horizontal: Intra-household decision making on women’s health, 
household purchases, and visits)
Life-Course Patterns (LCP)
(Net Reproduction Rate, marital expectancy at age 15, cohabitation 
expectancy at age 15, marital and cohabitation expectancy at age 15)
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Figure 1.4: Associations between HDI and GFC-indicators, global analysis 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported. The central point corresponds to the estimated slope of the 
relationship. The area of each marker is inversely proportional to the spread of the distribution of each indicator. 
Filled markers identify statistically significant estimates (p-value<0.05). Standard errors clustered at the country 
level. Estimates weighted by the number of survey waves per country. Contemporaneous values of HDI used.  
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
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Figure 1.5: Associations between HDI and GFC-indicators, regional analysis 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported. Each point corresponds to the estimated slope of the relationship 
for the overall sample, excluding the region that corresponds to the respective color. Filled markers refer to 
statistically significant estimates (p-value<0.05). Note that MENA countries report no indicators for SMAFS 
(women and men), SMAFM (men), SMAFB (men), prevalence of cohabitation, average number of years spent 
cohabiting, and average number of years spent married and cohabiting. Therefore, the regional coefficient 
corresponding to MENA for those indicators is equivalent to the pooled ‘global’ one. Standard errors clustered 
at the country level. Estimates weighted by the number of survey waves per country. Contemporaneous values 
of HDI used. 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
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Figure 1.6: Framework of analysis and general overview of findings, isolating the role of sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Notes: This is a stylized diagram. The horizontal axis measures the association of indicators of family change with 
HDI. Note that the association of family change indicators with HDI can be negative (e.g., fertility is negatively 
associated with HDI), yet the above graph summarizes the strength of association, i.e., it abstracts from the signs 
of the coefficients. The vertical axis measures convergence over HDI (specifically, beta-convergence). The gray 
line that cuts the plane horizontally corresponds to a null beta-convergence coefficient, pointing to persistent 
differences, i.e., neither convergence (above the gray line) nor divergence (below the gray line).  
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1.10 Appendix 
Table A1.1: Classification of countries (N=84) by region (N=5) and number of surveys waves 
(N=293) 
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Table A1.2: Associations between HDI and GFC-indicators, global analysis. Contemporaneous HDI 
(panel a), two-year lagged HDI (panel b), and five-year lagged HDI (panel c) 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered at the country level. Estimates weighted 
by the number of survey waves per country. Estimates reported in panel a correspond to those shown in Figure 
1.3 in the main text.  
Sig: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a. Contemporaneous HDI b. HDI lagged 2 years c. HDI lagged 5 years 
  Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. 
Reduction in TFR 0.650 p<0.001 *** 0.641 p<0.001 *** 0.654 p<0.001 *** 
Reduction in NRR 0.531 p<0.001 *** 0.523 p<0.001 *** 0.552 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFS - women 0.328 p<0.001 *** 0.331 p<0.001 *** 0.308 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFS - men -0.067 p>0.1  -0.068 p>0.1  -0.084 p>0.1  
Delay in SMAFM - women 0.468 p<0.001 *** 0.476 p<0.001 *** 0.460 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFM - men 0.117 p>0.1  0.139 p<0.1 + 0.147 p<0.1 + 
Delay in SMAFB - women 0.384 p<0.001 *** 0.391 p<0.001 *** 0.363 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFB - men 0.075 p>0.1  0.098 p>0.1  0.099 p>0.1  
Women's empowerment - health 0.550 p<0.001 *** 0.535 p<0.001 *** 0.515 p<0.001 *** 
Women's empowerment - purchases 0.557 p<0.001 *** 0.540 p<0.001 *** 0.523 p<0.001 *** 
Women's empowerment - visits 0.526 p<0.001 *** 0.514 p<0.001 *** 0.495 p<0.001 *** 
% children living with both parents 0.200 p<0.05 * 0.181 p<0.05 * 0.156 p<0.1 + 
Increase % women in nuclear HH 0.150 p<0.1 + 0.141 p<0.1 + 0.114 p>0.1  
Decline % women in three-gen. HH -0.067 p>0.1  -0.067 p>0.1  -0.089 p>0.1  
Decline % women in complex HH 0.425 p<0.001 *** 0.425 P<0.001 *** 0.395 p<0.001 *** 
Decline in marriage prevalence among women 0.204 p<0.05 * 0.193 p<0.05 * 0.198 p<0.05 * 
Decline in years spent in marriage for women 0.087 p>0.1  0.079 p>0.1  0.091 p>0.1  
Increase in cohabitation among women -0.007 p>0.1  -0.020 p>0.1  -0.007 p>0.1  
Increase in years spent cohabiting among women 0.019 p>0.1  0.007 p>0.1  0.018 p>0.1  
Decline in years spent in marriage or cohabitation 0.142 p<0.1 + 0.145 p<0.1 + 0.173 p<0.05 * 
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Table A1.3: Associations between HDI and GFC-indicators, regional analysis. Contemporaneous 
HDI. 
 
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered at the country level. Estimates weighted 
by the number of survey waves per country. Estimates reported correspond to those shown in Figure 1.4 in the 
main text.  
Sig: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
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Table A1.4: Associations between HDI-components and GFC-indicators, global analysis. GNI 
(panel a), education (panel b), and life expectancy (panel c)  
Notes: Standardized beta coefficients reported. Standard errors clustered at the country level. Estimates 
weighted by the number of survey waves per country. Estimates reported correspond to those shown in Figure 
A1.4 in the Appendix. 
Sig: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a. GNI Index b. Education Index c. Life Expectancy Index 
  Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. Stdz. Beta P-value Sig. 
Reduction in TFR 0.493 p<0.001 *** 0.470 p<0.001 *** 0.543 p<0.001 *** 
Reduction in NRR 0.423 p<0.001 *** 0.406 p<0.001 *** 0.384 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFS - women 0.197 p<0.05 * 0.249 p<0.001 *** 0.325 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFS - men -0.096 p>0.1  -0.088 p>0.1  0.079 p>0.1  
Delay in SMAFM - women 0.445 p<0.001 *** 0.358 p<0.001 *** 0.282 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFM - men 0.209 p<0.05 * 0.083 p>0.1  -0.005 p>0.1  
Delay in SMAFB - women 0.259 p<0.001 *** 0.325 p<0.001 *** 0.276 p<0.001 *** 
Delay in SMAFB - men 0.066 p>0.1  0.084 p>0.1  0.030 p>0.1  
Women's empowerment - health 0.358 p<0.001 *** 0.480 p<0.001 *** 0.389 p<0.001 *** 
Women's empowerment - purchases 0.366 p<0.001 *** 0.490 p<0.001 *** 0.383 p<0.001 *** 
Women's empowerment - visits 0.334 p<0.001 *** 0.439 p<0.001 *** 0.415 p<0.001 *** 
% children living with both parents 0.094 p>0.1  0.062 p>0.1  0.362 p<0.001 *** 
Increase % women in nuclear HH 0.044 p>0.1  0.132 p<0.05 * 0.158 p<0.05 * 
Decline % women in three-gen. HH -0.067 p>0.1  -0.044 p>0.1  -0.078 p>0.1  
Decline % women in complex HH 0.260 p<0.01 ** 0.331 p<0.001 *** 0.378 p<0.001 *** 
Decline in marriage prevalence among women 0.215 p<0.05 * 0.172 p<0.05 * 0.032 p>0.1  
Decline in years spent in marriage for women 0.136 p>0.1  0.108 p>0.1  -0.112 p>0.1  
Increase in cohabitation among women 0.046 p>0.1  -0.059 p>0.1  -0.013 p>0.1  
Increase in years spent cohabiting among women 0.068 p>0.1  -0.042 p>0.1  0.016 p>0.1  
Decline in years spent in marriage or cohabitation 0.233 p<0.01 ** 0.184 p<0.01 ** -0.167 p<0.05 * 
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Table A1.5: Differences in sample averages between the overall and the ‘convergence’ sample 
 
Notes: Estimates weighted by the number of survey waves available per country. N refers to the number of 
country-year combinations. Specifically, as the N is indicator-specific, it refers to the maximum number of 
observations per group. FEB: “Family events and behaviors”, LL: “Linked lives”; LCP: “Life-course patterns”. 
Information on cohabitation, sexual intercourse, and timing indicators for men is not available for MENA 
countries.  
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Type 
All 
(N=293) 
W>1 
(N=267)   
Diff. 
HDI  0.52 0.50  0.017 
GFC Indicators      
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) FEB 4.14 4.38  -0.238 
Net Reproduction Rate (NRR) LCP 1.72 1.79  -0.071 
SMAFS - women FEB 19.24 18.99  0.249 
SMAFS - men FEB 19.46 19.19  0.269 
SMAFM - women FEB 21.82 21.53  0.283 
SMAFM - men FEB 25.90 25.66  0.246 
SMAFB - women FEB 21.48 21.28  0.196 
SMAFB - men FEB 26.48 26.28  0.205 
Husband decides about women's health (prop. HH) LL 0.30 0.31  -0.019 
Husband decides about household purchases (prop. HH) LL 0.32 0.33  -0.009 
Husband decides about women's visits (prop. HH) LL 0.24 0.25  -0.011 
Children living with both parents (prop.) LL 0.68 0.68  0.004 
Women living in a nuclear household (prop.) LL 0.40 0.40  -0.003 
Women living in a three-gen. household (prop.) LL 0.29 0.28  0.010 
Women living in a complex household (prop.) LL 0.36 0.36  -0.002 
Prevalence of marriage (prop.) FEB 0.54 0.55  -0.009 
Marital expectancy at age 15 (yrs) LCP 18.55 18.63  -0.079 
Prevalence of cohabitation (prop.) FEB 0.14 0.13  0.003 
Cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) LCP 4.43 4.32  0.113 
Marital and cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) LCP 22.15 22.30   -0.154 
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Table A1.6: Beta-convergence over HDI per unit of time, global (panel a) and regional (panel b) 
analysis. Beta-convergence coefficients reported  
 
Notes: Estimates are weighted by the number of survey waves available per country. Note that MENA countries 
report no indicators for SMAFS (women and men), SMAFM (men), SMAFB (men), prevalence of cohabitation, 
average number of years spent cohabiting, and average number of years spent married and cohabiting. Therefore, 
the regional coefficient corresponding to MENA for those indicators is equivalent to the pooled ‘global’ one. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level. Estimates weighted by the number of survey waves per country. 
Contemporaneous values of HDI used. Regional dummies not included in panel b. 
Sig: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, +p<0.1 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division.  
Indicator 
a. Global   b. Region excluded 
No 
controls 
Regional 
dummies  
Americas Asia 
Former 
USSR 
MENA SSA 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 0.009 -0.045*  0.007 0.007 0.008 0.010 -0.065* 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.028) 
Net Reproduction Rate (NRR) -0.008 -0.182**  -0.015 -0.024 -0.020 -0.002 -0.141+ 
 (0.055) (0.062)  (0.064) (0.068) (0.047) (0.059) (0.072) 
         
SMAFS, women -0.007* -0.006**  -0.003 -0.008* -0.009*** -0.007* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
SMAFS, men -0.006 -0.005  -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) 
         
SMAFM, women -0.010** -0.012**  -0.009** -0.010** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.012 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
SMAFM, men -0.005 -0.006  -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) 
         
SMAFB, women -0.007* -0.011**  -0.008* -0.006+ -0.009** -0.010** -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SMAFB, men -0.006 -0.009*  -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
         
Husband decides about women's health (prop. HH) 0.101 -0.250  0.185 0.535 -0.118 0.075 -1.766+ 
 (0.446) (0.446)  (0.450) (0.497) (0.415) (0.462) (1.070) 
Husband decides about household purchases (prop. HH) 0.104 -0.294  0.135 0.288 0.102 0.119 -2.307* 
 (0.309) (0.518)  (0.265) (0.418) (0.334) (0.304) (0.854) 
Husband decides about women's visits (prop. HH) 0.108 -0.808+  -0.088 0.240 -0.054 0.126 -1.287 
 (0.382) (0.462)  (0.401) (0.472) (0.374) (0.384) (1.091) 
         
Children living with both parents (prop.) -0.093 -0.049  -0.120+ -0.100 -0.052 -0.162+ 0.162* 
 (0.070) (0.070)  (0.070) (0.078) (0.060) (0.084) (0.070) 
Women living in a nuclear household (prop.) -0.463 -0.388  -0.429 -0.435 -0.497+ -0.463 -0.319 
 (0.282) (0.280)  (0.307) (0.299) (0.285) (0.288) (0.318) 
Women living in a three-gen. household (prop.) -0.411 -0.504  -0.420 -0.422 -0.474 -0.685* 0.368 
 (0.347) (0.375)  (0.369) (0.396) (0.387) (0.322) (0.595) 
Women living in a complex household (prop.) -0.338 -0.406  -0.341 -0.275 -0.393+ -0.379+ -0.009 
 (0.210) (0.270)  (0.227) (0.221) (0.214) (0.222) (0.324) 
         
Prevalence of marriage (prop.) 0.220* 0.170  0.240 0.187 0.223* 0.229* 0.218+ 
 (0.100) (0.151)  (0.147) (0.112) (0.100) (0.100) (0.111) 
Marital expectancy at age 15 (yrs) 0.005+ 0.004  0.005 0.005 0.006+ 0.006+ 0.006+ 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prevalence of cohabitation (prop.) -0.879 -1.409**  -1.068+ -0.861 -1.301* -0.879 0.870 
 (0.571) (0.491)  (0.627) (0.609) (0.497) (0.571) (1.206) 
Cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) -0.032+ -0.048**  -0.039+ -0.033+ -0.045** -0.032+ 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.034) 
Marital and cohabitation expectancy at age 15 (yrs) -0.008** -0.009**  -0.007* -0.011** -0.007* -0.008* -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
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Figure A1.1: Kernel density of countries over Human Development Index (HDI), by group of 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Figure A1.2: Age-standardized vs crude family indicators. Example shown: age-standardized vs 
crude marriage prevalence 
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Figure A1.3: Scatter plots of the association between the 20 GFC-indicators and HDI 
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Figure A1.4: Associations between HDI-components and GFC-indicators, global analysis. GNI 
(left), education (center), and life expectancy (right) 
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Figure A1.5: Sigma-convergence over HDI 
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Notes: This figure presents trends in the coefficient of variation (CV) over HDI. To boost the number of 
observations we use a moving-average approach We use two-percentage-point steps to compare the moving 
measures. At each step we include countries over a bandwidth of ten percentage points for the assessment over 
HDI. The dotted line is estimated using local polynomial regression smoothing techniques. A CV of 0.1 indicates 
that the standard deviation is at most 10 per cent of the mean. A negative trend in the CV implies a decline in 
the variability relative to the mean, i.e., convergence; a flat trend implies differences are maintained; and a positive 
trend implies increasing heterogeneity, i.e., divergence. 
Sources: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), UNDP, and UN-DESA Population Division. 
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Chapter 2. Educational Assortative Mating in sub-Saharan Africa: Compositional 
Changes and Implications for Household Wealth Inequality 
 
2.0 Abstract 
Over the past decade, there has been increasing interest in patterns of educational assortative mating 
across the developing world. However, research on the topic in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is still scant. 
Using Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from 39 countries between 1986 and 2016, this 
paper is the first to offer a comparative overview of changes in educational assortative mating in SSA. 
The study has three aims. First, I examine whether educational assortative mating has increased over 
time, by sub-region and location of residence. Second, by comparing observed patterns of mating with 
the ones that would prevail under random mating, I investigate the extent to which trends are driven 
by compositional – shifting educational distributions – versus residual factors. Third, I adopt an 
accounting-based methodology to assess implications of educational assortative mating for household 
wealth inequality. Results show that mating has increased over marriage cohort in all sub-regions except 
for Southern Africa, with increases driven mostly by rural areas. Moreover, I find that educational 
assortative mating accounts for a non-negligible share (3 to 12 percent, varying by sub-region) of the 
cohort-specific inequality in household wealth, yet changes in mating over time hardly move the time 
trends in wealth inequality.  
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, there has been growing interest in patterns of educational assortative mating 
around the world. Assortative mating is a powerful driver of societal change, as it shapes the way people 
organize within families, affecting in turn individuals’ access to resources and their distribution across 
families (Schwartz 2013). In light of the role that education plays for economic inequality and its 
persistence from generation to generation, most of the focus on educational assortative mating to date 
– at least in high-income societies – has been tied to its implications for the study of inequality and the 
social stratification system (Mare 1991, 2016; Rosenfeld 2008; Schwartz and Mare 2005; etc.). Yet 
patterns of mating with regard to couples’ socio-economic characteristics are vital to understanding a 
whole set of dynamics in the demographic makeup of households, such as family formation, 
composition, and breakdown (Schwartz and Han 2014). They also have consequences for outcomes 
that are directly or indirectly linked to the family, such as longevity, health, fertility preferences, and 
fertility behavior (Huber and Fieder 2011; Ntoimo and Mutanda 2017; Trimarchi, Schnor, and Van 
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Bavel forthcoming). A proper understanding of mating patterns thus ultimately permits to shed light 
on fundamental changes underlying the demography of the population. This study focuses on trends, 
variation, and implications of educational assortative mating for inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
a region of the world that has been experiencing rapid socio-economic and demographic change yet 
has been largely neglected in the assortative mating literature.  
The paper has three aims. First, using 126 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) collected 
between 1986 and 2016, I provide an overview of educational assortative mating patterns across 39 
countries in SSA. Despite a series of global and comparative studies documenting declining hypergamy 
around the world (Esteve et al. 2016; Esteve, Garcia-Roman, and Permanyer 2012), never has the 
assortative mating literature focused exclusively and comparatively on patterns of change within SSA.23 
To put it simply, evidence is lacking on questions as simple as whether educational assortative mating 
has increased or decreased overtime. This is surprising, as scholars have devoted ample space to trends, 
determinants, and consequences of educational assortative mating in other parts of the world, such as 
the United States (Breen and Salazar 2011; Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar 2017; Greenwood et al. 2014; 
Mare 1991, 2016; Qian 1998; Schwartz and Mare 2005), Latin America (Esteve and McCaa 2007; 
Esteve, McCaa, and López 2013; Ganguli, Hausmann, and Viarengo 2014; Gullickson and Torche 
2014; Torche 2010), South-East Asia (Borkotoky and Gupta 2016; Hu and Qian 2015; Park and Smits 
2005; Smits and Park 2009), and Europe (Boertien and Permanyer 2017; Breen and Andersen 2012; 
Breen and Salazar 2010; De Hauw, Grow, and Van Bavel 2017; Esteve and Cortina 2006; Grow and 
Van Bavel 2015). Ntoimo and Mutanda (2017) is a notable exception, yet they examine patterns of 
homogamy and heterogamy in Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia only.24 
A more comprehensive study of mating in SSA is critical for several reasons. First and 
foremost, SSA countries are undergoing swift transformations in the realm of union formation, such 
as delays in mean ages at first union (Bongaarts, Mensch, and Blanc 2017; Koski, Clark, and Nandi 
2017; Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2014), along with increasing educational attainment particularly for 
women, and expanding female labor force participation rates (Lloyd et al. 2005). Underlying these 
                                                           
23 Educational homogamy is defined as union formation between individuals who are similar in terms of education. 
The alternative is educational heterogamy, defined as union formation between individuals with different levels of 
education. Heterogamous couples can in turn be educationally hypergamous – if the female partner/wife has lower 
education than the male partner/husband – and educationally hypogamous – if the female partner/wife has higher 
education than the male partner/husband.  
24 Another notable exception is Behrman (2016), who focuses on patterns of educational assortative mating 
across five Eastern and South-Eastern African countries. Yet her study is aimed at examining the implications of 
mating for intra-couple gender dynamics (e.g., decision-making, intimate partner violence, unmet need for family 
planning, etc.), rather than providing a comparative overview of trends and demographic determinants of mating. 
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changes has been a massive growth in urbanization, spreading “modern” ideals stressing the value of 
education, encouraging later marriage, and reducing the influence of kin who control the timing of 
marriage and choice of spouse (Cherlin 2012; Singh and Samara 1996). As these factors are key drivers 
of mating, there is reason to believe that important changes in educational assortative mating might 
have occurred in SSA over the past half century. Yet, demographic change and urbanization have 
followed uneven trajectories within SSA, partly as a function of the various cultural repertoires, 
diversified economies, political systems, but also on the crises – such as conflicts, civil wars, food 
shortages, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic – that countries or even entire sub-regions have experienced 
(Cherlin 2012; Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004). Hence, a closer look at within-region dynamics is likely 
to deliver a more nuanced picture of the phenomenon, highlighting sub-regional heterogeneity and 
diverging patterns of change that are masked in “global” studies of mating such as Esteve et al. (2016). 
Alongside the dramatic changes outlined above, there is yet evidence that SSA countries still 
lag behind other low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in areas such as gender and couple-related 
dynamics. For instance, gender gap reversals in education are occurring more slowly in SSA than in 
other world regions (Esteve et al. 2016) – the gender gap in education has narrowed but not reversed 
yet. Similarly, previous research has found stark gender imbalances in intra-household bargaining 
dynamics, to the extent that SSA remains the only region where the share of households in which the 
husband is the sole decision-maker reaches up to 40 percent (Pesando et al. 2018).25 Accordingly, there 
is ground to hypothesize that trends towards increasing assortative mating documented globally, often 
unfolding along with reversals in gender gaps in education and increases in women’s empowerment 
(Esteve, Garcia-Roman, and Permanyer 2012; Grow and Van Bavel 2015), might have occurred 
differently in SSA.   
One challenge in studies of mating is to determine whether increases in educational homogamy 
arise due to secular changes in educational attainment of women versus men, or because of shifts in 
educational assortative mating itself. For instance, the narrowing of the gender gap in education may 
increase the chance that someone with secondary education is married to someone else with secondary 
education even in the absence of changes in the assortativeness of marriage (Liu and Lu 2006). 
Therefore, as a second contribution I compare the observed patterns of mating to those predicted 
under random mating and investigate the extent to which trends in educational assortative mating are 
driven by compositional – i.e., changes in educational distributions – versus residual changes up and 
                                                           
25 Averages reach up to 70 percent in countries (and selected years) such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and 
Senegal.  
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beyond changes in educational distributions. In other words, I explore the extent to which shifts 
towards homogamy can be accounted for by “mechanical” changes that result from proportionally 
faster increases in women’s education, as compared to other responses related to the shifting value of 
education and spouses’ preferences for educational resemblance. To address this question I use 
contingency tables, sorting indicators, and log-linear models.  
As a third contribution, I rely on this same accounting-based methodology to assess 
implications of educational assortative mating for household wealth inequality – defined as inequality 
between households in asset possession.26 As a measure of wealth I adopt the International Wealth 
Index (IWI), the first comparable asset-based wealth index covering the complete developing world, 
based on data for over 2.1 million households (Smits and Steendijk 2015). I am interested in asking the 
following counterfactual questions relating mating and inequality: what would happen to the wealth 
distribution if in every marriage cohort mating was random instead of assortative? Similarly, what 
would happen to wealth inequality if couples from the latest marriage cohort matched as those in the 
earliest ones? These analyses address the broader puzzle of whether marital sorting affects household 
wealth inequality, another yet unexplored question in the SSA context, and rarely addressed in the 
assortative mating literature in general. More broadly, a more comprehensive understanding of 
determinants, trends, and implications of educational assortative mating in SSA has the potential to 
shed better light on the reciprocal linkages between demographic change, family change, and the social 
stratification system.  
2.2 Background 
Theoretical perspectives on educational assortative mating across Western and non-Western 
societies 
The assortative mating literature documents extensive variation in educational homogamy among 
countries, time periods, and even among studies focusing on the same country. Starting around the 
1960s, a close focus on temporal and spatial variation in the patterns of association between spouses’ 
educational attainment originated from studies on high-income Western societies, very much driven 
by the idea that industrialization brings progress, and differences in countries’ level of socio-economic 
development may explain variation in homogamy. The underlying logic – embedded in theoretical 
perspectives such as modernization theory (Blau and Duncan 1967; Parsons 1971), industrialization 
theory (Kerr 1983), and individualization theory (Beck 1986; Giddens 1991) – builds on the premise 
                                                           
26 Throughout the paper I refer to the terms “wealth inequality” and “asset inequality” interchangeably.  
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that industrialization and social modernization unfold in tandem with trends towards social openness 
and meritocratization, thus weakening societies’ social structures and social boundaries.  
Within this modernization macro-perspective, scholars have formulated and tested three 
competing hypotheses relating socio-economic development and educational homogamy both across 
countries and within a country overtime (Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998). First is the general 
openness hypothesis, which postulates that industrialization leads to less educational homogamy 
because of the decrease in parents’ control over the marriage process and the increase in the number 
of contacts between individuals from different classes and status groups, occurring through greater 
geographical mobility, more education, and the spread of mass communication (Blossfeld 2009; Smits, 
Ultee, and Lammers 1998). The second one, called the status attainment hypothesis, postulates instead 
a positive relationship between economic development and educational homogamy due to the 
increased importance of education as a marker of social status – which in turn pushes high-educated 
individuals to increasingly select their partners based on educational considerations (Blossfeld and 
Timm 2003; Kalmijn 1998; Treiman 1970). The third hypothesis (inverted U-curve hypothesis) 
combines the previous two and predicts an increase in educational homogamy in the first phase of the 
industrialization process, where status considerations and parental authority still play an important role 
in partner choice. Conversely, the decrease in educational homogamy takes place in a second phase, 
where rising wages and more binding laws loosen the parental bond and give individuals more freedom 
to marry whom they like, hence following more closely the logic of ‘romantic love’.27 
Gradually, research examining trends and variation in educational assortative mating has 
expanded to other societies across Latin America (Esteve and McCaa 2007; Esteve, López, and McCaa 
2013; Ganguli, Hausmann, and Viarengo 2014; Gullickson and Torche 2014; Torche 2010), East Asia 
(Hu and Qian 2015; Park and Smits 2005; Smits and Park 2009), South Asia (Borkotoky and Gupta 
2016; Prakash and Singh 2014), adopting a more large-scale comparative approach (Esteve et al. 2016; 
Esteve, Garcia-Roman, and Permanyer 2012; Raymo and Xie 2000; Smits 2003; Smits, Ultee, and 
Lammers 1998, 2000; etc.). Studies evaluating the applicability of the aforementioned hypotheses to 
different contexts has delivered quite mixed – and often conflicting – findings.28 Evidence in favor of 
                                                           
27 Smits et al. (2000) and Smits (2003) elaborated a fourth related hypothesis called the saturation hypothesis. This 
postulates a decrease in homogamy in modernizing societies which slows down and eventually stops in societies 
that have reached a high level of openness. As this hypothesis is more applicable to highly industrialized societies 
that are far from the sub-Saharan countries included in this study, I leave it aside. 
28 As claimed by Blossfeld (2009), several analytical choices contribute to explaining this mixed empirical 
evidence, such as the analytical focus (e.g., first marriages versus stock of marriages), the study population (e.g., 
marital matches versus all individuals at “risk” of entering a union), the type of data (cross-sectional versus panel), 
methodology (e.g., log-linear models versus event history models), etc.  
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a trend towards more educational homogamy has been found for several highly developed Western 
societies – mostly the United States (US) and some European countries – by scholars as diverse as 
Blossfeld and Timm (2003), Kalmijn (1991), Mare (1991), Qian and Preston (1993), Schwartz and Mare 
(2005), and Smits, Ultee, and Lammers (2000). 
However, research including LMICs suggests a more complex picture. Using data from 65 
countries, Smits, Ultee, and Lammers (1998) found a cross-sectional inverted U-shaped relationship 
between level of development and educational homogamy. The status attainment hypothesis (higher 
development, higher homogamy) was supported only when comparing the least-developed countries 
with countries at intermediate levels of development, while the general openness hypothesis (higher 
development, lower homogamy) was supported when comparing countries at intermediate levels with 
the most developed ones. Consistent with this finding, in a follow-up study covering 55 countries, 
Smits (2003) found declining educational homogamy and more openness in more rapidly developing 
countries. Although evidence from long-term trend studies remains scarce, less educational homogamy 
in higher developed countries – mostly Asian – has also been confirmed in trend studies such as Raymo 
and Xie (2000), Smits, Ultee, and Lammers (2000), and Smits and Park (2009). Focusing on ten East-
Asian societies, the latter authors documented a trend towards less homogamy over time and claimed 
that educational homogamy tends to be lower in societies that are more modern, have higher female 
labor force participation rates, and experience less Confucian influence. Research from India 
(Borkotoky and Gupta 2016; Prakash and Singh 2014) and Latin America (Esteve and McCaa 2007; 
Ganguli, Hausmann, and Viarengo 2014) suggests instead an increase in educational assortative mating 
over time.  
Although comparative studies such as Smits, Ultee, and Lammers (1998; 2000) included a few 
SSA countries, none of the above hypotheses has been wholly evaluated in the African context. This 
study attempts to do so by adopting a time-trend perspective. It is challenging to generalize claims on 
patterns of educational assortative mating in a region of the world as diverse and heterogeneous as 
SSA, yet documenting trends by sub-region and location of residence (urban/rural) is a first step 
towards a better understanding. As – comparatively – SSA countries rank lowest on development 
indices such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the above theories would suggest an increase 
in educational assortative mating over time in line with the status attainment hypothesis, with 
considerable differences by sub-region of SSA and location of residence, consistent with different rates 
of modernization and urbanization. Specifically, I hypothesize a more marked increase in mating in 
rural areas paralleled by a less marked increase (or even an incipient decline) in urban areas, where the 
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general openness hypothesis is more likely to take hold – as driven by greater geographical mobility, 
educational expansion, cross-cultural exchange, and mass communication. 
Educational expansion, urbanization, family change, and mating in sub-Saharan Africa 
Over the last few decades, there has been an increase in mean grades of schooling attained among 
young women in all regions of the developing world (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2006). Yet in their 
recent global study of declining educational hypergamy, Esteve et al. (2016) claim that African countries 
have the lowest proportions of the population with college education and the lowest levels of women’s 
education compared to men’s. According to their study, time trends indicate little progress in 
expanding college education in Africa, but substantial progress in women’s education that has 
contributed to narrowing the gender gap, which still favors men. A key factor underlying the expansion 
of education has been the massive growth in the share of the population living in cities, which started 
from very different levels across sub-regions, as Southern Africa was already far more urbanized than 
the other sub-regions in the 1950s. Heterogeneity in the degree of urbanization between sub-regions 
has lessened since the 1950s, as the least urbanized regions 50 years ago (Eastern Africa, followed by 
Western and Central Africa) have experienced the highest urban growth, with the urban population 
multiplied by roughly 20 between 1950 and 2000 (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004).  
In tandem with these macro-structural transformations, African families have also changed in 
domains that are likely to relate to mating patterns. First and foremost, age at marriage has risen 
throughout the continent (Koski, Clark, and Nandi 2017; Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004). According 
to data from the United Nations (UN) Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population 
Division (2015), the singulate mean age at marriage is now greater than 18 in the majority of countries 
in the region. This is relevant, as the age at which men and women form unions is influenced by social 
norms and expectations regarding their roles as spouse and parent – factors that are likely to change 
with globalization, urbanization, and rising educational attainment. Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 
(2006) found a marked reduction in the percent of 15-19-year-olds married throughout most LMICs 
over the past 30 years. These reductions were particularly striking in SSA. Even so, SSA remains the 
region with the highest rates of child marriage in the world (Singh and Samara 1996), for the most part 
driven by Western and Central Africa.29 Western and Central Africa are also the regions with the highest 
percentage of women ever married by age 25, while in Eastern and Southern Africa the likelihood of 
                                                           
29 Niger (Western Africa) has the highest rate of child marriage in the world, followed – within the SSA context 
– by Central African Republic and Chad (Central Africa). These are also the regions in which arranged marriage 
is more commonly practiced.  
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being still unmarried at 25 is higher (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2006).30 Southern Africa has actually 
had a late marriage pattern since the early 1970s, and is now the only sub-region in SSA to exhibit non-
negligible shares of never-married individuals (about 15 percent of women at age 45), partly due to 
labor migration (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004).  
Western Africa is also distinctive in that in most countries age at marriage has been increasing 
for women but not for men, likely due to changes in the practice of polygyny – an idiosyncratic feature 
of the region. Research suggests that in SSA the expansion of schooling had some impact on delaying 
women’s age at marriage, yet a considerable fraction of the increase cannot be accounted for by changes 
in education. Conversely, rising costs of establishing a household have been found to contribute more 
than increasing educational attainment to men’s marriage delays (Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2006). 
Differential increases in men and women’s ages at first union affect inter-spouse age 
differences, whose variation across societies can be interpreted in terms of two interrelated factors, 
namely kinship structure and women’s status. Casterline, Williams, and McDonald (1986) suggested 
that in patriarchal societies and in societies characterized by patrilineal kinship organization, the spousal 
age difference tends to be relatively large, and unions in which the husband is ten or more years older 
are relatively frequent. Conversely, in settings where the traditional social structure allows for a more 
equal status of spouses, or where exposure to Western family forms and modernization processes have 
improved the status of women – such as Southern Africa – the age difference tends to be smaller. 
Indeed, variation in inter-spouse age differences is also explained by marriage market – namely, age-
structure – constraints. On the whole, research from SSA suggests that age differences at first marriage 
have narrowed, though they remain important in a subset of Western African countries such as Guinea-
Bissau and Sierra Leone (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004).  
The widespread geographical heterogeneity in urbanization, globalization, and socio-cultural 
practices – such as child marriage, arranged marriage, polygyny, patriarchy, and patrilocality – and their 
differential prevalence and decline over time leads to expect heterogeneous patterns of mating by sub-
region of SSA, with Western Africa and Southern Africa following the most diverse – likely, opposed 
– trajectories.31  
Educational homogamy, inequality, and the social stratification system 
                                                           
30 Trends in ages at first marriage are deeply intertwined with educational expansion and urbanization patterns. 
For instance, Mensch, Singh, and Casterline (2006) reported that in Eastern and Southern Africa, more than four 
times as many women with 0 to 3 years of schooling married by age 18 as did women with 8-plus years of 
schooling. Similarly, 1.6 times as many women in rural areas married before age 18 as did women in urban areas.  
31 Even within sub-regions, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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It has been widely recognized that the degree of partners’ homogamy along specific socio-economic 
characteristics has the potential to shape different dimensions of inequality. Among these is household 
income inequality. Thinking about marital sorting on education – provided there is a reasonable 
correlation between educational attainment and later-life earnings – societies in which high-educated 
marry other high-educated and low-educated marry other low-educated will be more unequal than 
those in which high-educated marry low-educated. Increased educational assortative mating may affect 
inequality through changing the distribution of household configurations (or “types”), regardless of 
whether the increase itself is produced by shifts in shares of people with certain levels of education 
(so-called, structure), or changed sorting behavior (so-called, preferences). Given that household types 
possess different amounts of human capital – hence, different income potentials – a changed 
distribution of household types is expected to change inequality between types (Breen and Andersen 
2012).32  
While, as discussed in the previous sections, documenting trends and variation in educational 
assortative mating has taken a rather global and comparative scale (except for SSA), studies assessing 
implications of mating for inequality have centered primarily on high-income societies. Hu and Qian 
(2015) and Torche (2010) are notable exceptions from China and Latin America (Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico), respectively. From this body of studies there is overwhelming agreement that educational 
assortative mating plays a small to negligible role in explaining trends in household income inequality. 
In the US context, Western, Bloome, and Percheski (2008) found that neither educational inequalities 
in women’s incomes nor assortative mating contributed significantly to the rise in inequality. Similar 
results for the US are echoed in Breen and Salazar (2011), Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2017), and 
Greenwood et al. (2014). Similar conclusions were reached in the European context by Breen and 
Salazar (2010) for the UK and Boertien and Permanyer (2017) for a subset of 21 European countries. 
A minor exception to this finding is Breen and Andersen (2012), who showed that in Denmark – where 
inequality increased between 1987 and 2006 but educational homogamy declined – changes in 
assortative mating increased income inequality by about 7 percent, almost fully driven by changes in 
the educational distribution of men and women rather than in the propensity to choose a partner with 
a given level of education.  
Several hypotheses have been proposed to shed light on the weak relationship between 
educational assortative mating and income inequality (Schwartz 2013). One postulates that increases in 
                                                           
32 Note that part of this process is contingent on realizing the income potential once the couple is formed, which 
tends to be achieved through post-marital labor supply decisions (Breen and Andersen 2012; Gonalons-Pons 
and Schwartz 2017). 
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educational homogamy may not be large enough to produce meaningful shifts in inequality (Breen and 
Salazar 2011). Yet Boertien and Permanyer (2017) showed that even under extreme counterfactual 
scenarios, results would not change. Another hypothesis is that increases in educational homogamy 
among some types of couples might be offset by declines among other types of couples, such that the 
overall effect on inequality is negligible (Rosenfeld 2008). Alternatively, it might be the case that wives’ 
education is not as highly correlated with earnings as one would think. This very much depends on 
post-sorting labor supply adjustments, but if most women exit the labor force upon union formation, 
the correlation between the two would be driven down. Consistent with this hypothesis is the case of 
Denmark, where high percentages of wives are in the labor force (higher than in the US), and changes 
in educational homogamy have had a larger impact on income inequality (Breen and Andersen 2012). 
In light of the latter hypothesis, some of the most recent literature has claimed that women’s relative 
position within the couple and their labor supply decisions might constitute the “missing link” in 
explaining increases in family income inequality (Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz 2017).  
Again, none of these dynamics have ever been studied in SSA. The main challenge in this 
context – as in many other LMICs – is the lack of good measures of household income or, even more 
so, the lack of measures of each partner’s earnings. However, most existing surveys such as the DHS 
collect information of household assets that enter the computation of a wealth index which is measured 
at the household level. Previous research has shown that in contexts where household income or 
consumption is absent, wealth indices are effective indicators of long-term socio-economic position, 
living standards, or material well-being of households (Filmer and Pritchett 1999, 2001; McKenzie 
2005; Sahn and Stifel 2000). Shimeles and Ncube (2015) have shown that this is also the case in Africa. 
My analysis investigates whether educational assortative mating has implications for inequality defined 
as inequality between households in asset possession. Scant evidence exists on whether measuring 
inequality through assets in SSA is a meaningful approach in the context of mating studies. Although 
not ideal and perhaps far from measuring an equivalent of partners’ income, an approach of this kind 
has the potential to shed some light on the relationship between mating and inequality, thus providing 
some foundations for understanding the social stratification system in the African context.   
2.3 Data and measures 
The analysis uses pooled cross-sectional Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data – 126 survey 
waves – from 39 sub-Saharan African countries (Table 2.1).33 DHS are publicly available nationally 
                                                           
33 On average, four waves per country.  
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representative surveys of women ages 15-49 collected by ICF International in collaboration with host 
country governments. Standardized questionnaires allow for comparisons across countries and survey 
waves. SSA countries are grouped in four regions – namely Western (14 countries), Central (8 
countries), Eastern (12 countries), and Southern Africa (5 countries) – according to the classification 
provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). The pooled comparative analysis offers a 
series of advantages over country-specific studies, including more observations, more variance on key 
variables, and the ability to assess pan-national regional trends (for similar analyses using DHS data see 
Clark and Brauner-Otto 2015; DeRose and Kravdal 2007; Reniers and Tfaily 2012; Smith-Greenaway 
and Trinitapoli 2014, etc.). The analysis spans a 30-year time frame, with the oldest surveys collected 
in 1986 in Liberia and Senegal, and the most recent survey collected in 2016 in Ethiopia. Additional 
details on the countries included, the number of waves, and the number of observations (couples) per 
wave are provided in Appendix Table A2.1. 
In line with the observation that the focus on marriage cohort – rather than survey year or 
birth cohort – is more adequate for detecting trends in educational homogamy (Mare 1991), in this 
study I assess time trends over marriage cohort (MC). A similar perspective has been adopted in several 
prominent studies in the field (Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986; Smits and Park 2009; etc.). I 
construct ten 5-year marriage cohorts: <1970, 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, >=2010.34 This approach is sensible when using DHS data as 
surveys are collected at non-regular intervals, hence only data from selected countries are available for 
each survey year.  
While DHS collect couple-level files in some countries, this study relies on information 
provided in the women’s file to maximize the number of couples in the analysis.35 I use the partnership 
information provided by the women to construct a couple-level dataset where wives and husbands are 
nested within couples.36 Women whose marital status is missing or who provide no information on 
their own and their partner’s educational attainment are excluded from the sample. I keep couples who 
are currently married or living in a cohabiting union (“living together”), and rely on the DHS definition 
of marital union, which includes both civil and customary marriages – as prevalent in the African 
context (van de Walle and Meekers 1994). In so doing, I follow previous scholarship in the claim that 
in settings where the definition of union is ambiguous and the process of union formation is “fluid,” 
                                                           
34 Note that the first and last cohorts span more than five years for sample size reasons.  
35 The couple-level file is not available for every country, and the sample of couples would be restricted by about 
two-thirds.  
36 Throughout the paper I use the terms “husband” and “male partner”, “wife” and “female partner”, and 
“marriage” and “union” interchangeably.  
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distinguishing between formal marriages and informal unions may be impossible, hence the 
combination of the two constitutes the correct focus (Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986; Clark 
and Brauner-Otto 2015; Gage 1995). The sample is further restricted to couples where women are 
between the ages of 25 and 40. The reason is that by age 25 virtually all women have reached their 
highest educational level, and 95 percent of them have entered their first union, therefore reducing 
concerns about censoring on single marital status or education (Esteve et al. 2012). To avoid 
specification problems, I perform sensitivity analyses using both narrower and wider age ranges (15-
49, 20-35, 30-45); results obtained are essentially the same and reported in the Appendix. As the DHS 
only provide data on the year of first union and include information on the education of the current 
partner/husband – but not any previous one – the sample is limited to couples where women have 
been married or have cohabited only once, i.e. about 82 percent of women (in a spirit similar to 
Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986).37 These restrictions provide a sample of 416,038 couples 
with complete information on marital status, year of first union, and educational level of both partners. 
The DHS includes a categorical and a continuous measure of educational attainment, namely 
highest level attained, and grade attained. The categorical variable is coded as follows: 0 for “no 
education”, 1 for “primary”, 2 for “secondary”, and 3 for “higher.” The continuous variable ranges 
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 23. While the continuous variable offers a more precise 
measure of schooling achievement, it ignores the importance of academic boundaries, which matter 
more for determining whether individuals marry “within their group.” Furthermore, this latter 
classification captures similar stages in the educational career, even if these stages represent a different 
number of years across countries. Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics on the number of couples 
and the highest level (panel a) and grade (panel b) attained by wives and husbands, by marriage cohort.38 
Estimates suggest that couples from the earliest marriage cohort (<1970) have on average some lower 
primary schooling, with husbands completing 2.7 grades, as compared to wives completing around 1.4 
grades. Conversely, couples from the latest marriage cohort (>2010) possess upper primary/secondary 
education, with wives and husbands attaining an average of 8.3 and 9 school grades, respectively. 
Overall, the table shows a steep increase in educational attainment over marriage cohort, with a 
                                                           
37 DHS include a question on the total number of unions the woman has been in: “Have you been married or 
lived with a man only once or more than once?”. All women reporting two or more unions are considered to 
have ever been remarried. Note that the sample is not restricted to men who have only married once. Indeed, 
the high prevalence of polygyny, particularly in Western Africa, suggests that many of the sampled men have 
married more than once (Fenske 2015; Reniers and Tfaily 2012; Smith-Greenaway and Trinitapoli 2014; Wagner 
and Rieger 2015).  
38 I here report both measures of schooling attainment to assess consistency and comparability, yet I rely on the 
categorical variable for all analyses that follow.  
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proportionally faster increase – yet no gender gap reversal – in wives’ educational attainment, hinting 
at decreasing intra-household schooling inequality over time. Most importantly, a comparison between 
the two panels suggests a high degree of consistency between the categorical and the continuous 
measures. For instance, wives’ averages in the 1970-1974 marriage cohort are 1.2 and 1.3 times their 
<1970 value for the categorical and continuous measures, respectively, while husbands’ averages are 
1.1 times their <1970 value for both measures. Similarly, wives’ averages in the latest marriage cohort 
are 5.1 and 5.8 times their <1970 value for the categorical and continuous measures, respectively, while 
husbands’ averages are 3.2 and 3.3 times their <1970 value. Appendix Table A2.2 provides some 
descriptive statistics on spousal differences in age by marriage cohort and shows similar patterns. While 
in the earliest marriage cohort the average difference is 11 years, in the latest it is reduced by about 
half.39 
To measure household wealth, I rely on the International Wealth Index (IWI), the first 
comparable asset-based wealth index measuring the level of material well-being and standard of living 
in the complete developing world (Smits and Steendijk 2015). IWI is a stable and understandable 
yardstick for comparing the performance of societies with regard to wealth, inequality and poverty. 
IWI runs from 0 to 100, with 0 representing households having none of the assets and lowest quality 
housing, and 100 representing households having all assets and highest quality housing. Information 
collected on the possession of consumer durables, access to basic services and housing characteristics 
is entered into a factor analysis (PCA) from which the first factor is selected as the wealth index.40  
Thanks to the inclusion of a household identifier, the IWI can be merged to the original DHS 
datasets. Note, however, that the IWI cannot be computed for some DHS surveys collected before (or 
around) 1990. It follows that the analytical sample included in the wealth analysis is reduced to 392,486 
couples (~94 percent of the original sample), for a total of 112 survey waves across 38 countries – 
rather than 126 across 39 countries.41 The main benefit of the IWI over the standard wealth index 
provided in the DHS lies in its comparability across countries and over time. As a matter of fact, the 
standard DHS wealth index is specific to the situation in each country at the time of the survey, making 
                                                           
39 Due to a high number of missing cases in the age of the current partner/husband, the number of couples for 
these age-analyses is reduced to 373,831. 
40 Information on 12 assets is needed to compute the IWI of a household. These assets include seven consumer 
durables (possession of a TV, fridge, phone, bike, car, a cheap utensil and an expensive utensil), access to two 
public services (water and electricity) and three housing characteristics (number of sleeping rooms, quality of 
floor material and of toilet facility). For additional details on the IWI see Smits and Steendijk (2015).  
41 There is only one DHS survey for Botswana collected in 1988. The IWI for this country is not available, hence 
the country is not included in the wealth analysis. The survey waves that are excluded in the wealth analysis due 
to the unavailability of the IWI are reported in Appendix Table A1 in italic.  
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it a reliable measure only for households within a certain country-year combination. This is not to claim 
that the IWI provides a flawless measure of assets and wealth – its limitations will be discussed in the 
concluding remarks – yet it is more suited to studies that are comparative in nature.  
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 2.1 describes the types of unions prevailing in SSA in the earliest (left panel) and latest (right 
panel) marriage cohorts available for each country.42 The graph reports the share of homogamous 
(“=”), hypergamous (“H”), and hypogamous (“W”) unions for the 39 countries, in a spirit similar to 
De Hauw, Grow, and Van Bavel (2017). The dominant pattern across cohorts is one in which the 
highest share of couples is homogamous followed, respectively, by hypergamous and hypogamous 
unions. Some exceptions are noteworthy. First, looking at the left panel we observe that the share of 
hypergamous couples is higher than – or very close to – the share of homogamous couples in countries 
such as Angola (AGO), Gabon (GAB), Mozambique (MOZ), Sao Tome and Principe (STP), and 
Uganda (UGA) – yet there is a trend towards declining hypergamy across cohorts observed in all five 
countries. Second, hypogamous unions are more prevalent than hypergamous unions in Botswana 
(BWA), Lesotho (LSO), Namibia (NAM), and Swaziland (SWZ), highlighting the somewhat peculiar 
nature of Southern African countries, and providing a first indication that assortative mating dynamics 
might differ by sub-region. In terms of extreme cases, Lesotho and Liberia stand out for being the 
countries with the highest shares of hypogamous and hypergamous unions, respectively.43  
The two panels combined suggest significant changes in the composition of couples between 
the earliest and latest marriage cohort, evidencing a far narrower distribution in the right panel, driven 
primarily by a combination of increasing hypogamy and declining hypergamy. The coexistence of these 
opposing dynamics (namely, W moving the right and H moving to the left) alters the prevalence of 
homogamy only to a small extent. In fact, as shown in Appendix Figure A2.1 (top panel), country and 
sub-regional trends in the share of homogamous couples are heterogeneous – declining across Western 
and Central Africa and mildly increasing across Eastern and Southern regions – and point towards a 
decline for SSA as a whole from 0.7 to around 0.6. Hidden from these figures is, however, an 
assessment of the extent to which the composition of homogamous couples has changed over time, 
                                                           
42 Not all ten marriage cohorts are available for each country, especially if only one survey wave per country is 
available. For instance, there is only one DHS for Angola, collected in 2015. As only women 25-40 are included 
in the sample, the oldest women were born around 1975 and entered their first union around 1990. Hence, the 
first marriage cohort available for Angola is the 1990-1994 one. These discrepancies are likely to create issues 
when analyzing trends at the country level, but less so when trends are analyzed at the sub-regional level, as 
mostly done in this paper.  
43 Lesotho reports the highest shares of hypogamous couples in both marriage cohorts.  
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i.e., whether variation along the educational distribution is responsible for observed upward or 
downward trends in educational homogamy.  
Figure 2.2 plots the share of unions involving men and women of the same educational strata 
by educational level, for SSA as a whole (top panel) and by location of residence (bottom panel). The 
top panel points towards declining shares of couples with no education and increasing shares of 
couples with secondary or higher education. As the share of couples with both partners having primary 
education has remained virtually unchanged, this graph suggests that homogamy trends in SSA have 
been mostly driven by changes at the bottom and the top of the educational distribution. Specifically, 
the share of couples with both spouses having no education has declined from about 0.5 to 0.1, while 
the share of couples with both spouses having secondary or higher education has increased from 0 to 
0.22 and 0.14, respectively. The steep decline in couples with no education (also shown in Figure A2.1, 
middle panel, by country and sub-region) thus more than offsets the weaker increase in couples with 
higher education (also shown in Figure A2.1, bottom panel, by country and sub-region), producing a 
downward overall trend in the share of homogamous couples – all levels of education combined.  
Estimates by location of residence (Figure 2.2, bottom panel) show vastly different trends 
between urban and rural areas. While most of the decline in the share of homogamous couples with 
partners having no education is occurring in rural areas, increasing shares of couples with partners 
having secondary or higher education are driven primarily by urban areas. This is reasonable, as these 
areas underwent rapid industrialization earlier in time, thereby creating economic growth and job 
opportunities drawing people to cities, in tandem with a faster expansion of higher education and 
access to other public services.  
Although the share of unions involving men and women of the same educational strata is a 
straightforward measure of educational homogamy (Mare 1991), trends in educational assortative 
mating based on this variable should be interpreted with caution (Schwartz and Mare 2005; Torche 
2010). The reason is that variation in observed proportions in different categories of the joint 
distribution of partners’ education is the outcome of two “forces”: variation in the marginal 
distributions (e.g., declines in the share of women with no education over time), and variation in the 
association between partners’ educational attainment net of marginal distributions (Torche 2010). For 
instance, the share of homogamous unions may simply be higher in the earliest marriage cohort because 
of the high concentration of husbands and wives in the “No education” category. Even given a 
constant association between husbands’ and wives’ levels of education, periods in which the marginal 
distributions are highly concentrated tend to produce a higher percentage of homogamous unions 
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(Schwartz and Mare 2005). Furthermore, the share of homogamous unions neglects information about 
the permeability of boundaries (Mare 1991), i.e., the ease with which individuals marry outside their 
own educational group. In what follows, I address some of these criticisms and explore whether the 
strength of the association between husbands’ and wives’ education has increased, or whether this 
trend is altered after controlling for shifts in the marginal distributions of husbands’ and wives’ 
education. In so doing, my ultimate goal is to provide a more precise categorization of educational 
assortative mating patterns in SSA.   
2.5 Educational assortative mating 
Trends 
To measure educational assortative mating I follow an approach similar to Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar 
(2017) and Greenwood et al. (2014), based on contingency tables and marital sorting parameters. For 
every given marriage cohort, each cell in the contingency table gives the observed fraction of partnered 
households that occurs in a specific educational pairing. Positive (negative) educational assortative 
mating is defined as men and women with the same level of education marrying more (less) frequently 
than what would be expected under a marriage pattern that is random with respect to education. Marital 
sorting between education levels + and  , is then the observed probability that a husband with 
education level + is married to a wife with education level ,, relative to the probability under random 
mating with respect to education: 
-(+, ,) = ./(0+ = +, 0, = ,)./(0+ = +)Pr (0, = ,) 
where 0+  (0,) denotes the education level of the husband (wife). Positive assortative mating occurs 
when the marital sorting parameter -(+,,) is larger than 1 when  is equal to . In a contingency 
table world, the diagonal of the contingency table describes the matches that occur when husbands 
and wives have the same educational level. This observed pattern of mating can be compared with the 
one that would obtain if husbands and wives matched randomly.44 Taking the sum along the diagonals 
for each of these two types of matches, actual and random, and computing the ratio of these two sums, 
we obtain -(+,,). The estimated marital sorting parameters – relative sum of diagonals – by marriage 
                                                           
44 Proportions under random mating are the expected frequencies under the independence assumption (i.e. the 
product of the marginal distributions for husbands and wives). For explanatory purposes, contingency tables by 
marriage cohort for SSA as a whole are reported in Appendix Table A2.3. 
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cohort are plotted in Figure 2.3 by sub-region (top panel) and location of residence (bottom panel). 
The exact value of the sorting parameters is provided in Appendix Table A2.4. 
Figure 2.3 provides evidence of positive educational assortative mating in SSA. That is, the 
ratios are larger than one, implying that the number of matches between husbands and wives with 
identical education is larger than what would occur if matching was random. Sorting parameters are 
higher for the latest marriage cohort relative to the earliest one, both for SSA as a whole and for each 
sub-region individually (top panel), suggesting that educational assortative mating has increased over 
subsequent cohorts. However, while for the whole SSA the marital sorting parameters increase 
monotonically from 1.4 to approximately 2 – meaning that in the latest marriage cohort assortative 
matches occur twice as often relative to a situation in which matches are formed randomly – sub-
regional trends are heterogeneous. For instance, positive assortative mating in early cohorts is lower in 
Western Africa, yet this region experiences the steepest increase in the sorting parameter followed, in 
turn, by Eastern and Central Africa. Conversely, Southern Africa experiences mild increases across 
early cohorts, followed by a downward trend thereafter. Steep upward trends in Western Africa and 
relatively flat/downward trends in Southern Africa are confirmed in Appendix Figure A2.2, which tests 
the robustness of the findings to alternative age ranges of women. The Southern African trends that 
emerge from this analysis are unique within SSA, and consistent with the hypotheses outlined in the 
theoretical background.  
The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 provides estimates of the marital sorting parameters by 
location of residence and shows evidence of positive educational assortative mating in both urban and 
rural areas. Yet, although mating in early cohorts is higher in urban areas, most of the increase in mating 
across cohorts is accounted for by changes in rural areas, where the sorting parameter increases 
monotonically from 1.3 to about 2.1. Conversely, overall trends in urban areas are fairly flat. Note that 
Southern Africa is the only sub-region where the sorting parameter does not follow an upward trend 
neither in urban nor rural areas, and where the rural-urban divide in mating patterns is less stark. As 
such, these findings seem consistent with the status attainment hypothesis in rural areas, and the 
inverted U-curve hypothesis in urban areas, where greater geographical mobility, educational 
expansion, cross-cultural exchange, and mass communication contribute to gradually spreading the 
logic of ‘romantic love.’ 
Given that conclusions about changes in educational assortative mating are dependent on the 
methodology used (Blossfeld 2009; Rosenfeld 2008; Schwartz 2013; Schwartz and Mare 2005), in 
Appendix Figure A2.3 I present results using an alternative measure, namely Kendall’s tau correlation 
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between husband and wife’s highest level attained in each 5-year marriage cohort.45 Despite minor 
discrepancies, this supplementary analysis confirms my main findings, i.e., the steep increase in the tau-
correlation in Western Africa, the uniqueness of Southern Africa as the only sub-region where mating 
has not increased, and the pivotal role of rural areas in driving SSA mating patterns. 
Log-linear models 
To be in line with some of the most prominent sociological literature on educational assortative mating 
(Mare 1991; Schwartz and Mare 2005; Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1998; Torche 2010; etc.), I 
complement the above analysis with a series of log-linear models. The underlying motivation is to 
summarize international variation in marital sorting in the best – defined as a combination of fit and 
parsimony – possible way. Log-linear models are appropriate in that they provide estimates of the 
changing association between couples’ educational characteristics while controlling for shifts in their 
marginal distributions (e.g., Agresti 2002). I estimate the following baseline model: 
#$34% = 5 + 56 + 57 + 548 + 59 + 567 + 5468 + 569 + 5478 + 579 + 5489 + 54689 + 54789 + 54678 
where H is husband’s education (i=1,2,3,4), W is wife’s education (j=1,2,3,4), R is sub-region 
(k=1,2,3,4), and M is marriage cohort (l=<1970, …,>=2010).46 In line with findings from the previous 
analysis, I estimate models separately for the overall sample, urban areas, and rural areas. 34 is the 
expected number of unions between husbands in education category i and wives in education category 
j, in sub-region k, from marriage cohort l. This baseline model captures variation in the distribution of 
husband’s and wife’s education by cohort and sub-region (54689 and 54789), allows the interaction 
between husband’s and wife’s education to vary by sub-region (54678), and contains all lower-order 
terms. In a second step I add homogamy and crossing parameters to the baseline specification to assess 
which model fits the data best. A homogamy model is: 
#$34% = :;-# <=> +  ?@A9 
                                                           
45 Kendall’s tau is a measure of rank correlation, given by the difference between the number of concordant and 
discordant pairs of couples relative to the total number of pairs of couples. A pair of couples is said to be 
concordant if both the wife and husband in one couple have higher education than the wife and husband in the 
other couple. The pair of couples is discordant if one couple has a wife with lower education and a husband with 
higher education as compared to the other couple. The Kendall correlation ranges from -1 to 1 and it is closer to 
1 the more similar the ranks of the spouses are in the marginal distribution of education of husbands and wives.  
46 For operationalization purposes, the two categorical variables for education – wife’s education and husband’s 
education – have been recoded as 1,2,3,4 instead of 0,1,2,3.  
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where O=1 if husband’s education category equals wife’s education category, and 0 
otherwise. ?@A9estimates the change in the odds of homogamy in marriage cohort l relative to the 
baseline year (<1970). A crossing model is: 
#$34% = :;-# <=> +  ?B9 
where ?B9 = C∑ ?D
EDF  G=/  > ∑ ?DEDF  G=/  < 0 G=/  =   
?D represents the change in the difficulty of crossing educational barrier q in marriage cohort l relative 
to the baseline year. Crossing models summarize the association between spouses’ education as a series 
of barriers to marriage between education groups, or in terms of the relative permeability of boundaries 
between adjacent education groups. Hence, the crossing parameters measure the log odds of marriage 
for couples in adjacent education categories relative to the log odds of homogamy, net of the marginal 
distributions of spouses’ education (Schwartz and Mare 2005; Torche 2010). Past research from the 
US has found these models to fit marriage data quite well (Blackwell 1998; Mare 1991). 
Table 2.3 provides the model specifications and fit statistics of the log-linear models. The table 
is divided in three panels, for SSA as a whole (panel a), urban areas (panel b), and rural areas (panel c). 
I present both the deviance and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics for model fit, yet 
rely mainly on the latter due to large sample sizes that make it hardly possible to find a model that does 
not significantly differ from the saturated model (Raftery 1995). More negative BIC statistics indicate 
a better-fitting model, and differences in BIC values that are larger than 10 provide good evidence that 
the model with the more negative BIC fits the data better.  
Model 1 is the baseline model, which assumes that the educational resemblance of spouses is 
time invariant – yet it is allowed to vary by sub-region.47 This model (panel a) fits the data better than 
alternative general specifications that allow the association to vary by marital cohort (Model 2). Model 
3 is the homogamy trend model, which parameterizes the trend as a change in the likelihood that 
husbands and wives share the same education level. By the BIC, adding this term does not alter the fit 
of the model relative to the baseline model, suggesting that the tendency for couples to marry within 
the same education category for SSA as a whole has not changed significantly over subsequent marriage 
                                                           
47 The model in which the husband-wife association is assumed to be both time-invariant and region-invariant 
(i.e., HRM and WRM, excluding HWM and HWR) has a deviance of 4,365 and a positive BIC of 3,308. As the 
model fits the data poorly by conventional standards, it is not reported in the analysis – yet it is available upon 
request.  
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cohorts. This model, however, might conceal variation in trends across different portions of the 
distribution (Schwartz and Mare 2005). Model 4 hence allows the degree of homogamy to differ across 
the diagonal cells of the homogamy table, showing a marginal improvement over the homogamy model 
described by a single parameter. Model 5 significantly improves the fit of the model by including an 
asymmetry parameter which accounts for the possibility that men and women “marry up” or “marry 
down” with respect to socioeconomic characteristics.48 Model 6 is the crossing trend model, which 
adds terms to capture variation in the difficulty of crossing educational boundaries across the education 
distribution. According to the BIC, the crossing model provides a better fit to the data than the baseline 
model, while it performs worse than the gender asymmetry specification. Models 7, 8, 9, and 10 are 
similar to 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, although the added parameters (O, D, A, and C) are allowed to 
vary by sub-region, testing the assumption that variation over marriage cohort might unfold differently 
across contexts. Among these, Model 7 (OMR) – allowing the homogamy parameter to vary by 
marriage cohort and region – significantly improves upon previous specifications and best describes 
the data. This finding indicates that while the tendency for couples to marry within the same education 
category for SSA as a whole has not changed significantly over marriage cohort (Model 3), the same is 
not true once sub-regional differences are accounted for.  
Models 11 to 14 build on Model 7 – the preferred specification up to this point – by adding 
inter-cohort (Models 11 to 13) and cross-regional (Model 14) variation in diagonal, asymmetry, and 
crossing parameters. As Model 12 has the lowest BIC, I conclude that the best-fitting model is one 
that permits the homogamy parameter to vary by marriage cohort and sub-region (OMR), while 
allowing for an asymmetric tendency to marry up or down to vary by marriage cohort (AM). Not least, 
consistent with my previous findings I show that model specifications summarizing international 
variation in marital sorting differ between urban and rural areas, and that SSA trends are mostly driven 
by variation in rural areas. In line with panel a, in rural areas (panel c) Model 7 is the best fitting model, 
and Model 12 provides a similar level of fit. Conversely, in urban areas (panel b), the baseline model is 
good enough to summarize variation in the data. Overall, this analysis shows that in SSA trends in 
assortative mating are better described by inter-cohort and cross-regional variation in homogamy and 
heterogamy, rather than by changes in the degree to which couples cross educational barriers. This 
                                                           
48 The variable is created as 0 if husband and wife have the same education, 1 if the husband “marries down” and 
2 if the husband “marries up” – irrespective of how many educational categories there are between husband and 
wife (e.g., the variable is 1 both for the pairing “husband-higher education” and “wife-no education” and the 
pairing “husband-higher education” and “wife-secondary education”). 
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finding is novel in itself and departs from previous scholarship in the US (Mare 1991; Schwartz and 
Mare 2005) and Latin America (Torche 2010).  
2.6 Wealth analysis 
Trends in wealth dispersion 
Before assessing the implications of educational assortative mating for household wealth inequality, I 
begin the analysis by exploring how between-household wealth inequality has evolved over marriage 
cohort. Note that for this portion of the analysis the number of marriage cohorts is reduced from ten 
(5-year) to five (10-year) to maximize sample variability.49 As the IWI is measured on a 0-100 scale in 
every country and it is comparable both between countries and over time, I measure inequality through 
the most straightforward measure of dispersion, i.e. the variance or standard deviation (SD). 
Specifically, I compute the variance of the IWI for every country-cohort combination. 
Figure 2.4 provides a geographical overview of wealth dispersion (in SD) by country and 
marriage cohort. In a spirit similar to Figure 2.1, I provide estimates for the earliest (left panel) and 
latest (right panel) marriage cohorts available for each country. The map shows that wealth dispersion 
is on average higher in Southern Africa and has increased across cohorts throughout most of SSA. 
There are some exceptions to this pattern in countries such as Gabon, Nigeria, and Central African 
Republic, where wealth dispersion shows a downward trend. Table A2.5 in the Appendix reports 
estimates from an OLS regression of the IWI SD on a categorical variable for marriage cohort. 
Estimates show that wealth dispersion has been increasing over marriage cohort, with only marginal 
differences between urban and rural areas. For instance, compared to the SD in the earliest marriage 
cohort, the SD in IWI in the latest marriage cohort for SSA as a whole is 6 to 7 units higher (panel a). 
Although there is a dearth of research on patterns of wealth inequality in SSA – mostly due to the 
complexities inherent in measuring social and economic performance in this region (Harttgen, Klasen, 
and Vollmer 2013; Klasen and Blades 2013) – my findings are consistent with figures from the African 
Development Bank (Shimeles and Nabassaga 2018).50 Other recent studies suggest that inequality 
                                                           
49 Also, as households/couples in more recent cohorts have likely had less time to accumulate assets/wealth, by 
widening the horizon to ten years we are likely to obtain a more representative and balanced picture.  
50 Data on income inequality are instead more readily available and show that SSA remains one of the most 
unequal regions in the world. Ten of the 19 most unequal countries globally are in SSA and seven outlier African 
countries drive this inequality. Between 1991 and 2011, a clear bifurcation in inequality trends existed across 
countries in the region. Furthermore, 17 countries (predominantly agricultural economies from West Africa and 
a few from other regions) experienced declining inequality, whereas 12 countries, predominantly in Southern and 
Central Africa and economies characterized by an important oil and mining sector, recorded an inequality rise 
(UNDP 2017). Although asset measures largely differ from income measures, there is a good degree of 
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trends across countries in Africa have not leveled off, with no downward pattern emerging either with 
respect to the recent economic resurgence, or any other improvements in the level of human 
development (Bigsten 2018; Fosu 2015). 
Counterfactual analysis 
To assess implications of educational assortative mating for household wealth inequality, I follow a 
simple approach that well suits micro-level data. Specifically, I model the cohort-specific variance 
(VAR) of wealth 
KLMNOP = N0(OQ) − $0(O)%QP 
and use regression analysis to estimate counterfactual expectations reweighting the betas using either 
“assortative” (observed) or “random” (counterfactual) proportions from the above contingency tables. 
For each marriage cohort, each component of the variance in the above formula (i.e., the second 
moment and the squared mean) is regressed onto a series of dummies for whether the couple is 
homogamous with both partners having no education (reference category), both partners having 
primary education, both partners having secondary education, both partners having higher education, 
and partners having discordant levels of education (the off-diagonals).51 After obtaining the betas, 
expectations are computed multiplying the betas by either the observed or counterfactual proportions. 
This way, for each marriage cohort I obtain an estimated variance computed under observed 
proportions, and an estimated variance computed under counterfactual proportions. With these 
quantities, I compute the share of cohort-specific inequality attributable to educational assortative 
mating as follows: 
%#S = KLMNOP@TUVWXVY − KLMNOPZ@[VW\]Z[]KLMNOP@TUVWXVY  
where KLMNOPZ@[VW\]Z[] = $KLM^KLM_]`FW]Y@_%. 
How would wealth inequality change if we imposed random – instead of assortative – mating in each 
marriage cohort? Table 2.4 reports the variance under observed proportions and random proportions, 
by urban/rural location of residence (panel a) and sub-region (panel b). Estimates for SSA as a whole 
(panel a) show that the share of inequality attributable to mating is low, reaching at most 3.7 percent 
in the latest cohort. Further disaggregation unravels interesting heterogeneity, suggesting that only in 
                                                           
consistency between the maps I provide and the UNDP findings on income inequality, especially for what 
concerns Southern African countries such as Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc. 
51 These regression estimates are not reported in the analysis (available upon request). 
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urban areas mating explains a share of the cohort-specific inequality, albeit low. Heterogeneity by sub-
region (panel b) further reveals that the low shares accounted for by mating are driven primarily by 
Western Africa. Conversely, in Eastern Africa mating accounts for up to 12 percent of the cohort-
specific inequality in wealth, followed in turn by Southern Africa (at most 10-11 percent) and Central 
Africa (at most 7 percent). High shares in Eastern Africa are aligned with the urban/rural differences 
identified in panel a, in that – as of 2014 – Eastern Africa has the lowest share of urban population (25 
percent, against 44 percent in Western and Central Africa, and 61 percent in Southern Africa), yet it 
exhibits the highest urbanization rate within SSA, with an average annual increase in the urban 
population of 4.5 percent (UN-DESA 2015). Overall, these findings support the idea that educational 
assortative mating accounts for a non-negligible share of the cohort-specific inequality in wealth. 
Indeed, these are not sizeable coefficients, yet they still point to a link between educational assortative 
mating and household wealth inequality which has not been previously identified in the literature. 
Can changes in mating overtime explain time trends – mostly, the increase – in wealth 
inequality? To answer this question, I examine what would happen to wealth inequality if couples from 
the latest marriage cohort matched as those in the earliest ones. Methodologically, I re-compute the 
variance in the latest cohort, applying the observed proportions from the earlier cohorts. However, 
changes in observed proportions are affected by shifts in marginal distributions. To overcome this 
issue, I use the Sinkhorn-Knopp algorithm (1967), an iterative procedure outlined in Mosteller (1968) 
and recently adopted by Greenwood et al. (2014), to construct standardized contingency tables, such 
that two contingency tables have the same marginal distributions associated with the rows and 
columns.52 After imposing the marginal distributions of the latest marriage cohort to all preceding 
cohorts, I thus compute the new “observed” proportions and estimate the corresponding variances. 
Table 2.5 provides results from the simulation exercise described above. The first two columns 
in each sub-panel rely on “unadjusted” (i.e., affected by differences in marginal distributions) observed 
proportions, while the last two columns rely on “adjusted” (i.e., independent of differences in marginal 
distributions) observed proportions obtained through the above iterative procedure. Focusing on 
unadjusted estimates for SSA as a whole (panel a), the first two columns suggest that wealth inequality 
in the latest cohort (>=2005) would be lower by about 19 percent if we imposed the observed pattern 
of mating from the earliest cohort (<1975), with trends very much driven by rural areas. The opposite 
                                                           
52 The basic idea is to fix the marginal distributions of a contingency table and rework the internal cells such that 
the “new” marginal distributions are respected. Once two contingency tables have the same marginal 
distributions, the cells within the table can be compared. Taking a 4x4 table, this can be standardized so that each 
element of the two marginal distributions is ¼. 
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trend is observed in urban areas, where wealth inequality would actually be larger if we imposed the 
observed pattern of mating from the earliest cohort (by 7 percent). However, if we rely on adjusted 
estimates we observe that changes in mating hardly move time trends in wealth inequality, irrespective 
of location of residence and SSA sub-region. The bottom line of this exercise is that whatever is the 
share of the time trend in inequality that is accounted for by changes in mating, this is driven by shifting 
educational distributions rather than by assortative mating itself.  
Note that – differently from income and consumption expenditure data – IWIs and asset 
indices in general are not adjusted for household size or other demographic characteristics of the 
household. The reason is that the assets used for constructing these indices consist almost exclusively 
of household public goods. Housing characteristics, access to basic services and durables like a TV, 
fridge, clock, or car tend to benefit all household members (Smits and Steendijk 2015).53 In any case, 
to provide a proxy for “crowding” and evaluate whether household characteristics explain any 
variability in the IWI, I re-estimate IWI variances controlling for some household characteristics, 
namely the total number of household members (residents plus visitors), a dummy for whether the 
partner lives in the household or elsewhere, the total number of sons living at home, and the total 
number of daughters living at home. Appendix Table A2.6 replicates panel a of Table 2.4 comparing 
variances computed under observed and random proportions, controlling for the above-listed 
household characteristics. Estimated variances are almost identical to those provided in Table 2.4, in 
line with most of the available literature (Filmer and Scott 2012; Rutstein and Johnson 2004; Sahn and 
Stifel 2000). This finding suggests I am not missing any significant household-related variability in the 
estimation of variances.  
Lastly, I conduct these analyses by country selecting the three countries where inequality has 
increased the most between the earliest and latest marriage cohort – namely, Guinea, Rwanda, and 
Uganda – and the three countries where inequality has increased the least (or has decreased) – Central 
African Republic, Congo, and Zimbabwe. Results show that even in these “extreme” cases, changes in 
mating itself explain trends in wealth inequality to a negligible extent – available upon request.  
                                                           
53 As explained in Smits and Steendijk (2015), in some studies the number of sleeping rooms is divided by the 
number of persons in the household, to obtain an indicator of "crowding". For IWI this is not the case, as the 
number of rooms is meant to be an indicator of the size of the house and not of crowding. A house with three 
sleeping rooms is generally bigger and more expensive than a house with less sleeping rooms and this is 
independent of family size. 
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2.7 Conclusions and discussion 
This study has provided a comprehensive analysis of educational assortative mating across 39 countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, a region of the world that has experienced rapid socio-economic and 
demographic change yet has been largely neglected in the assortative mating literature. Adopting a 
marriage-cohort temporal perspective and computing measures that net out the confounding role of 
shifting educational distributions, I have shown that mating in SSA has followed rather different 
trajectories both by sub-region and by location of residence. Specifically, while there is evidence of 
positive educational assortative mating throughout SSA – i.e., men and women with the same level of 
education marrying more frequently than what would be expected under a marriage pattern that is 
random with respect to education – mating has increased over subsequent cohorts in Western, Central, 
and Eastern Africa, yet it has flattened out and somewhat decreased in Southern Africa. Heterogeneity 
is also evident in levels and relative growth, as mating was lower in Western Africa for early cohorts, 
yet the sub-region has witnessed the steepest increase in the marital sorting parameter. Additionally, I 
have shown that increases in mating have been largely driven by rural areas – where the trend for SSA 
as a whole is consistent with the status attainment hypothesis – while mating in urban areas has shown 
a mild increase followed by an incipient decline – consistent with the inverted U-curve framework and 
the increasing applicability of the general openness hypothesis. Overall, the documented heterogeneity 
– and, foremost, the diverging trends between Western and Southern Africa – is consistent with the 
economic (e.g., urbanization), socio-demographic (e.g., changes in families), and cultural specificities 
(e.g., patriarchal norms) of each sub-region. 
 In the second part of the analysis I have explored implications of educational 
assortative mating for household wealth inequality measured through the International Wealth Index. 
Using counterfactual simulations both within and across-cohorts, I have shown that assortative mating 
accounts for a non-negligible share of the cohort-specific inequality in household wealth, which ranges 
sub-regionally between 3 and 12 percent and is wholly driven by urban areas. Mating accounts for a 
higher share of inequality in Southern Africa – the most urbanized sub-region – and Eastern Africa – 
the sub-region that has experienced the highest rates of urbanization. Provided a link exists between 
mating and wealth inequality, the steepest increases in mating in rural areas would have led us to expect 
the share of cohort-specific inequality attributable to mating to be higher in rural areas. Empirical 
evidence contradicts this expectation, thus strengthening the claim that mating matters little for wealth 
inequality. This is further confirmed by cross-cohort simulations, which show that changes in mating 
over time barely move the time trends in wealth inequality. This finding echoes the solid body of 
evidence from high-income societies claiming that mating plays a small to negligible role in explaining 
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trends in household income inequality (Breen and Salazar 2011; Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar 2017) and 
pushes to consider additional factors – missing in the present analysis – such as women’s labor supply 
decisions (Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz 2017; Greenwood et al. 2014; etc.).  
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first large-scale study focusing on trends, 
variation, and implications of mating in SSA. As such, it suffers from several limitations that set the 
stage for future research. First, the data and measures present limitations that relate to the nature and 
sampling frame of DHS data. As the DHS only provide data on the year of first union and include 
information on the education of the current partner – but not any previous one – the sample was 
limited to couples where women had been married only once, while no restrictions were imposed on 
men due to the lack of information on their marriage order. While this approach follows existing 
literature (e.g., Casterline, Williams, and McDonald 1986) and pretty much aligns with the claim that a 
focus on first marriages is what really matters for understanding mating patterns (Schwartz and Mare 
2012), there is still room for improvement. However – at least as of now – there is no other dataset 
that would permit an analysis of mating patterns in SSA with analogous coverage.  
Another possible source of concern in studies of mating is the classification of educational 
levels which, as stated by Blossfeld (2009), should be neither too crude nor too detailed to be 
informative. Ideally, it is key to define categories such that differences between them reflect well-
chosen attainment levels with social significance. Only in that case increases in homogamy rates can 
really be interpreted as indicators of social closure, and increases in intermarriage as gains in social 
openness. Although the DHS collect educational variables similarly across countries and over time, 
making sure the above requirements are satisfied is always a challenge in broad-scale comparative 
studies.  
Methodologically, this study – as many other studies of mating that build on cross-sectional 
data – takes marital matches as the starting point and attempts to explain trends and variation in mating 
through spouses’ individual characteristics. As such, the analysis excludes all those individuals who are 
still single at the time of the interview. This is likely to create issues in societies with increasing single 
rates at the beginning of the life course. However, I believe in the SSA context this is less problematic, 
as getting married remains the largely predominant social norm for both men and women and virtually 
everyone eventually enters a union (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2004). Given the increasing proportion 
of never-married individuals in Southern Africa, this is likely the only sub-region in which this omission 
is likely to introduce some bias. Another methodological issue is tied to the scale of the analysis. As 
mating is ultimately determined by the availability of partners and potential matches, its functioning is 
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more easily – and perhaps properly – understood at a finer level of analysis, such as districts or cities. 
As this study sought to provide an overview of patterns for the region as a whole, this ultimately boils 
down to the usual trade-off between breadth of analysis and level of detail.  
Lastly, the wealth analysis presents some limitations that pertain to the type of measure used 
– which is the only available for most LMICs. The IWI has the advantage of easy reproducibility, as it 
builds on the same set of assets across countries. At the same time, its universality may be a drawback, 
as finding a small set of assets common to such a large number of surveys requires discarding a lot of 
the asset information gathered about any given household – at the risk of obtaining a variable that is 
somewhat uninformative. Despite not being dismissive of asset indices, Harttgen, Klasen and Vollmer 
(2013) claimed that asset indices substantially overstate the pace of poverty reduction as there is strong 
evidence of ‘asset drift’, i.e., an accumulation of assets over time, with households accumulating assets 
such as mobile phones and TVs without getting any less poor. Households often accumulate these 
assets because they are becoming relatively cheaper, preferences are shifting towards them, and 
households often do not dispose of them; but this does not mean that these households are any less 
poor as a result. Using data from South Africa, Wittenberg and Leibbrandt (2017) also showed that, 
despite being powerful tools for analyzing social trends, asset indices often fail an internal validity test, 
that is, ranking individuals with rural assets below individuals with no assets at all – thus leading to an 
exaggerated sense of rural deprivation and a lack of appreciation for deprivation in urban areas.  Lastly, 
there is skepticism on whether asset indices may proxy for measures on income. In line with Sahn and 
Stifel (2003) and Filmer and Scott (2012), Smits and Steendijk (2015) claimed that asset indices are 
more indicators of longer-term, more stable, aspects of household’s economic status, rather than 
monetary or expenditure-based welfare measures. As such, it is not clear (yet) whether it makes sense 
to study mating patterns in relation to analyses of inequality based on asset measures. The high degree 
of consistency between my results and research on mating and inequality in high-income societies 
provides some reliability to the findings. Yet these are certainly not indisputable, and further advances 
in the field will permit to assess their robustness.   
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2.9 Tables 
Table 2.1: Number of countries and survey waves included in the analysis, by region of sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Notes: Regional classification from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). Number of survey waves in 
parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional classification of Sub-Saharan African countries 
Western  Central  Eastern  Southern  
Benin (4)  Angola (1)  Burundi (2)  Botswana (1) 
Burkina Faso (4)  Cameroon (4)  Comoros (2)  Lesotho (3) 
Cote d'Ivoire (2)  Central African Republic (1)  Ethiopia (4)  Namibia (4) 
Gambia (1)  Chad (3)  Kenya (6)  South Africa (1) 
Ghana (6)  Congo (2)  Madagascar (4)  Swaziland (1) 
Guinea (3)  Congo, DR (2)  Malawi (5)   
Liberia (3)  Gabon (2)  Mozambique (3)   
Mali (4)  Sao Tome and Principe (1)  Rwanda (5)   
Mauritania (1)    Tanzania (5)   
Niger (4)    Uganda (5)   
Nigeria (4)    Zambia (5)   
Senegal (7)    Zimbabwe (6)   
Sierra Leone (2)       
Togo (3)       
14 countries - 48 surveys   8 countries - 16 surveys   12 countries - 52 surveys   5 countries - 10 surveys 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics on couples’ education, by marriage cohort 
 
Notes: Weighted estimates using sample DHS weights. Standard errors in parentheses. “Ratio over <1970” gives 
the relative ratio of the value in each cohort compared to the <1970 one, i.e., the earliest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marriage 
cohort 
    a. Highest level attained       b. Grade attained 
    Wife   Husband      Wife   Husband 
N   Average 
Ratio 
over 
<1970 
  Average 
Ratio 
over 
<1970 
 N   Average 
Ratio 
over 
<1970 
  Average 
Ratio 
over 
<1970 
<1970 4,956  0.32 .  0.54 .  4,893  1.43 .  2.71 . 
   (0.011)   (0.015)     (0.055)   (0.081)  
1970-1974 12,718  0.40 1.2  0.62 1.1  12,536  1.83 1.3  3.09 1.1 
   (0.008)   (0.010)     (0.042)   (0.059)  
1975-1979 25,384  0.46 1.4  0.67 1.2  24,959  2.18 1.5  3.37 1.2 
   (0.007)   (0.009)     (0.036)   (0.047)  
1980-1984 40,607  0.55 1.7  0.75 1.4  40,069  2.62 1.8  3.76 1.4 
   (0.006)   (0.008)     (0.032)   (0.040)  
1985-1989 55,511  0.63 2.0  0.83 1.6  54,927  3.00 2.1  4.19 1.5 
   (0.006)   (0.007)     (0.030)   (0.037)  
1990-1994 74,626  0.68 2.1  0.91 1.7  73,977  3.26 2.3  4.57 1.7 
   (0.006)   (0.007)     (0.030)   (0.036)  
1995-1999 82,918  0.79 2.5  1.02 1.9  82,293  3.82 2.7  5.17 1.9 
   (0.006)   (0.007)     (0.032)   (0.038)  
2000-2004 69,789  0.93 2.9  1.15 2.1  69,358  4.56 3.2  5.89 2.2 
   (0.007)   (0.008)     (0.038)   (0.043)  
2005-2009 37,903  1.22 3.8  1.39 2.6  37,633  6.11 4.3  7.21 2.7 
   (0.010)   (0.010)     (0.055)   (0.057)  
>=2010 11,626  1.62 5.1  1.72 3.2  11,565  8.31 5.8  9.05 3.3 
   (0.017)   (0.016)     (0.092)   (0.092)  
Total 416,038               412,210             
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Table 2.3: Log-linear models for the association between partners’ educational attainment 
 
Notes: Model terms: H=husband’s education; W=wife’s education; R=region; M=marriage cohort; 
O=homogamy (reduced homogamy); D=main diagonal (expanded homogamy); A=marrying up/down 
(asymmetry); C=crossing parameters. 
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Table 2.4: Cohort-specific variance in wealth (IWI) under observed and random mating scenarios, by 
location of residence (top panel) and region of sub-Saharan Africa (bottom panel) 
 a
.
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
 
c
o
h
o
rt
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
<
19
7
5
32
8.
1
31
6.
6
3.
5%
60
7.
3
60
4.
9
0.
4%
11
6.
7
11
6.
7
0.
0%
19
7
5
-1
9
8
4
43
4.
8
42
9.
1
1.
3%
68
1.
9
64
6.
6
5.
2%
15
4.
7
15
6.
3
-1
.0
%
19
8
5
-1
9
9
4
51
2.
3
51
4.
8
-0
.5
%
63
5.
9
61
4.
2
3.
4%
22
0.
1
22
3.
8
-1
.7
%
19
9
5
-2
0
0
4
58
4.
0
57
6.
0
1.
4%
56
0.
1
53
3.
5
4.
7%
27
1.
4
26
9.
6
0.
7%
>
2
0
0
5
71
7.
4
69
0.
7
3.
7%
47
4.
9
45
4.
0
4.
4%
35
6.
3
34
8.
7
2.
1%
b
.
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
 
c
o
h
o
rt
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(a
ss
or
ta
tiv
e)
V
ar
ia
nc
e 
(r
an
do
m
)
%
 in
eq
.
<
19
7
5
32
3.
7
33
1.
2
-2
.3
%
36
3.
5
33
9.
0
6.
8%
28
0.
3
24
6.
3
12
.1
%
91
4.
8
81
9.
5
10
.4
%
19
7
5
-1
9
8
4
36
4.
9
37
6.
5
-3
.2
%
41
5.
6
38
2.
2
8.
0%
38
3.
9
33
6.
5
12
.3
%
10
84
.7
99
9.
6
7.
8%
19
8
5
-1
9
9
4
46
0.
3
46
4.
6
-0
.9
%
58
6.
9
58
4.
6
0.
4%
42
7.
5
38
1.
5
10
.8
%
98
4.
7
92
3.
0
6.
3%
19
9
5
-2
0
0
4
54
6.
9
53
4.
4
2.
3%
63
8.
2
62
9.
4
1.
4%
50
3.
5
44
4.
3
11
.8
%
86
9.
2
80
7.
7
7.
1%
>
2
0
0
5
59
4.
3
56
8.
0
4.
4%
84
3.
6
80
0.
3
5.
1%
65
3.
5
59
3.
2
9.
2%
77
6.
7
69
4.
4
10
.6
%
S
o
u
th
e
rn
O
v
e
ra
ll
U
rb
a
n
R
u
ra
l
W
e
st
e
rn
C
e
n
tr
a
l
E
a
st
e
rn
91 
 
Table 2.5: Variance in wealth (IWI) for the latest marriage cohort (>=2005) under different 
counterfactual distributions  
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2.10 Figures 
Figure 2.1: Share of homogamous (=), hypergamous (H), and hypogamous (W) unions for the 
earliest (left panel) and latest (right panel) marriage cohorts for each country  
 
Notes: MC: marriage cohort. “W”: Men<Women; “=”: Men=Women; “H”: Men>Women. Country codes: 
AGO-Angola; BDI-Burundi; BEN-Benin; BFA-Burkina Faso; BWA-Botswana; CAF-Central African Republic; 
CIV-Côte d’Ivoire; CMR-Cameroon; COD-Democratic Republic of the Congo; COG-Congo; COM-Comoros; 
ETH-Ethiopia; GAB-Gabon; GHA-Ghana; GIN-Guinea; GMB-Gambia; KEN-Kenya; LBR-Liberia; LSO-
Lesotho; MDG-Madagascar; MLI-Mali; MOZ-Mozambique; MRT-Mauritania; MWI-Malawi; NAM-Namibia; 
NER-Niger; NGA-Nigeria; RWA-Rwanda; SEN-Senegal; SLE-Sierra Leone; STP-Sao Tome and Principe; SWZ-
Swaziland; TCD-Chad; TGO-Togo; TZA-Tanzania; UGA-Uganda; ZAF-South Africa; ZMB-Zambia; ZWE-
Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 2.2: Share of homogamous couples by educational level, for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole 
(top panel) and by location of residence (bottom panel) 
 
Notes: “U”: urban; “R”: rural. 
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Figure 2.3: Positive educational assortative mating (s parameter), by region of sub-Saharan Africa (top 
panel) and location of residence (bottom panel) 
 
Notes: “U”: urban; “R”: rural. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
Figure 2.4: Wealth dispersion (SD in IWI) for the earliest (left panel) and latest (right panel) marriage 
cohort, by sub-Saharan African country  
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2.11 Appendix 
Table A2.1: Number of countries, survey waves, and couples per wave included in the analysis, by 
region of sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Notes: Regional classification from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). Number of couples per wave 
in parentheses. The 14 survey waves for which no IWI is available are reported in italic.  
 
Western 
 (14 countries - 48 surveys) 
Central 
 (8 countries - 16 surveys) 
Eastern 
 (12 countries - 52 surveys) 
Southern 
 (5 countries - 10 surveys) 
Benin  Angola Burundi Botswana 
1996 (3,362) 2015 (6,764) 1987 (2,718)  1988 (1,998) 
2001 (3,994) Cameroon 2010 (5,572) Lesotho 
2006 (13,272) 1991 (1,035) Comoros 2004 (1,803) 
2011 (13,438) 1998 (1,403) 1996 (621) 2009 (2,059) 
Burkina Faso 2004 (2,605) 2012 (1,345) 2014 (1,914) 
1993 (4,346) 2011 (3,917) Ethiopia Namibia 
1998 (4,490) Central African Republic 2000 (3,623) 1992 (1,024) 
2003 (8,682) 1994 (2,518) 2005 (4,001) 2000 (1,339) 
2010 (13,082) Chad 2011 (4,943) 2006 (1,761) 
Cote d'Ivoire 1996 (2,351) 2016 (5,039) 2013 (1,690) 
1994 (2,260) 2004 (1,880) Kenya South Africa 
2011 (2,977) 2014 (6,644) 1989 (2,568)  1998 (2,838) 
Gambia Congo 1993 (2,453) Swaziland 
2013 (3,373) 2005 (3,210) 1998 (2,594) 2006 (1,081) 
Ghana 2011 (2,635) 2003 (2,543)  
1988 (1,157)  Congo, DR 2008 (2,696)  
1993 (1,300)  2007 (5,460) 2014 (5,185)  
1998 (1,347) 2013 (11,242) Madagascar  
2003 (1,581) Gabon 1992 (1,377)  
2008 (1,325) 2000 (1,163) 1997 (1,608)  
2014 (2,755) 2012 (1,614) 2003 (2,113)  
Guinea Sao Tome and Principe 2008 (4,572)  
1999 (2,551) 2008 (590) Malawi  
2005 (2,966)  1992 (1,236)  
2012 (3,219)  2000 (3,389)  
Liberia  2004 (3,024)  
1986 (1,021)  2010 (6,470)  
2007 (1,733)  2015 (6,905)  
2013 (2,304)  Mozambique  
Mali  1997 (1,921)  
1995 (3,652)  2003 (2,923)  
2001 (4,790)  2011 (3,502)  
2006 (5,396)  Rwanda  
2012 (4,871)  1992 (2,014)  
Mauritania  2000 (2,405)  
2000 (1,763)  2005 (2,779)  
Niger  2010 (3,999)  
1992 (1,954)   2014 (4,261)  
1998 (2,209)  Tanzania  
2006 (3,188)  1991 (2,347)  
2012 (4,515)  1996 (2,288)  
Nigeria  2004 (2,966)  
1990 (3,427)  2010 (2,791)  
2003 (2,389)  2015 (3,665)  
2008 (12,081)  Uganda  
2013 (14,025)  1988 (1,117)  
Senegal  1995 (1,741)  
1986 (1,274)  2000 (1,829)  
1992 (1,817)  2006 (2,317)  
2005 (3,887)  2011 (2,496)  
2010 (4,846)  Zambia  
2012 (2,488)  1992 (1,704)  
2014 (2,553)  1996 (1,841)  
2015 (2,724)  2001 (1,862)  
Sierra Leone  2007 (1,942)  
2008 (2,561)  2013 (4,623)  
2013 (5,108)  Zimbabwe  
Togo  1988 (1,228)  
1988 (967)   1994 (1,714)  
1998 (2,780)  1999 (1,615)  
2013 (3,328)  2005 (2,251)  
  2010 (2,672)  
  2015 (2,964)  
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Table A2.2: Summary statistics on couples’ age, by marriage cohort 
 
Notes: Weighted estimates using sample DHS weights. Standard errors in parentheses. “Ratio over <1970” gives 
the relative ratio of the value in each cohort compared to the <1970 one, i.e., the earliest.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marriage cohort N 
Age 
Wife   Husband   Diff. 
Ratio over 
<1970 
<1970 258 39.50   50.61   11.11   
  (0.069)  (0.603)  (0.594)  
1970-1974 3,285 38.49  49.26  10.77 0.97 
  (0.041)  (0.193)  (0.184)  
1975-1979 11,665 36.71  46.99  10.28 0.92 
  (0.039)  (0.120)  (0.111)  
1980-1984 28,545 34.96  44.78  9.82 0.88 
  (0.045)  (0.083)  (0.068)  
1985-1989 49,810 33.59  42.94  9.34 0.84 
  (0.041)  (0.067)  (0.051)  
1990-1994 73,873 32.53  41.32  8.79 0.79 
  (0.033)  (0.052)  (0.043)  
1995-1999 84,241 30.92  39.14  8.22 0.74 
  (0.027)  (0.045)  (0.040)  
2000-2004 71,309 29.25  36.80  7.55 0.68 
  (0.025)  (0.046)  (0.042)  
2005-2009 38,862 28.31  34.94  6.63 0.60 
  (0.027)  (0.053)  (0.048)  
>=2010 11,983 28.26  34.17  5.91 0.53 
  (0.049)  (0.098)  (0.084)  
Total 373,831             
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Table A2.3: Contingency tables (actual and random mating) by marriage cohort, sub-Saharan Africa as 
a whole 
 
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.524 0.411 0.051 0.148 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.001
Primary (H) 0.161 0.231 0.157 0.083 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.001
Secondary (H) 0.026 0.062 0.046 0.023 0.016 0.002 0.000 0.000
Higher (H) 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.479 0.355 0.053 0.151 0.003 0.027 0.000 0.002
Primary (H) 0.158 0.220 0.166 0.094 0.009 0.017 0.000 0.001
Secondary (H) 0.023 0.075 0.059 0.032 0.031 0.006 0.001 0.000
Higher (H) 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.000
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.461 0.323 0.049 0.148 0.004 0.039 0.000 0.004
Primary (H) 0.140 0.204 0.170 0.094 0.015 0.025 0.000 0.002
Secondary (H) 0.026 0.087 0.065 0.040 0.047 0.011 0.001 0.001
Higher (H) 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.002 0.005 0.000
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.437 0.287 0.049 0.145 0.006 0.054 0.000 0.005
Primary (H) 0.114 0.178 0.170 0.090 0.021 0.033 0.000 0.003
Secondary (H) 0.030 0.099 0.070 0.050 0.067 0.019 0.002 0.002
Higher (H) 0.003 0.020 0.006 0.010 0.016 0.004 0.008 0.000
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.399 0.246 0.049 0.138 0.006 0.064 0.000 0.006
Primary (H) 0.104 0.162 0.169 0.091 0.027 0.043 0.000 0.004
Secondary (H) 0.034 0.110 0.078 0.062 0.088 0.029 0.003 0.003
Higher (H) 0.004 0.023 0.008 0.013 0.022 0.006 0.010 0.001
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.369 0.219 0.048 0.130 0.007 0.067 0.000 0.008
Primary (H) 0.104 0.152 0.163 0.090 0.026 0.047 0.001 0.006
Secondary (H) 0.038 0.118 0.086 0.070 0.099 0.036 0.005 0.004
Higher (H) 0.004 0.027 0.009 0.016 0.026 0.008 0.013 0.001
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.316 0.171 0.050 0.121 0.007 0.072 0.000 0.010
Primary (H) 0.099 0.139 0.172 0.098 0.032 0.058 0.001 0.008
Secondary (H) 0.039 0.119 0.093 0.084 0.122 0.050 0.007 0.007
Higher (H) 0.005 0.029 0.009 0.021 0.032 0.012 0.019 0.002
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.264 0.126 0.045 0.104 0.010 0.077 0.000 0.013
Primary (H) 0.086 0.117 0.171 0.096 0.038 0.071 0.001 0.012
Secondary (H) 0.038 0.119 0.100 0.098 0.154 0.073 0.010 0.012
Higher (H) 0.005 0.032 0.009 0.027 0.039 0.020 0.030 0.003
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.176 0.065 0.043 0.073 0.013 0.074 0.001 0.021
Primary (H) 0.065 0.079 0.170 0.089 0.045 0.090 0.003 0.025
Secondary (H) 0.033 0.097 0.094 0.110 0.200 0.110 0.021 0.031
Higher (H) 0.005 0.038 0.008 0.043 0.059 0.043 0.065 0.012
Marginal
Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random Assortative Random
No Education (H) 0.098 0.024 0.031 0.037 0.016 0.058 0.002 0.028
Primary (H) 0.037 0.036 0.128 0.056 0.050 0.087 0.006 0.043
Secondary (H) 0.023 0.064 0.083 0.100 0.243 0.156 0.048 0.077
Higher (H) 0.003 0.038 0.010 0.060 0.085 0.093 0.139 0.046
Marginal
0.663 0.283 0.051 0.004
<1970
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.713 0.257 0.027 0.002
1970-1974
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.584 0.296 0.109 0.011
1975-1979
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.628 0.288 0.076 0.007
1980-1984
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.516 0.307 0.159 0.019
1985-1989
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.541 0.304 0.142 0.014
1990-1994
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
>2010
No Education (W) Primary (W)
1995-1999
No Education (W) Primary (W) Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.458 0.323 0.192 0.027
2000-2004
Secondary  (W) Higher (W)
0.161 0.252 0.394 0.194
0.0900.3170.3160.278
Higher (W)Secondary  (W)Primary (W)No Education (W)
Higher (W)Secondary  (W)Primary (W)No Education (W)
2005-2009
0.0410.2410.3250.393
99 
 
Table A2.4: Relative sum of diagonals of cohort-specific contingency tables (observed mating/random 
mating) 
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Table A2.5: Association between wealth dispersion (SD) and marriage cohort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IWI (SD) 
a. All   b. Urban   c. Rural 
(1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Marriage cohort (Ref.<1975)         
         
1975-1984 2.036*** 1.846***  2.441*** 1.916***  1.859*** 1.803*** 
 (0.070) (0.068)  (0.173) (0.126)  (0.077) (0.079) 
1985-1994 3.673*** 3.412***  3.911*** 3.351***  3.475*** 3.390*** 
 (0.078) (0.074)  (0.192) (0.139)  (0.086) (0.086) 
1995-2004 4.984*** 4.626***  4.884*** 4.250***  4.807*** 4.727*** 
 (0.080) (0.074)  (0.198) (0.139)  (0.089) (0.086) 
>=2005 7.055*** 6.188***  6.534*** 5.388***  6.958*** 6.689*** 
 (0.086) (0.079)  (0.203) (0.146)  (0.095) (0.093) 
         
Constant 16.688*** 23.289***  17.516*** 23.822***  16.503*** 23.087*** 
 (0.076) (0.078)  (0.192) (0.142)  (0.084) (0.092) 
         
Country FE No Yes   No Yes   No Yes 
Obs. 392,486 392,486  126,272 126,272  266,214 266,214 
R2 0.164 0.874   0.105 0.878   0.176 0.870 
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Table A2.6: Cohort-specific variance in wealth (IWI) under observed and random mating scenarios, 
estimating wealth controlling for household characteristics 
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Figure A2.1: Share of homogamous couples: both partners with the same educational level (top 
panel), both partners with no education (middle panel), both partners with higher education (bottom 
panel), by country (left) and region (right) of sub-Saharan Africa 
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Figure A2.2: Positive educational assortative mating (s parameter), by region of sub-Saharan Africa 
and alternative age ranges of women: 15-49 (top), 20-35 (middle), and 30-45 (bottom) 
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Figure A2.3: Positive educational assortative mating (b parameter), by region of sub-Saharan Africa 
(top panel) and location of residence (bottom panel)  
 
Notes: “U”: urban; “R”: rural. 
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Chapter 3. Beyond Attendance: Gendered Impacts of a Cash Transfer for Education 
and the Unpaid Care Burden in Rural Morocco  
 
3.0 Abstract 
This paper capitalizes on a randomized cash-transfer intervention implemented in rural Morocco 
between 2008 and 2010 to shed new light on the interplay between household inequality, as driven by 
gender and unpaid care work dynamics, and children’s schooling. The study explores the effect of the 
cash transfer on school progression and unpaid care work, including analyses of how effects vary by 
gender and time spent on unpaid care work prior to intervention implementation. Results suggest that 
the intervention increased the likelihood of girls progressing through grades on time by approximately 
6 to 10 percentage points, while it had no discernible effect for boys. Yet the benefit of the treatment 
on timely grade progression was reduced by a third to a half for girls engaged in unpaid care tasks, and 
the transfer proved ineffective in lessening the care burden. Taken together, findings suggest that as a 
result of the intervention girls performing unpaid care work were staying in school more but were less 
likely to progress on time relative to their counterparts not engaged in unpaid work. Insights from this 
research shed light on whether promoting gender equitable opportunities within the household might 
enable children to follow a more regular school path. 
3.1 Introduction 
Considerable academic research focuses on the socio-economic factors that predict school enrolment 
and attainment in both developed and developing countries. More often neglected in the scholarly 
debate is research delving into the factors that prevent children from progressing through grades in a 
timely fashion. The costs of age-grade distortions – an umbrella term that accounts for both delayed 
school entry and grade repetition – are very high, particularly for developing countries, where retention 
rates are high (Schiefelbein and Wolff 1992; Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994; Patrinos and 
Psacharopoulos 1996). Estimates for Brazil reveal that the costs of grade repetition alone represent an 
amount equivalent to the entire federal government contribution to first-level schooling (UNESCO 
2012). Costs incurred by students in terms of lost opportunities and wasted human capital are even 
more significant (Manacorda 2012).  
A factor that may significantly relate to the risk of not progressing through school is the 
amount of time children devote to unpaid care work within the household (Siddiqui and Iram 2007; 
El-Kogali and Krafft 2015). Household chores affect children’s opportunities to learn and thrive by 
taking away valuable time they could spend on their education. The situation tends to be worse for 
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girls, and somewhat exacerbated in rural settings characterized by high poverty rates, weak 
infrastructure, poor school quality, and large family sizes (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997; Gupta 
2015). For instance, data from Guatemala show that an increase in the number of siblings does not 
affect time devoted to domestic work for boys, while it brings about an additional four hours per week 
for girls (Dammert 2009b). Among other factors, large family size implies increased responsibilities for 
girls, more time spent on rearing children, cooking meals, washing clothes, caring for sick relatives, etc. 
The implications of this unequal care burden extend beyond resource-deprived households in low-
income contexts. Women of all ages across all world regions suffer from the burden of unpaid care 
responsibilities, with particularly stark imbalances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
– the geographical focus of this paper – where the female-to-male ratio of time devoted to unpaid care 
responsibilities approaches seven, as shown in Appendix Figure A3.1 (Ferrant, Pesando, and Nowacka 
2014; World Bank 2015). 
Using data from a randomized cash-transfer intervention (“Tayssir”) implemented in rural 
Morocco between 2007 and 2010, this paper aims to shed new light on the interplay between household 
inequality, as driven by gender and unpaid care work dynamics, and children’s schooling. Specifically, 
I assess the impact of the cash transfer on school progression outcomes – defined as progressing 
through grades in a timely fashion – allowing for heterogeneity of the treatment along socio-
demographic lines such as the gender of the child and the amount of time spent by children on unpaid 
care work prior to intervention implementation. As unpaid care work emerges as a negative predictor 
of school progression, the analysis concludes with an examination of whether the cash transfer had 
any effect on lessening the care burden itself.  
This work capitalizes on previous research from Benhassine et al. (2015),54 who first evaluated 
Tayssir documenting positive and significant impacts of the program on school enrolment and 
attendance. My study builds on the premise that extending the focus to school progression outcomes 
is key for several reasons. First, enrolment and attendance do not necessarily translate into learning 
gains and progression through grades, which hinge upon demand-side, as well as supply-side factors 
such as school infrastructure, classroom structure, teachers’ quality, and grade repetition policies.55 
Second, there is evidence that school progression is a key determinant of subsequent educational 
outcomes such as school completion (Jacob and Lefgren 2009; Glick and Sahn 2010). Therefore, in a 
                                                           
54 Benhassine, N., F. Devoto, E. Duflo, P. Dupas, and V. Pouliquen. 2015. "Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A 
'Labeled Cash Transfer' for Education." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, no. 3: 86-125. 
55 While this idea has been acknowledged globally with the shift from the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), targeting “education for all”, to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), stressing the value of 
“quality education”, few scholars evaluating educational interventions embed this component in their analyses. 
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study that spans a two-year intervention period, school progression matters to the extent that it 
captures children who are in school but are exposed to the risk of not completing primary or secondary 
education at a subsequent point in time. This is relevant to the Moroccan context, where large 
percentages of youth enroll in school without completing primary education (Benhassine et al. 2015; 
Wagner 1994). Third, when studied in conjunction with intra-household dynamics such as the unequal 
allocation of unpaid care tasks, a specific focus on school progression may unravel interesting patterns. 
Specifically, a cash transfer of this kind – relatively small in size and not conditional on attendance56 – 
may incentivize children to stay in school, although it might not be enough to help them progress 
through grades on time if they have competing time demands within the household. By the same token, 
competing time demands might not be so high as to prevent children from going to school whatsoever, 
while they can interfere with children’s smooth progression by taking away valuable time they could 
devote to, for instance, out-of-school study time.   
Girls in low-income contexts – such as rural settings in MENA countries – are often at higher 
risk of not completing primary education due to rooted traditions and moral and religious beliefs that 
perpetuate gender inequalities since young ages. These inequalities affect the role girls play within the 
household, the distribution of activities, and the amount of time spent on them, leading to unequal 
allocations of care tasks (World Bank 2015). In this work I bring a gender lens to the analysis of the 
effects of a cash transfer to investigate whether these household-level dynamics shape the effectiveness 
of the policy implemented. By assessing whether the impacts of the transfer on school progression 
differ by gender of the child and burden of unpaid care work prior to intervention implementation, I 
evaluate whether the disproportionate care burden affecting girls may – at least partly – explain 
differential educational outcomes among heterogeneous groups of children. 
In general terms, evaluating whether the impacts of a cash-transfer intervention differ for 
defined subpopulations is crucial to identifying groups that might need ad hoc policy targeting 
(Dammert 2009a; Handa et al. 2010; Moffitt 2009; Vivalt 2015). In this context, a stronger effect of 
the treatment for children engaged in unpaid care responsibilities would point towards the idea that 
the intervention targeted those groups that were ex ante most exposed to the risk of following an 
irregular school path due to competing time demands. In other words, parents receiving the cash 
transfer would invest the money “wisely” within the household towards promoting a better future for 
the children left behind. Conversely, a weaker effect of the treatment for the aforementioned group 
                                                           
56 The cash transfer was equal to approximately 5 per cent of the average household monthly consumption. In 
contrast, the range for traditional CCTs is between 6 per cent and 27 per cent of mean monthly household 
consumption – with PROGRESA being around 20 per cent (Fizbein et al. 2009).   
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would hint at the need to design careful policy interventions promoting more gender equitable 
opportunities within the household. At a deeper level, a finding of this kind would imply tackling 
rooted social norms that in resource-constrained contexts lead parents to make differential 
“investments” in sons versus daughters.  
3.2 Background 
The context 
Morocco is a lower middle-income country with GDP per capita estimated at about 7,800 USD (PPP) 
in 2015. Education levels in the population are relatively low, with about 68.5 per cent of the adult 
population literate (Central Intelligence Agency 2015). In terms of schooling outcomes, recent 
UNICEF estimates (2014) suggest that 26 per cent of 5-year-olds who should be in pre-primary school 
are out of school, along with nearly 2 per cent of primary school-aged children, and over 16 per cent 
of lower secondary school-aged children.  
Over the past two decades, Morocco instituted a series of successful reforms in the educational 
system aimed at achieving universal primary school enrolment. From 1999 to 2004, the enrolment rate 
increased from 79 per cent to 88 per cent at the national level, and from 58 per cent to 87 per cent in 
rural areas. Figure 3.1 provides a regional breakdown of Morocco, reporting the number and 
percentage of out-of-school children using the latest available Demographic and Health Survey (DHS, 
2003-04).57 Despite progress, the data show that the risk of being out of school at primary and lower 
secondary school ages was still significant as of 2004. In the 2007/2008 academic year, the year 
preceding the introduction of the pilot program examined here, the Ministry of Education estimated 
that over 90 per cent of rural children started primary school, but 40 per cent dropped out before 
completing the full six years of primary education (Benhassine et al. 2015), and the government became 
concerned again about improving enrolment and retention in school.  
Micro-evidence from DHS data further reveals that the risk of being out of school was 
particularly high for girls, for children living in rural areas, and in regions where the poverty rate was 
above 30 per cent. Figure 3.2 suggests that a girl living in a poor rural community was five times more 
likely to be out-of-school at primary school age, and four times more likely to be out-of-school at lower 
secondary school age with respect to a boy living in a non-poor urban community, a gap which is likely 
                                                           
57 These statistics include children of primary school age who are not in primary or secondary school, and children 
of lower secondary school age who are not in primary or secondary school. Also, note that at the time of the 
intervention Morocco was divided into 16 administrative regions, while since 2015 Morocco officially administers 
12 regions.  
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indicative of entrenched social and cultural norms that still place rural girls at a significant 
disadvantage.58  
The cash-transfer intervention 
In order to address some of the concerns outlined above, in 2007 the Moroccan Higher Council of 
Education (CSE) launched a nationwide cash-transfer program together with the National Ministry of 
Education (MEN) to encourage parents to keep their children in school. With this goal in mind, the 
Government of Morocco partnered with a group of researchers affiliated with the Abdul Latif Jameel 
Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) to evaluate “Tayssir”, a two-year (2008-2010) pilot program targeted at 
the geographic level designed to increase student participation in primary school. Tayssir, which means 
“facilitation” in Arabic, made cash payments to parents with children aged 6 to 15 in targeted 
communities. Parents had to formally enroll each of their children into the program, and the enrolment 
process took place in schools. The pilot involved 318 rural primary school sectors,59 each of which 
included two communities in the poorest areas (i.e., at least 30 per cent of the population living in 
poverty) within five of Morocco’s 16 regions, namely Marrakech-Tensift-Al Haouz, Meknès-Tafilalet, 
l’Oriental, Souss-Massa-Draa and Tadla-Azilal (see Figure 3.1). All households with children aged 6-15 
in targeted communities (i.e., municipalities) were eligible to receive the transfer, and the transfer was 
capped at three children per household. Ninety-seven per cent of households in the household sample 
had at least one child enrolled in Tayssir by the end of year two, hence program participation was nearly 
full.60  
The Tayssir pilot included two versions of the program, a Labeled Cash Transfer (LCT) and 
a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT). In the first version, families with children of primary school age 
were eligible to receive the transfer whether or not their children attended school. In practice, since 
enrolment in the Tayssir program happened at schools, children registering for Tayssir were enrolled 
in school at the same time, but the transfer was not conditional on continued enrolment. The transfer 
                                                           
58 Note that it is not possible to draw estimates comparable to Figure 3.2 for school-progression outcomes such 
as the likelihood of being in the correct grade-for-age, as the latest DHS for Morocco does not report the grade 
the children were enrolled in at the time of the survey, nor their age of entrance in primary school. Besides 
country-level statistics supplied by UNICEF (2014), very little is known about school progression patterns at the 
micro-level, as no comparable dataset exists that would permit an analogous regional breakdown. 
59 Randomization was implemented at the school-sector level. A school sector includes a “main” primary school 
unit and several “satellite” school units (four on average). Satellite units fall under the authority of the headmaster 
of the main unit, and sometimes offer only lower grade classes. The pilot originally involved 320 school sectors 
but two (one in the control group and one in the treatment group) had to be dropped after the randomization 
because floods rendered them inaccessible.  
60 For more details on the experimental design, program take-up, variants of the intervention, and sampling 
procedure, please see Benhassine et al. (2015). 
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was given every two months during the 2008-2010 school years. The monthly amount per child 
increased as each child progressed through school, starting from 60 MAD (8 USD) for each child in 
grades 1 and 2 and increasing to 100 MAD (13 USD) for children in grades 5 and 6. The average 
transfer represented about 5 per cent of the average household’s monthly consumption. In the second 
version of the program, the cash transfer was disbursed to parents of primary school-age children, as 
long as their child did not miss school for more than four times each month. The monthly transfer 
amount was the same as for the LCT program.  
Mothers received the transfer in half of the school sectors sampled for Tayssir, while fathers 
received it in the other half. Hence, each school sector sampled for the study was randomly assigned 
to one of the following five arms: LCT to fathers (80 communities from 40 school sectors), LCT to 
mothers (80 communities from 40 school sectors), CCT to fathers (180 communities from 90 school 
sectors), CCT to mothers (178 communities from 89 school sectors), and a comparison group receiving 
no transfers (118 communities from 59 school sectors). Figure A3.2 in the Appendix summarizes the 
experimental design.  
Previous evaluation of Tayssir 
Benhassine et al. (2015) documented positive and significant impacts of the cash transfer on school 
enrolment and attendance, together with positive yet weakly significant effects on arithmetic test 
scores. Concerned with variation in program impact by gender of the transfer recipient (mother versus 
father) and type of transfer issued (LCT versus CCT), Benhassine et al. found no difference in impacts 
between transfers issued to fathers and transfers issued to mothers. Making cash transfers conditional 
did not increase the effectiveness of the program either. Likely, directing the cash transfer to mothers 
or adding conditionality did not substantially alter the program’s impacts because Tayssir was framed 
as an educational support program and perceived as an endorsement of the local schools, since 
headmasters were responsible for enrolling families. Overall, Benhassine et al. documented that Tayssir 
in all forms increased parents’ belief that education was a worthwhile investment.  
Despite the richness of the analysis carried out in Benhassine et al., no reference is made to 
whether the intervention translated into smoother progression through grades for students who 
remained in school between baseline and endline, which I address in the present analysis. The treatment 
arms in the current study are reduced from five to two, i.e. any cash transfer given to parents – the 
treatment group (259 school sectors) – versus no cash transfer (59 school sectors) – the control group 
(shaded boxes in Figure A3.2 in the Appendix). The motivation behind this choice is twofold. First, 
the focus and policy relevance of Benhassine et al.’s study lies in the differential effectiveness of the 
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LCT versus the CCT, and the related implications for budgeting and government spending. 
Conversely, my study aims to provide a better understanding of how a cash transfer – irrespective of 
type – shapes parents’ differential investments in boys versus girls. Second, and most importantly, 
Benhassine et al. reported that in the first year of the program about 50 per cent of parents did not 
understand the difference between the conditional versus labeled nature of the transfer, thereby 
evidencing large misunderstanding of program functioning and making this distinction less meaningful 
for my purposes.61 As for differences in targeting mothers versus fathers, Benhassine et al. ascribed 
their null findings to the fact that women’s independent role in financial transactions in poor 
households in rural Morocco is very limited. I test differential impacts of targeting mothers versus 
fathers and find results analogous to Benhassine et al. In the main body of the text I hence leave these 
distinctions aside (available upon request), thus boosting sample size.  
Grade repetition in Morocco 
Albeit limited, existing research suggests that in Morocco repetition rates – defined as the proportion 
of pupils from a cohort enrolled in a given grade in a given school-year who study in the same grade 
in the following year – are high, especially in primary school (Mansouri and El Amine Moumine 2017). 
Within primary school, recent data from the Education Policy Data Center (2014) show that students 
in Morocco are more likely to repeat grade 1. The repetition rate in grade 1 is 10.9 per cent for both 
males and females, which is 1.7 points higher than the average repetition rate across other primary 
grades (of 9.2 per cent).  
Although there remains considerable between-school variation in terms of rules and standards 
behind grade repetition policies, repetition in Moroccan primary schools is guided by a national policy 
that combines normative rank ordering on academic performance with consideration of the capacity 
of higher grade level classrooms to absorb children promoted to the next grade (Wagner 1994). 
Through the first four years of primary school, grade promotion or repetition is determined on the 
basis of an annual meeting of classroom teachers. During this year-end meeting, children are ranked 
by classroom grade point average (GPA) – taking into account attendance and absenteeism – and then 
passed or failed according to a system whereby the lowest-ranked 10 per cent to 20 per cent of children 
in each grade level are required to repeat the entire year’s academic program (Wagner 1994). Promotion 
rates are set yearly on the basis of projected space availability in the higher-grade levels of each school 
district, as well as on certain political exigencies. Only two grade repetitions are allowed by Moroccan 
                                                           
61 I conducted separate analyses by type of transfer (LCT versus CCT) and found no differential impacts on the 
outcomes I investigate. These analyses are hence omitted in the text (available upon request).  
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law during the primary school years, and children exceeding this number are candidates for school 
expulsion or dropout. It follows that the high rates of repetition are a serious harbinger of school 
dropout (Agnaou 2004).  
3.3 Literature review 
School participation and school progression 
While many studies explore the impact of cash transfer programs on school attendance and school 
performance (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994; Cardoso and Souza 2009; Ponce and Bedi 2010; 
Kumara and Pfau 2011; Dubois, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2012; Amarante, Ferrando, and Vigorito 2013; 
Benhassine et al. 2015; Reynolds 2015; etc.), there is surprisingly little evidence on the impact of cash-
transfer interventions on measures of school progression. Some exceptions are Behrman, Parker, and 
Todd (2009) and Maluccio, Murphy, and Regalia (2010), who document positive and significant effects 
of conditional cash transfers on grade progression in Mexico and Nicaragua, respectively. Both papers 
aim to fill a gap in the impact evaluation literature by stressing the importance of focusing on school 
progression, in addition to enrolment and attendance. The latter further note that half of the estimated 
program effect on progression was accounted for by a reduction in the dropout and repetition rates of 
beneficiary children who were already in school when the program began. 
As previous research has documented that school attendance and progression may be quite 
heterogeneous in terms of both their socio-economic determinants and their consequences (Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos 1996; Pal 2004; Glick and Sahn 2010), it is puzzling that so little research related 
to cash-transfer interventions has focused on the latter. There are several reasons why school 
progression tends to be more often neglected in scholarly discourse. First, the operationalization of 
the measure requires more data inputs such as the age of entry in school and builds – almost by 
construction – on longitudinal designs or repeated cross-sections. Second, as mentioned above the 
determinants of school progression include more binding supply-side factors like school policies and 
regulations on grade repetition (Maluccio, Murphy, and Regalia 2010). Third, as academic performance 
is a key determinant of school progression, and most cash-transfer interventions aim at boosting 
attendance rather than targeting learning itself, there is a tendency to believe that impacts on school 
progression generally echo impacts on school performance.  
Unpaid care work  
Unpaid care work is defined by the United Nations (UN) as “a critical - yet largely unseen - dimension 
of human well-being that provides essential domestic services within households, for other households, 
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and to community members” (UNDP 2009).62 The literature on unpaid care work has expanded rapidly 
over the past decade, following two main directions. First is a more macro-level approach concerned 
with pooling country-level time-use data to assess gender imbalances in unpaid care work among the 
adult population (Razavi and Staab 2008; Budlender 2008), and the implications of these inequalities 
for labor market outcomes (Ferrant, Pesando, and Nowacka 2014). Ferrant, Pesando, and Nowacka 
document that across all regions of the world women spend, on average, three to six hours on unpaid 
care activities, while men spend between half an hour and two hours. North America (NA) and the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) stand out, respectively, as the most equal and the most unequal 
regions, with a female-to-male ratio of time spent on unpaid care work approaching two in the former 
case and seven in the latter (Appendix Figure A3.1). Often embedded in this line of research is a 
broader discussion of the importance of valuing unpaid care work to make its contribution visible and 
accounted for in GDP calculations (Budlender and Brathaug 2004; Folbre 2006, 2014), and the need 
to develop appropriate indicators to quantify the “feminization of poverty” (UNIFEM 2000). 
The second strand of the literature focuses on micro-level analyses of the relationship between 
unpaid care work and school outcomes among youth in disadvantaged, mostly rural contexts. Authors 
in countries as diverse as Bolivia (Zapata, Contreras, and Kruger 2011), Egypt (Assaad, Levison, and 
Zibani 2010), rural Ethiopia (Admassie 2003), Guatemala and Nicaragua (Dammert 2009b), Peru 
(Levison and Moe 1998), rural Vietnam (Le and Homel 2015) etc. find that domestic work is associated 
with lower rates of school participation and attendance, and poorer academic performance. Among 
the main takeaways from these studies is the need to separate paid market work from unpaid care work 
due to their different drivers and later-life consequences. In line with this idea, using data from 186,795 
families with 7 to 14-year-old children across 30 low middle-income countries, Putnick and Bornstein 
(2015) claim that the negative relations observed between child labor and school enrolment are much 
more consistent for family work and household chores as compared to paid work outside the home.  
My work enriches the literature on unpaid care work in two directions. First, as there is still a 
paucity of micro-level research documenting time spent on unpaid care work by young children in low-
income contexts,63 this study provides a clear picture of gender imbalances in care-related activities 
                                                           
62 The adjective ‘unpaid’ signals that the person carrying out the activity does not receive a wage, hence the work 
is not counted in official GDP calculations as it falls outside the production boundary in the System of National 
Accounts (SNA). ‘Care’ suggests that the activity serves people and their wellbeing, and includes both personal 
care and care-related activities, such as cooking, cleaning and washing clothes. ‘Work’ means that the activity 
entails expenditures of time and energy. Unpaid care work is also referred to as ‘reproductive’ or ‘domestic’ work 
in order to distinguish it from market-based work.  
63 Lloyd, Grant, and Ritchie (2008) and Vu (2014) are notable exceptions. 
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using time-use data from rural Morocco. Second, as most studies relating child domestic work and 
schooling outcomes focus on school participation or school performance, I here shift the focus onto 
how unpaid care work relates to grade progression through school.64 In this respect, it is worth 
mentioning that the specific focus on unpaid care work in this context vis-à-vis paid work is tied to the 
far higher prevalence of the former – less than 4 per cent of out-of-school children and 2 per cent of 
all children in the sample report any work outside the home (Benhassine et al. 2015).  
3.4 Data and methodology 
Data and variables  
This paper uses publicly available data.65 Four types of data were collected as part of the randomized 
control trial. School participation was measured through school visits spread over the two years of the 
program, for all students enrolled in the study schools at the beginning of “year 0” (the academic year 
2007/2008). This is labeled the “school sample”, and it comprises over 47,000 students. Second, a 
comprehensive survey was carried out at both baseline and endline with close to 4,400 households, 
defined as the “household sample.” Third, one child per household completed a basic arithmetic test 
(ASER test) during the endline household survey. Finally, the authors conducted “awareness” surveys 
at and around schools to measure teachers and households’ understanding of the program. This study 
builds primarily on the baseline and endline surveys, as these are the sole sources that permit to retrieve 
a measure of unpaid care work from the time-use diaries. 
Households were sampled as follows. For each school unit, eight households were randomly 
selected for a baseline survey administered in June 2008, before Tayssir was announced and before 
school sectors had been randomly assigned to either treatment or control. The endline survey was 
administered in June 2010, after exactly two years. To select the households, enumerators visited each 
school in spring 2008, and used the 2007/2008 school register, as well as the registers from the previous 
three academic years, to draw two lists: (i) the list of all households in the school’s vicinity that had at 
least one child enrolled in school, and (ii) the list of households with no child currently enrolled in 
school but at least one child of school age who had enrolled at some point but dropped out within the 
previous three years. A total of six households were randomly selected from list 1, and two from list 2. 
As a consequence of this sampling strategy, the sampling frame does not include households who never 
                                                           
64 Buonomo Zabaleta (2011) focuses on the relationship between child labor and school progression (as measured 
by grade-for-age) in Nicaragua. Yet her focus is mostly on non-housework labor.  
65 Data are available on the World Bank platform or at: 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.20130225 
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enrolled any school-age children in school, though such households appear to be very rare (Benhassine 
et al. 2015). An average of two children per household were enrolled in the Tayssir program. 
This study focuses on children aged 6-15 as the main units of analysis, and school progression 
as the main outcome of interest. Scholars tend to operationalize school progression through variables 
such as schooling-for-age (SAGE) or grade-for-age (Cascio 2005; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 1997), 
which measure whether a child is in the right grade given her/his age.66 These are powerful indicators, 
yet they are not suitable to the case at hand as they capture a degree of pre-treatment heterogeneity 
that is beyond the scope of these analyses. As I am interested in the actual grade progression over the 
two-year intervention period, I measure school progression as the difference between the grade the 
child was enrolled in at endline (2010) and the grade the child was enrolled in at baseline (2008). This 
way, children progressing two (or more) grades over two years were considered “on time”, – regardless 
of whether they were in the correct grade for their age to start with – whereas children progressing 
zero or one grade over two years were not progressing in a timely fashion.67 Children enrolled in school 
in 2008 may have dropped out between baseline and endline, hence raising challenges on the 
operationalization of school progression, a point I will return to in the following sections.  
I measure unpaid care work at baseline and endline as the amount of time per day children 
spent on several unpaid care activities. The household surveys include a time-use diary recording the 
primary and secondary activities each child performed the day preceding the survey during fixed time 
intervals of 30 minutes which, summed up, account for a full 24-hour day. In line with the UN 
definition of unpaid care work, I consider as unpaid care work the following 10 activities: “preparing 
food for a meal” (FM), “preparing food for another occasion” (FO), “doing housework” (HW), 
“washing clothes” (WC), “other domestic activities” (OD), “shopping for the house” (SH), “going to 
get water” (GW), “occupied with children in the household” (CHH), “occupied with older members 
in the household” (EHH), and “occupied with other sick or handicapped members in the household” 
(SHH). Following the relevant literature (United Nations 2005), I attribute 20 minutes to the primary 
activity and 10 minutes to the secondary activity in order to allow for simultaneity of tasks, i.e., to 
account for the possibility that the 30-minute slot may not be entirely devoted to the activity listed by 
                                                           
66 For instance, in a country like Morocco where the school entry age is 6, a 8-year-old in first grade is not in the 
correct grade for age. 
67 An analogous way of framing this concept of grade progression, perhaps more common in the literature, is in 
terms of grade repetition. Children progressing two grades over two years experienced no grade repetition within 
the two-year timeframe. Conversely, assuming there was no temporary school exit, children progressing one and 
zero grades over two years repeated one and two grades, respectively. 
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the caregiver as the primary one.68 After adding up all of the 30-minute time slots in which a child 
performs one or more of the above-mentioned activities, I obtain an estimate of the amount of time 
per day (minutes or hours) devoted to unpaid care work.69 
Methodology  
The effect of the treatment on school progression and the subgroup analyses by baseline unpaid care 
work are analyzed using a series of linear probability models (LPM). As the treatment was implemented 
at the school-sector level, while the outcome and the main heterogeneity variable were measured at the 
individual level, the analysis is carried out by means of the following specification: 
, = " + cde]WVf + g,h ? + ijcO, ∗ cde]WVfl m + n,                                     (1) 
where , is the school outcome of interest for student  in school ; cde]WVf (the treatment) is a 
dummy equal to 1 if school  falls under any of the cash-transfer typologies; g, is a vector of strata 
randomization dummies, child-level (including jcO,), household-level, and school-level controls.70 
These include variables such as age at baseline, number of siblings, unpaid care work, mother’s 
education, father’s education, schooling status at baseline, ownership of a cellphone, access to 
electricity, and remoteness.71 Due to incomplete data on grade attained, parents’ education is measured 
through dummy variables that equal one if the parent has at least some primary education. Household 
composition variables are constructed using information from the household roster. As children aged 
6-15 are the main units of analysis and young children are unlikely responsible for the care of far older 
siblings, I here restrict the focus to siblings aged 15 or less. jcO, ∗ cde]WVf is an interaction term 
that permits to investigate variation in program impact by means of baseline time-use data on unpaid 
care work (kept as a continuous variable).72 Note that I also construct a categorical counterpart of the 
unpaid care work variable classified as “No UCW,” “Medium UCW” (0-2 hours/day), and “High 
                                                           
68 Note that the alternative approach would be to attribute the whole 30-minute slot to the activity listed as 
primary. Measures constructed using these two different approaches yield a correlation of about 0.98.  
69 Unless further specified, unpaid care work is measured in minutes per day in the descriptive statistics, and 
hours per day in the regression analyses.  
70 Randomization was stratified by region, school size, dropout rate, and by whether the government was planning 
to make improvements to school infrastructure within the two-year time frame of the evaluation (Benhassine et 
al. 2015). 
71 The latter household-level and school-level variables are included as they were found to be unbalanced at 
baseline in the original study. 
72 One significant advantage of the regression framework is the ability to estimate continuous heterogeneous 
treatment effects. This way, the interaction term is analogous to the idea of the marginal treatment effect 
(Heckman 2001; Heckman and Vytlacil 2005). The interpretation of the continuous conditional average treatment 
effect is the same as for any other continuous-binary interaction term, although care should be taken not to 
extrapolate beyond the support of the covariate. 
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UCW” (>2 hours/day). Some analyses using this variable are reported in the Appendix (additional 
analyses available upon request).  
To test the effectiveness of the intervention in reducing unpaid care work within the 
household I adopt the following Difference-in-Difference (DD) specification: 
jcO,, = " + ocde]WVf + p.=-  + i.=-  ∗ cde]WVl q + g,,h r + n,,                        (2) 
where .=-  is a dummy for time that equals 0 in 2008 (baseline) and 1 in 2010 (endline), and q is the 
coefficient of interest capturing the effect of the cash transfer on time spent on unpaid care work. 
Although in the context of a randomized experiment – where variables ought to be balanced at baseline 
– a simple LPM controlling for baseline UCW is also a viable strategy, a DD estimation strategy permits 
to difference out both time-invariant confounders between treatment and control units and time-
trends. 
For expositional clarity I stratify the sample by gender of the child. Pooled-sample analyses 
including a dummy for gender and a treatment/gender interaction are included in the Appendix. Strata 
dummies take account of stratification variables used in the randomization. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the school-sector level. Lastly, as the sampling procedure oversamples 
households with dropout children (the final household sample includes 17 per cent of households with 
dropout children, while those households represent only 9 per cent of the population), sampling 
weights are used in all statistics and analyses. This way regressions are representative of the population 
from which the researchers surveyed.  
Sample attrition bias 
From the baseline survey I was able to identify 10,889 children aged 6-15 living in the household with 
their parents. Among these, 951 (8.73 per cent of the baseline sample) dropped out of the study 
between 2008 and 2010, delivering a post-attrition sample of 9,938 children. In order to assess 
differences between children that dropped out and the 9,938 children who were present at both 
baseline and endline, Table A3.1 in the Appendix examines differential attrition by treatment status 
and selected socio-demographic characteristics. While attritors were not significantly different on age, 
number of siblings, amount of time spent on unpaid care work, and baseline schooling status, attrition 
was higher among control units and among boys. There is also evidence that attrition was higher in 
smaller households and in households where the father was slightly better educated. As control units 
did not receive the transfer, they were indeed the ones with the least incentives to participate in the 
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study. Therefore, this finding raises potential concerns to keep in mind while interpreting results.73 To 
check whether differential attrition yields imbalances in child and household-level characteristics, in 
what follows I present summary statistics by treatment group on the post-attrition sample. 
3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 provides balance checks and baseline summary statistics on the analytical sample of 9,938 
children. Column 1 reports the mean of the variable in the control group, with standard deviations in 
brackets, while column 2 reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from an OLS 
regression of the left-hand side variable on a dummy for treatment, controlling for strata randomization 
dummies. The table shows that the groups are relatively well balanced with respect to observable 
characteristics, hence increasing confidence in the effectiveness of the randomization. There are 
significant differences in baseline schooling status, however, as the share of treated children enrolled 
in school at baseline was higher by roughly 4.3 percentage points.74 Similarly, the share of treated 
children never enrolled in school at baseline was lower by about 2.4 percentage points. In all analyses 
below, I condition on baseline schooling status in order to ensure these differences do not drive my 
results. In terms of sample composition, Table 3.1 suggests that out of the 9,938 children 46.6 per cent 
were girls, and children at baseline were on average 10.4 years old, had 1.7 siblings aged 15 or less, and 
spent around 47 minutes per day on unpaid care work activities. Also, 16 per cent of children had 
fathers with at least some primary education, while this same figure for mothers was around 4.9 per 
cent only. As for children’s schooling status, their average entrance age in primary school was 6.5, and 
76 per cent of children were enrolled in school as of June 2008. Children enrolled in school were on 
average in their third grade of primary school. 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics on the amount of time per day boys and girls spent on 
each of the 10 unpaid care activities selected from the time-use diary. The table shows pronounced 
differences between boys and girls, suggesting that in the poorest regions of rural Morocco girls 
disproportionately suffer from the burden of unpaid care work within the household. Overall, mean 
gender differences in the total amount of time spent on unpaid care work (UCW) are stark, with boys 
devoting approximately 18 minutes per day as compared to girls who spent one additional hour. This 
is particularly true for activities such as preparing food for a meal (FM), doing housework (HW), 
                                                           
73 In the presence of post-treatment data on the 951 children who attrited, attrition concerns could be reduced 
by means of imputation techniques. Absent these data, any imputation would be based on either baseline 
characteristics or endline characteristics of students who did not attrite. This is not a valid strategy as it relies on 
the assumption that attritors would respond to the intervention the same way as non-attritors.  
74 This finding aligns with what found by Benhassine et al. (2015) in the main study. 
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washing clothes (WC), and other related domestic tasks. The only activity to which boys devoted 
marginally more time was shopping for the house, a finding which is in line with restrictions to the 
freedom of movement that women face in several MENA countries. Similarities also emerge when 
dealing with sick or handicapped members within the household, though for these activities averages 
are very low in absolute values. With reference to Table 3.1, note that the unpaid care work variable is 
balanced at baseline, hence making it possible to use it as a moderator of the treatment. Appendix 
Table A3.2 further shows that all components of the UCW variable do not statistically differ by 
treatment status.  
It is important to stress, however, that many children – approximately 77 per cent of boys and 
48 per cent of girls – did not engage in any form of unpaid care work, hence the averages are driven 
down by these “artificial” zeroes. In Table A3.3 in the Appendix I run t-tests for gender differences in 
means for the sub-sample of children aged 6-15 who reported spending a non-zero amount of time on 
each activity. These tests show that averages are statistically higher for girls across the majority of the 
activities, and working girls spend twice as much time on unpaid care work per day relative to working 
boys (149 against 78 minutes, respectively). Figure 3.3 provides a clearer picture of boys’ and girls’ 
participation in each unpaid care activity and conveys the idea that not only girls spent on average more 
time on UCW as compared to boys, but also the percentage of girls engaged in each task was far higher, 
except for shopping for the house (SH). For instance, the female-to-male participation ratio reaches 
up to 9 and 7.5 for housework and washing clothes, respectively. 
Figure 3.4 shows the total minutes per day spent on UCW by number of siblings (top panel) 
and by age of the child (bottom panel). Unpaid care work increases with number of siblings for both 
boys and girls, yet the gradient is clearer for girls. While girls with no siblings devoted about an hour 
to unpaid care tasks, girls with three or more siblings spent an additional 23 minutes.75 Patterns of 
unpaid care work by age are strikingly different by gender. While the age profile of UCW for girls is 
steep and upward sloping – reaching almost three hours per day at age 15 – boys spend an average of 
15 to 20 minutes irrespective of age. These descriptive relationships provide prima facie evidence that 
gender and unpaid care work are closely intertwined dimensions, and hint at the existence of rooted 
gender inequalities within the household that place rural girls at a disadvantage. 
                                                           
75 Figure A3.3 in the Appendix is analogous to Figure 3.4 (top panel) in the paper, yet the number of siblings is 
replaced by the overall number of children (ages 0-15) present in the household. Gradients of UCW in this latter 
scenario are less clearly identifiable.  
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3.6 Results 
School outcomes are operationalized along two axes of analysis. First is the extensive margin of school 
participation, which I define as being in school versus being out of school. To capture the extensive 
margin of school participation, I construct a dummy for dropout since 2008 which equals 1 if the child 
was enrolled in school at baseline but dropped out between 2008 and 2010 (i.e., the child was not in 
school anymore as of the endline survey, june 2010), and 0 otherwise. Second is the intensive margin 
of school participation, which I define as progressing through grades on time versus stalling, 
conditional on remaining in school. To capture the intensive margin of school participation, I construct 
a timely grade progression dummy, which equals 1 if the child progressed two (or more) grades over 
the two-year intervention period, and 0 if the child progressed 0 or 1 grades over two years.  
Extensive margin: dropout  
Table 3.3 (panel a) provides LPM estimates of the effect of the cash transfer on the dropout dummy 
variable. First, as captured by the constant term, the share of girls that dropped out between baseline 
and endline was substantially higher than that of boys (0.17 against 0.11, respectively). In line with 
findings from the original study, the cash transfer had large and significant impacts on school dropout, 
decreasing it by approximately 4.3 and 7.3 percentage points for boys and girls, respectively (model 
1).76 Adding controls does not alter the magnitude and significance of the estimates to a big extent 
(model 2). Note that in relative terms results are substantially similar by gender, as a drop of 4.7 
percentage points off of a base rate of about 11.4 per cent in the male control group entailed a reduction 
in boys’ dropout rate of roughly 41 per cent, while a drop of 7.3 percentage points off of a base rate 
of about 17.1 per cent in the female control group entailed a reduction in girls’ dropout rate of about 
43 per cent.77  
Neither sibship size nor unpaid care work emerge as strong predictors of girls’ likelihood of 
dropping out, while unpaid care work more strongly predicts boys’ likelihood of dropping out. 
Specifically, one additional hour of unpaid care work is associated with an increase in boys’ probability 
of dropping out by 1.8 percentage points. Given the stark gender differences in unpaid care work 
documented above, this finding is somewhat surprising, yet consistent with the idea that UCW might 
                                                           
76 This is the only result that replicates findings from the original study. As the post-attrition sample and the 
operationalization of most variables (foremost, unpaid care work) partly differ from Benhassine et al. (2015), the 
effect size is not identical, yet qualitatively the same. Importantly, Benhassine et al. did not present separate 
analyses by gender, nor did they account for treatment-baseline UCW interactions. 
77 Also, pooled estimates with a dummy for gender and a gender/treatment interaction show that the effect of 
the treatment on dropout was not statistically different for boys and girls (Panel a, Table A3.4 in the Appendix). 
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be so ingrained in girls’ daily lives that it does not operate as a determining factor for whether they are 
able to go to school or not. Conversely, boys’ likelihood of staying in school versus dropping out might 
be more sensitive to smaller increases in UCW. Lastly, estimates in panel a reveal no differential 
treatment effect by baseline unpaid care work, suggesting that the effect of the intervention on dropout 
operated similarly for all children. 
Intensive margin: timely grade progression  
Table 3.3 (panel b) provides LPM estimates of the effect of the cash transfer on the timely grade 
progression dummy variable. Note that in this specification children enrolled in school in 2008 but 
dropping out before 2010 (i.e., 707 children) are excluded – the problems that arise adopting this 
approach are discussed in the next section. While the cash transfer significantly reduced dropout for 
both boys and girls, these estimates provide initial evidence that the effects on timely grade progression 
operated along gender lines. While the intervention increased the likelihood of girls progressing 
through grades by approximately 6 percentage points – equivalent to a 10 per cent increase relative to 
the mean in the control group – it had no discernible effect for boys.  
Differently from panel a, both sibship size and unpaid care work emerge as negative predictors 
of girls’ timely grade progression. Specifically, one additional sibling and one additional hour of unpaid 
care work are associated with a decrease in girls’ likelihood of timely grade progression by 2.2 and 3.4 
percentage points, respectively. Moreover, the significant coefficient on the interaction between unpaid 
care work and the treatment points at subgroup differences among girls. The negative coefficient 
suggests that the benefit of the treatment on timely grade progression was halved for girls engaged in 
each additional hour of unpaid care work prior to intervention implementation. Figure 3.5 plots the 
predicted proportion of girls progressing through grades on time based on estimates from panel b, yet 
replacing the continuous UCW variable with its categorical counterpart (No, medium, high) – detailed 
regression estimates for boys and girls using UCW as a categorical variable are reported in Appendix 
Table A3.5.78 This figure shows that the cash transfer was effective in increasing girls’ timely grade 
progression in the “No UCW” group only, and the benefit of the treatment was cut proportionally 
more, the more was the time girls spent on UCW at baseline. For girls spending more than two hours 
per day on UCW, the benefit of the treatment was cut by 100 per cent (i.e., it was reduced to zero).  
In light of the non-significant coefficient on the interaction term between UCW and the 
treatment dummy in the dropout specification (panel a), estimates from Table 3.3 as a whole suggest 
                                                           
78 The distributions of children that fall in each UCW category is, approximately, 77 (No), 18 (Medium), and 5 
(High) per cent for boys, and 48 (No), 23 (Medium), and 29 (High) per cent for girls. 
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that as a result of the treatment, girls engaged in UCW were staying in school more – rather than 
dropping out – but were not progressing through grades at a pace comparable to girls who were not 
engaged in analogous tasks (or at least, not as much). 
Sample selectivity and robustness checks 
Despite suggestive, these findings raise some methodological concerns. First, as grade progression is 
only observed for kids who remained in school throughout the observation period, OLS estimates on 
the restricted sample (i.e., the sample excluding the 707 dropouts) may be biased and inconsistent. The 
reason is that kids who remained in school (6,981) were likely a non-random sample of all children 
enrolled in school at baseline (7,688). Second, as the cash transfer is found to affect dropout, excluding 
dropouts “breaks” the RCT, as it entails differentially excluding treatment versus control units from 
the sample. To deal with these issues, I follow three different strategies.  
First, I bound the estimates assigning extreme values of grade progression to kids who 
dropped out. Specifically, I assume that, had they remained in school, kids who dropped out would 
have either progressed on time (dummy=1), or at a sub-optimal pace (dummy=0). Although both 
scenarios are unlikely – the second one perhaps more realistic – this exercise is useful to the extent that 
it provides a lower-bound and an upper-bound to the effect of the treatment. Table 3.4 shows that 
keeping dropouts as progressing on time (panel a) weakens the effect of the treatment for both boys 
and girls, yet some evidence of a differential treatment effect by baseline UCW persists for girls. 
Conversely, keeping dropouts as not progressing on time (panel b) strengthens the effect of the 
treatment for both boys and girls (reasonable, as it conflates the estimates with the findings on dropout 
documented in Table 3.3, panel a), although a differential treatment effect by baseline UCW status is 
observed for girls only. This latter coefficient suggests that the beneficial effect of the treatment for 
girls engaged in each additional hour of UCW was cut by about a third.  
Second, I conduct more formal tests of attrition – defined in this case as leaving school 
between 2008 and 2010 (rather than leaving the study sample altogether) – to assess whether attrition 
is random. I perform a Becketti, Gould, Lillard, and Welch (BGLW) test, whose goal is to determine 
whether those who subsequently leave the sample differ in their initial “behavior” relationships 
between predetermined (observed) variables and baseline outcomes (Alderman et al. 2001; Becketti et 
al. 1988).79 As the test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that attrition is random (p>F=0.000; 
                                                           
79 The test needs to be repeated for each baseline outcome of interest and works as follows: an outcome at 
baseline (y(0)) is regressed on a set of predetermined variables (x(0)), an attrition dummy (A) for whether the 
child subsequently leaves the sample, and the attrition dummy interacted with the explanatory variables (A*x(0)). 
An F-test of the joint significance of coefficients on A and (A*x(0)) suggests whether there is evidence to reject 
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Appendix Table A3.6), I reweight the sample using Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW) and re-
estimate the restricted model on timely grade progression (Table 3.5, panel a). The underlying idea with 
IPW is to give more weight to children whose observed characteristics are more similar to those of 
children who attrited.80 Estimates using IPW somewhat weaken the effect of the treatment for boys, 
while they strengthen it for girls. According to the IPW specification for girls, the cash transfer 
increased timely grade progression by about 10 percentage points. 
Third, as the above methodology deals with sample selectivity based on observable 
characteristics only, I implement a 2-step Heckman correction approach (Table 3.5, panel b) which 
relies on identifying a variable – or a set of variables – that affect the selection equation but are, at least 
theoretically, orthogonal to the second-stage error term. Following the literature (Carneiro, Heckman, 
and Vytlacil 2011; Schwartz, Stiefel, and Wiswall 2013), I hypothesize that the time and distance (in 
km) from the household to the school potentially affect whether children go and attend school, but 
not whether they progress through grades on time (or, at least, not through channels other than going 
to school).81 These two variables have strong predictive power in the selection equation, while the 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) added to the second-stage does not turn out as statistically significant, thus 
suggesting that there is little evidence of selection on unobservables. This set of estimates reveals that 
the cash transfer increased timely grade progression for girls by 7.7 percentage points, and that the 
benefit of the treatment was cut in half for girls engaged in UCW. Also, these estimates provide neater 
evidence that the effect of the cash transfer was statistically different between boys and girls. 
Unpaid care work 
Table 3.6 shows results from a DD specification on unpaid care work.82 Results point to two main 
findings. First, time spent on unpaid care work increased overtime for girls by approximately half an 
hour, while it decreased for boys by less than 3 minutes, even after accounting for age and the same 
set of controls included in the above set of models. In other words, there is evidence that as children 
grow older, gender inequalities in unpaid care work widen. Second, time spent on unpaid care work 
                                                           
the null hypothesis that attrition is random. For more details and applications of the test to longitudinal data 
from low- and middle-income countries, see Alderman et al. (2001).  
80 For boys, variables that most strongly predict the likelihood of dropping out of school between 2008 and 2010 
– hence entering the estimation of weights – are age (+), treatment status (-), UCW (+), having electricity in the 
household (-), and having access to a water network connection (-). For girls, these factors boil down to age (+) 
and treatment status (-) only – see Appendix Table A3.7. 
81 As always, the validity of the exclusion restriction can be criticized along several directions. Note that in this 
study this strategy is only adopted as a further robustness check, not as a primary finding.  
82 Appendix Table A3.8 reports analogous results from a LPM on endline UCW controlling for baseline UCW 
(in a spirit similar to the other set of estimates presented in this study). 
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did not change as a result of the intervention, as witnessed by the non-significant coefficient on the 
time-treatment (Post x CT) interaction term. 
3.7 Additional analyses 
Mechanisms and explanations 
Summarizing all this evidence, how can we make sense of these findings? First, given that test scores 
are a – perhaps the most – proximate determinant of grade progression, we would expect the cash 
transfer to have had a stronger impact on girls’ test scores. In line with Benhassine et al. (2015), I find 
that the cash transfer had in fact weak effects on test scores measured as the proportion of children 
who could correctly recognize digits and numbers and perform simple operations such as subtraction 
and division (Appendix Table A3.9). If anything, evidence is more in favor with the transfer being 
more effective in improving test scores for boys. In this respect, three observations are worth making. 
First, the endline ASER test was only administered to one child per household aged 6-12 at baseline, 
hence the sample size for these analyses is greatly reduced. Second, the ASER test only measures 
numeric and arithmetic capabilities. In light of existing literature showing that also in low-income 
contexts boys are typically better at maths while girls perform better in other domains such as literacy 
(Dickerson, McIntosh, and Valente 2015), a test covering a broader set of skills would be desirable to 
evaluate alternative channels. Third, measurement error remains a potential issue plaguing the validity 
of test score measures. Hence, the combination of small sample size, limited test coverage, and possible 
measurement error might account for the limited role of test scores in explaining differential grade 
progression outcomes.  
Other explanations could lie behind the significant effect of the transfer on girls’ timely grade 
progression.83 For instance, girls might have been more likely than boys to be pulled out of school by 
their families in the first place, hence the cash transfer – increasing in amount as a child progressed 
through school – could have had a proportionately larger impact on the former group. A second 
hypothesis may posit that grade progression improved for girls due to a more sizeable reduction in 
girls’ absenteeism, another important predictor of grade repetition. This finding is somewhat consistent 
with Benhassine et al. (2015) – who reported a reduction in absenteeism following the intervention – 
and with my additional analyses by gender of the child showing that as a result of the treatment 
absenteeism decreased for both boys and girls (more for girls), yet the benefit for girls engaged in UCW 
                                                           
83 As the treatment did not reduce time spent on unpaid care work, reduction in unpaid care work is not a 
plausible mechanism. 
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was reduced (analyses available upon request). In a similar vein, girls might have spent more time doing 
homework and participating in extracurricular activities organized by the school following the 
implementation of the program. Yet this explanation is less likely to hold true as more dedication to 
homework plausibly translates into improved test scores, a finding which is at odds with Benhassine 
et al. Alternatively, the implementation of the cash transfer program might have changed headmaster’s 
behavior, yet data on these variables are not available. Most likely, the cash transfer affected girls’ 
progression differentially as parents interpreted the introduction of a program sponsored by the 
Ministry of Education as a positive signal about the value of girls' education. Consistent with 
Benhassine et al., parental beliefs regarding the returns to education – measured as the subjective 
probability that a child who completes a certain level of education gets a job once adult – dramatically 
increased following the intervention, especially for girls. For girls expected to complete junior high 
school or high school, the cash transfer program led to large positive changes in the perceived returns 
to education (Appendix Table A3.10).84 This hypothesis also aligns with findings from previous 
research showing that parents respond to interventions that increase the perceived returns to education 
by boosting their children's motivation and effort in school (Jensen 2010; Jensen 2012; Nguyen 2008). 
Limitations 
One important limitation of this study deals with the possibility that the amount of unpaid care work 
children engage in reflects an explicit choice of parents who respond to their children’s cognitive 
endowments by investing more in the child who is more successful in school. Stated otherwise, parents 
might value unpaid care work as an option that empowers less academically-oriented offspring. Data 
limitations – such as the lack of data on test scores at baseline – prevent us from exploring whether, at 
the very least, test scores at baseline differ between kids engaged and not engaged in UCW. Some 
evidence consistent with this idea emerges from analyses of endline scores limited to the control group. 
These suggest that the proportion of kids who answered correctly was lower the higher the engagement 
in UCW, with the pattern limited to girls (Appendix Table A3.11). 
Adopting an instrumental variable approach would be a suitable approach to deal with the 
endogenous nature of UCW. This route is however challenging, as the instrument would need to proxy 
for the demand for household work and be exogenous to household decisions on schooling. A number 
of papers have proposed instrumental variables to identify the causal impact of child labor on 
                                                           
84 In households where the average amount of time spent on unpaid care work at baseline – average among all 
children aged 6-15 at baseline present in the household – was more than two hours per day, the positive effect 
of the treatment was reduced to almost zero. 
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educational outcomes in the context of developing countries, with most of the focus being on market 
work. An exception is Assaad, Levison, and Zibani (2010), who proxied for the demand for domestic 
work in rural Egypt using households’ access to basic public services such as piped water, piped sewage 
disposal, and garbage collection. In a similar spirit I attempted to use information on household access 
to services (well, piped water, etc.) and household composition (ratio of girls over boys aged 16 to 18 
in the household) as instruments for unpaid care work, though the first stage did not prove strong 
enough.85 As the primary aim of this paper is to uncover the differential causal impact of the 
intervention on different types of students defined by baseline characteristics – rather than to estimate 
the causal effect of unpaid care work on progression – I leave this issue aside. Yet it is important to 
keep in mind that this concern might underlie a different mechanism. Further research should take up 
this important concern. 
3.8 Conclusions and discussion 
In this study I have used secondary data from a cluster-randomized control trial to evaluate the impact 
of a cash-transfer program that was launched in 2007 with the aim of increasing the rural primary 
school completion rate in rural Morocco. My first finding suggests that a cash transfer explicitly tied 
to an educational purpose – yet not expressly supporting learning – affected school progression on top 
of enrolment and attendance by stemming dropout (extensive margin) and increasing the likelihood of 
timely grade progression (intensive margin). While the former effect operated similarly for boys and 
girls, the latter was null for boys. In other words, the cash transfer was effective in reducing boys’ 
dropout, though it did not alter their grade progression path.  
My second finding suggests that while the effect of the intervention on dropout operated 
equally for children who performed unpaid care work versus those who did not, the beneficial effect 
of the treatment on timely grade progression was cut by a half to a third for girls overburdened by 
household chores. Therefore, there is reason to believe that – as a result of the treatment – girls engaged 
in unpaid care tasks were staying in school more but were less likely to progress on time. This claim 
lends itself to two implications. First, it points to the need to design policy interventions with the 
potential to help children attend and progress through school in a timely manner, as a monetary 
                                                           
85 In Appendix Table A3.12 I nonetheless reported an analysis of the determinants of UCW, including the above-
mentioned (potential) instruments. Interestingly, a higher ratio of girls over boys aged 16-18 in the household is 
associated with a sharp reduction in hours per day spent on UCW for girls but not for boys, suggesting that older 
girls “relieve” younger girls from some of these responsibilities. Also, having access to a well or an individual 
network connection, and a pipe to sanitation network for used water in the household are negatively associated 
with UCW for all kids, yet coefficients are on the whole bigger in magnitude for girls.  
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“nudge” might not be sufficient to simultaneously achieve both goals. Second, it stresses the 
importance of tackling rooted gender inequalities within the household by directing policies to 
vulnerable children that may need ad hoc targeting. 
Finally, despite unpaid care work emerges as a barrier to school progression, estimates show 
that a cash transfer of this kind was not effective in reducing unpaid care work, neither for boys nor 
for girls. Although the cash transfer system was not designed to address any form of child work in the 
first place, it is still surprising that the policy boosted school enrolment, attendance, and progression 
without affecting household chores. Once again, this finding suggests that policymakers concerned 
with improving children's academic outcomes should take into more careful consideration the 
mechanisms whereby these outcomes are produced and reinforced – often originating in the family 
and attributable to within-household inequalities – and craft policies accordingly.  
My findings complement and enrich knowledge on the effectiveness of Tayssir by shedding 
light on an academic outcome that rarely receives adequate consideration both in the education 
literature and in the policy debate. Moreover, while the main policy implication in Benhassine et al. 
relates to the idea of promoting cheaper cash transfers tied to education (“nudge”) over more expensive 
programs conditional on attendance (“shove”), I here suggest that policies aimed at improving school 
outcomes should target both the intensive and the extensive margin of school participation, and take 
into more careful consideration the within-household pathways that promote or hinder some of these 
outcomes. A concern that I share with Benhassine et al. is the extent to which the cash transfer impacts 
would persist in the long run, as the documented effects relate to an intervention that was implemented 
over a two-year period and evaluated shortly thereafter. To the extent that the positive impacts of the 
cash transfer on girls’ progression are due to an increased estimate of the returns to education, long-
run impacts would be hampered, for instance, if the program led parents to temporarily overestimate 
those returns.  
Overall, this study has demonstrated the need to focus on school progression outcomes, and 
to advance knowledge on the interplay between household inequality, as driven by gender and unpaid 
care work dynamics, and children's schooling. The study has also stressed the added value of 
capitalizing on the many hundreds impact evaluations conducted in low and middle-income countries 
over the past decade to shed new light on dynamics that may have been neglected in previous analyses. 
Addressing questions concerning variation in and mechanisms of program impact is crucial to both 
promoting transparency and guiding the replicability and scalability of successful programs, and greatly 
increases the returns yielded from valuable, yet hugely expensive large-scale interventions. Future 
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research should push forward the field in its use and sharing of large-scale intervention data toward 
greater insights, and thus better outcomes, in areas such as women’s economic empowerment and child 
development in low and middle-income countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
3.9 References 
Admassie, A. 2003. "Child Labour and Schooling in the Context of a Subsistence Rural Economy: Can 
They be Compatible?" International Journal of Educational Development 23, no. 2: 167–185. 
Agnaou, F. 2004. Gender, Literacy, and Empowerment in Morocco. Routledge, New York. 
Alderman, H., Behrman, J. R., Kohler, H-P., Maluccio, J. A., and Watkins, S. C. 2001. "Attrition in 
Longitudinal Household Survey Data." Demographic Research 5, no. 4:79-124. 
Amarante, V., Ferrando, M., and Vigorito, A. 2013. "Teenage School Attendance and Cash Transfers: 
An Impact Evaluation of PANES." Economía 14, no. 1: 61–96. 
Assaad, R., Levison, D., and Zibani, N. 2010. "The Effect of Domestic Work on Girls’ Schooling: 
Evidence from Egypt." Feminist Economics 16, no. 1: 79–128. 
Becketti, S., Gould, W., Lillard, L., and Welch, F. 1988. “The Panel Study of Income Dynamics after 
Fourteen Years: An Evaluation.” Journal of Labor Economics 6, no. 4: 472-92.  
Behrman, J. R., Parker, S. W., and Todd, P. E. 2009. "Schooling Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers 
on Young Children: Evidence from Mexico." Economic Development and Cultural Change 57, no. 
3: 439–477. 
Benhassine, N., F. Devoto, E. Duflo, P. Dupas, and V. Pouliquen. 2015. "Turning a Shove into a 
Nudge? A 'Labeled Cash Transfer' for Education." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, 
no. 3: 86-125. 
Budlender, D. 2008. "The Statistical Evidence on Care and Non-Care Work Across Six Countries." 
UNRISD: Gender Programme Paper No.4, UNRISD, Geneva. 
Budlender, D., and Brathaug, A. L. 2004. "Calculating the Value of Unpaid Labour in South Africa." 
Atlantis 28, no. 2: 29–40. 
Buonomo Zabaleta, M. 2011. "The Impact of Child Labor on Schooling Outcomes in Nicaragua." 
Economics of Education Review 30, no. 6: 1527–1539. 
Cardoso, E., and Souza, A. P. 2009. "The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Labor and School 
Enrollment in Brazil." In Child Labor and Education in Latin America: An Economic Perspective (pp. 
133-146). Palgrave Macmillan US, New York. 
Carneiro, P., Heckmna, J. J., and Vytlacil, E. J. 2011. "Estimating Marginal Returns to Education." 
American Economic Review 101, no. 6: 1754-81. 
Cascio, E. U. 2005. "Evidence from the Current Population Survey: School Progression and the Grade 
Distribution of Students." IZA Discussion Paper, 1747. 
Central Intelligence Agency. 2015. Morocco. In The World Factbook. Retrieved from:  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html.    
Dammert, A. C. 2009a. "Heterogeneous Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from 
Nicaragua." Economic Development and Cultural Change 58, no. 1: 53–83. 
———. 2009b. "Siblings, Child Labor, and Schooling in Nicaragua and Guatemala." Journal of 
130 
 
Population Economics 23, no. 1: 199–224. 
Dickerson, A., McIntosh, S., and Valente, C. 2015. "Do the maths: An analysis of the gender gap in 
mathematics in Africa." Economics of Education Review 46: 1-22. 
Dubois, P., de Janvry, A., and Sadoulet, E. 2012. "Effects on School Enrollment and Performance of 
a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Mexico." Journal of Labor Economics 30, no. 3: 555–589. 
Education Policy Data Center (EPDC). 2014. National Education Profile, 2014 Update, Morocco.  
El-Kogali, S., and Krafft, C. 2015. Expanding Opportunities for the Next Generation. Early Childhood 
Development in the Middle East and North Africa. Edited by Directions in Development-Human 
Development. World Bank Group. 
Ferrant, G., Pesando, L. M., and Nowacka, K. 2014. "Unpaid Care Work: The Missing Link in the 
Analysis of Gender Gaps in Labour Outcomes." OECD Development Centre Issues Paper. 
Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/Unpaid_care_work.pdf. 
Fizbein, A., Schady, N., Ferreira, F. H. G., Grosh, M., Keleher, N., Olinto, P., and Skoufias, E. 2009. 
Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Folbre, N. 2006. "Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy." Journal of Human 
Development 7, no. 2: 183–199. 
———. 2014. "The Care Economy in Africa: Subsistence Production and Unpaid Care." Journal of 
African Economies 23, suppl_1: i128-i156. 
Glick, P., and Sahn, D. E. 2010. "Early Academic Performance, Grade Repetition, and School 
Attainment in Senegal: A Panel Data Analysis." World Bank Economic Review 24, no. 1: 93–120. 
Gomes-Neto, J. B., and Hanushek, E. A. 1994. "Causes and Consequences of Grade Repetition: 
Evidence from Brazil." Economic Development and Cultural Change 43, no. 1: 117–148. 
Gupta, L. 2015. Education, Poverty and Gender: Schooling Muslim Girls in India. Abingdon,. Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge. 
Handa, S., Davis, B., Stampini, M., and Winters, P. C. 2010. "Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in 
Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes: Assessing the Impact of Progresa on Agricultural 
Households." Journal of Development Effectiveness 2, no. 3: 320–335. 
Heckman, J. J. 2001. "Micro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy: Nobel Lecture." 
Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 4: 673–748. 
Heckman, J. J., and Vytlacil, E. 2005. "Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and Econometric 
Policy Evaluation." Econometrica 73, no. 3: 669–738. 
IEG. 2012. World Bank Group Impact Evaluations Relevance and Effectiveness. Retrieved from: 
http://ieg.worldbank.org/Data/reports/impact_eval_report.pdf. 
Imai, K., and Strauss, A. 2011. "Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects from Randomized 
Experiments, with Application to the Optimal Planning of the Get-out-the-vote Campaign." 
Political Analysis 19, no. 1: 1–19. 
131 
 
Jacob, B. A., and Lefgren, L. 2009. "The Effect of Grade Retention on High School Completion." 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 3: 33–58. 
Jensen, R. 2010. "The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 125, no. 2: 515–548. 
———. 2012. "Do Labor Market Opportunities Affect Young Women’s Work and Family Decisions? 
Experimental Evidence from India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, no. 2: 753–792. 
Kumara, A. S., and Pfau, W. D. 2011. "Impact of Cash Transfer Programmes on School Attendance 
and Child Poverty: An ex Ante Simulation for Sri Lanka." Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 
11: 1699–1720. 
Le, H. T., and Homel, R. 2015. "The Impact of Child Labor on Children’s Educational Performance: 
Evidence from Rural Vietnam." Journal of Asian Economics 36: 1–13. 
Levison, D., and Moe, K. S. 1998. "Household Work as a Deterrent to Schooling: An Analysis of 
Adolescent Girls in Peru." The Journal of Developing Areas 32, no. 3: 339–356. 
Lloyd, C. B., Grant, M., and Ritchie, A. 2008. "Gender Differences in Time Use Among Adolescents 
in Developing Countries: Implications of Rising School Enrollment Rates." Journal of Research 
on Adolescence 18, no. 1: 99–120. 
Maluccio, J. A., Murphy, A., and Regalia, F. 2010. "Does Supply Matter? Initial Schooling Conditions 
and the Effectiveness of Conditional Cash Transfers for Grade Progression in Nicaragua." 
Journal of Development Effectiveness 2, no. 1: 87–116. 
Manacorda, M. 2012. "The Cost of Grade Retention." The Review of Economics and Statistics 94, no. 2: 
596-606. 
Mansouri, Z., and El Amine Moumine, M. 2017. "Primary and Secondary Education in Morocco: From 
Access to School into Generalization to Dropout." International Journal of Evaluation and Research 
in Education (IJERE) 6, no. 1: 9-16. 
Moffitt, R. A. 2009. "Issues in the Estimation of Causal Effects in Population Research, with an 
Application to the Effects of Teenage Childbearing." In Causal Analysis in Population Studies, 
Edited by Henriette Engelhardt, Hans-Peter Kohler and Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz, The 
Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis, edited by Berlin: Springer 
Verlag, 9/29. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
Nguyen, T. 2008. "Information, Role Models and Perceived Returns to Education: Experimental 
Evidence from Madagascar." MIT Job Market Paper. 
Pal, S. 2004. "Child Schooling in Peru: Evidence from a Sequential Analysis of School Progression." 
Journal of Population Economics 17, no. 4: 657–680. 
Patrinos, H. A., and Psacharopoulos, G. 1996. "Socioeconomic and Ethnic Determinants of Age-grade 
Distortion in Bolivian and Guatemalan Primary Schools." International Journal of Educational 
Development 16, no. 1: 3–14. 
———. 1997. "Family Size, Schooling and Child Labor in Peru - An Empirical Analysis." Journal of 
Population Economics 10, no. 4: 387–405. 
132 
 
Ponce, J., and Bedi, A. S. 2010. "The Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Cognitive Achievement: 
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano of Ecuador." Economics of Education Review 29, no. 1: 116-
125. 
Putnick, D. L., and Bornstein, M. H. 2015. "Is Child Labor a Barrier to School Enrollment in Low-and 
Middle-Income Countries?" International Journal of Educational Development 41: 112–120. 
Razavi, S., and Staab, S. 2008. "The Social and Political Economy of Care: Contesting Class and Gender 
Inequalities." Paper Prepared for the UN Expert Group Meeting on Equal Sharing of 
Responsibilities between Women and Men, Including Caregiving in the Context of AIDS. 
Reynolds, S. A. 2015. "Brazil's Bolsa Familia: Does it Work for Adolescents and do They Work Less 
for it?" Economics of Education Review 46, issue C: 23-38. 
Schiefelbein, E., and Wolff, L. 1992. "Repetition and Inadequate Achievement in Latin America’s 
Primary Schools: A Review of Magnitudes, Causes, Relationships and Strategies." The World 
Bank; Human Resources Division. 
Schwartz, A. E., Stiefel, L., and Wiswall, M. 2013. "Do Small Schools Improve Performance in Large, 
Urban Districts? Causal Evidence from New York City." Journal of Urban Economics 77: 27-40. 
Siddiqui, A., and Iram, U. 2007. "Socioeconomic Determinants of School Progression in Pakistan." 
Applied Econometrics and International Development 7, no. 2: 1–28. 
UNDP. 2009. "Unpaid Care Work." UNDP Policy Brief: Gender Equality and Poverty Reduction no. 1: 1–8. 
UNESCO. 2012. Opportunities Lost: The Impact of Grade Repetition and Early School Leaving. Global Education 
Digest. 
UNIFEM. 2000. "Progress of the World’s Women 2000." Unifem, 1–166. 
United Nations. 2005. Guide to Producing Statistics on Time Use: Measuring Paid and Unpaid Work. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Retrieved from: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_93e.pdf. 
Vivalt, E. 2015. "Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in Impact Evaluation." American Economic Review 
105, no. 5: 467–470. 
Vu, T. M. 2014. "Are Daughters Always the Losers in the Chore War? Evidence Using Household 
Data from Vietnam." The Journal of Development Studies 50, no. 4: 520–529. 
Wagner, D. 1994. Literacy, Culture, and Development: Becoming Literate in Morocco. Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
World Bank. 2015. Morocco, Mind the Gap: Empowering Women for a More Open, Inclusive, and Prosperous 
Society. Washington, D. C.: World Bank Group. 
Zapata, D., Contreras, D., and Kruger, D. 2011. "Child Labor and Schooling in Bolivia: Who’s Falling 
Behind? The Roles of Domestic Work, Gender, and Ethnicity." World Development, 39 (4), 588–
599. 
 
133 
 
3.10 Tables 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics and balance checks for the post-attrition sample  
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. Column (1) 
reports the mean of the variable listed on the left in the control group, with standard deviations in brackets; 
column (2) reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of the left-hand side variable on a dummy for 
treatment, accounting for strata randomization dummies. 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
Variable 
Mean control 
Diff. treatment-
control 
Obs.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Female 0.466 0.027 
9,938 
 [0.499] (0.018) 
Age 10.44 0.047 9,938 
 [2.493] (0.064) 
Number of siblings (0-15) 1.701 -0.009 9,938 
 [0.965] (0.044) 
Number of children in the HH (ages 0-5) 0.806 -0.009 
9,938 
 [0.876] (0.040) 
Number of children in the HH (ages 0-15) 3.575 -0.035 
9,938 
 [1.341] (0.066) 
Household size 7.273 -0.052 
9,938 
 [2.151] (0.099) 
Unpaid care work (mins/day) 47.50 -2.321 9,938 
 [87.08] (3.326) 
Mother has primary education (or more) 0.049 -0.000 9,938 
 [0.216] (0.010) 
Father has primary education (or more) 0.164 0.009 
9,938 
 [0.370] (0.023) 
Never enrolled in school (june 2008) 0.086 -0.024* 
9,938 
 [0.280] (0.009) 
Currently enrolled in school (june 2008) 0.761 0.043** 
9,938 
 [0.426] (0.016) 
Share of children in the HH enrolled in school (june 2008) 0.606 0.031* 9,938 
 [0.269] (0.015) 
Current grade (june 2008) 3.190 0.023 7,688 
 [1.649] (0.050) 
Age of entry in primary school (for enrolled in june 2008) 6.449 0.013 
7,688 
 [1.019] (0.045) 
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Table 3.2: Average time per day (mins/day) spent on unpaid care work, by activity. Children aged 6-
15, by gender 
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Sampling weights used. Standard deviations in brackets. 
  
Activity   Overall Boys Girls  
Preparing food for a meal (FM) Mean  6.344 2.956 9.948 
 [SD] [21.64] [13.99] [27.08] 
Preparing food for another occasion (FO) Mean  0.461 0.139 0.804 
 [SD] [4.857] [2.004] [6.648] 
Doing housework (HW) Mean  14.67 2.049 28.08 
 [SD] [40.36] [15.06] [52.63] 
Washing clothes (WC) Mean  4.645 0.672 8.869 
 [SD] [19.39] [6.213] [26.45] 
Other domestic activities (OD) Mean  6.581 2.153 11.29 
 [SD] [26.85] [14.43] [34.98] 
Shopping for the house (SH) Mean  0.934 1.093 0.765 
 [SD] [6.343] [6.981] [5.582] 
Get water (GW) Mean  9.909 8.026 11.91 
 [SD] [27.27] [25.01] [29.35] 
Occupied with children in the HH (CHH) Mean  2.270 0.577 4.071 
 [SD] [16.98] [6.982] [23.16] 
Occupied with elderly in the HH (EHH) Mean  0.195 0.093 0.303 
 [SD] [4.460] [2.473] [5.875] 
Occupied with other sick/handicapped in the HH (SHH) Mean  0.063 0.031 0.097 
 [SD] [2.007] [1.119] [2.643] 
Unpaid care work (UCW) Mean  46.07 17.79 76.14 
 [SD] [83.30] [43.35] [102.8] 
Obs.   9,938 5,101 4,837 
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Table 3.3: LPM on dropout by the end of year 2 among those enrolled in school at baseline (panel a) 
and timely grade progression through school (panel b), by gender 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. Estimates 
from panel a from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is no differential treatment effect by gender 
of the child (p=0.132); estimates from panel b from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is no 
differential treatment effect by gender of the child (p=0.168). 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Dropout 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) -0.047** -0.046** -0.041**  -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.077*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Number of siblings  0.002 0.002   0.008 0.008 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.006) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.018* 0.037   -0.001 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.023)   (0.005) (0.013) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.023    -0.004 
   (0.024)    (0.014) 
Constant 0.114*** -0.227*** -0.233***  0.171*** -0.450*** -0.453*** 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.034)  (0.015) (0.045) (0.046) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,256 4,256 4,256   3,432 3,432 3,432 
b. Timely grade progression 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.021 0.020 0.026  0.061+ 0.054+ 0.088* 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) 
Number of siblings  -0.002 -0.002   -0.022* -0.022* 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.019 0.043   -0.034*** 0.003 
  (0.012) (0.028)   (0.009) (0.020) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.029    -0.044* 
   (0.031)    (0.022) 
Constant 0.617*** 0.456*** 0.450***  0.620*** 0.376*** 0.347*** 
 (0.022) (0.066) (0.066)  (0.029) (0.071) (0.074) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,936 3,936 3,936   3,045 3,045 3,045 
 
136 
 
Table 3.4: Bounding of estimates for timely grade progression. Dropouts assumed to progress on time 
(panel a) and to not progress at all (panel b) 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. Estimates 
from panel a from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is no differential treatment effect by gender 
of the child (p=0.365); estimates from panel b from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is a 
differential treatment effect by gender of the child (p=0.081). 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Timely grade progression 
a. Dropout coded as 1 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.004 0.003 0.011  0.029 0.022 0.054+ 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) 
Number of siblings  -0.002 -0.002   -0.017+ -0.017+ 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.023* 0.051*   -0.029*** 0.003 
  (0.011) (0.024)   (0.007) (0.016) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.033    -0.039* 
   (0.027)    (0.018) 
Constant 0.659*** 0.390*** 0.381***  0.684*** 0.268*** 0.241*** 
 (0.020) (0.062) (0.062)  (0.025) (0.063) (0.065) 
b. Dropout coded as 0 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.051* 0.049* 0.052*  0.103*** 0.104*** 0.135*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) 
Number of siblings  -0.004 -0.004   -0.025* -0.025* 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.010) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.006 0.016   -0.029*** 0.002 
  (0.012) (0.030)   (0.008) (0.019) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.012    -0.037+ 
   (0.032)    (0.021) 
Constant 0.545*** 0.617*** 0.614***  0.511*** 0.714*** 0.688*** 
 (0.023) (0.065) (0.065)  (0.026) (0.072) (0.074) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,256 4,256 4,256   3,432 3,432 3,432 
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Table 3.5: Inverse Probability Weighting (panel a) and Heckman two-step correction (panel b) 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. Estimates 
from panel a from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is a differential treatment effect by gender 
of the child (p=0.089); estimates from panel b from specification (1) pooled by gender show that there is a 
differential treatment effect by gender of the child (p=0.078). 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Timely grade progression 
a. IPW 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.020 0.015 0.004  0.101+ 0.097+ 0.139* 
 (0.053) (0.049) (0.052)  (0.061) (0.053) (0.066) 
Number of siblings  0.006 0.006   -0.058* -0.058* 
  (0.020) (0.020)   (0.026) (0.026) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.024 -0.042   -0.065** 0.010 
  (0.026) (0.050)   (0.020) (0.039) 
CT x Unpaid care work   0.070    -0.062+ 
   (0.057)    (0.033) 
Constant 0.579*** 0.283* 0.293*  0.506*** 0.093 0.051 
 (0.050) (0.124) (0.125)  (0.066) (0.157) (0.159) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,936 3,936 3,936   3,045 3,045 3,045 
b. Heckman 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.021 0.024 0.028  0.077** 0.056* 0.087** 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)  (0.027) (0.025) (0.029) 
Number of siblings  -0.003 -0.002   -0.017+ -0.018+ 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.009) (0.009) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.012 0.028   -0.037*** -0.000 
  (0.013) (0.032)   (0.008) (0.018) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.019    -0.043* 
   (0.034)    (0.019) 
Constant 0.652*** 0.401*** 0.400***  0.678*** 0.454*** 0.439*** 
 (0.081) (0.101) (0.101)  (0.078) (0.098) (0.098) 
Lambda (IMR) 
0.022 0.117 0.113   0.120 0.044 0.029 
(0.108) (0.083) (0.083)  (0.082) (0.070) (0.070) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Censored obs. 320 320 320  387 387 387 
Uncensored obs. 3,936 3,936 3,936   3,045 3,045 3,045 
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Table 3.6: Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimation predicting time (hours) per day spent on unpaid 
care work, by gender 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. 
Number of observations is doubled as there are two observations per child (2008 and 2010).  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Boys   Girls 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Time (Post) -0.040 -0.040  0.532*** 0.532*** 
 (0.041) (0.041)  (0.118) (0.118) 
Treatment (CT) -0.009 0.002  -0.114 -0.082 
 (0.041) (0.040)  (0.097) (0.083) 
Post x CT 0.037 0.037  0.033 0.033 
 (0.046) (0.046)  (0.128) (0.128) 
Number of siblings  0.012   -0.042* 
  (0.009)   (0.021) 
Age (at baseline)  0.030***   0.232*** 
  (0.003)   (0.008) 
Constant 0.304*** 0.143*  1.359*** -0.343** 
 (0.037) (0.062)  (0.090) (0.132) 
Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Obs. 10,202 10,202   9,674 9,674 
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3.11 Figures 
Figure 3.1: Number and percent of out-of-school children by region of Morocco (DHS 2003-04) 
 
Source: Morocco’s most recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), i.e., DHS 2003-04.  
Notes: These statistics include children of primary school age who are not in primary or secondary school, and 
children of lower secondary school age who are not in primary or secondary school.  
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Figure 3.2: Cumulative out-of-school risk according to selected characteristics (DHS 2003-04) 
 
 
Source: Morocco’s most recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), i.e., DHS 2003-04.  
Notes: Estimates computed using multivariate logistic regression.  
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of children performing each unpaid care work activity, by gender 
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
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Figure 3.4: Minutes per day spent on unpaid care work by gender and number of siblings (top panel), 
and by gender and age of the child (bottom panel) 
 
            Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
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Figure 3.5: Predicted girls’ grade progression, by treatment status and categories of unpaid care work 
 
Source: Baseline and endline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Corresponding detailed regression estimates reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. Adjusted proportions 
computed assuming controls at their mean values. Tests for statistical significance of the coefficients between 
treatment and control groups: T-No UCW vs C-No UCW: p>F=0.037; T-Medium UCW vs C-Medium UCW: 
p>F=0.596; T-High UCW vs C-High UCW: p>F=0.623. Tests for statistical significance of the coefficients 
between treatment groups: T-No UCW vs T-Medium UCW: p>F=0.093; T-No UCW vs T-High UCW: 
p>F=0.069; T-Medium UCW vs T-High UCW: p>F=0.753. 
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3.12 Appendix 
Table A3.1: Differential attrition by treatment status and selected characteristics 
 
Source: Baseline survey – pre-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. Column (1) 
reports the mean of the variable listed on the left in the non-attrition group, with standard deviations in brackets; 
column (2) reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of the left-hand side variable on a dummy for attrition, 
accounting for strata randomization dummies. 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
No attrition 
Diff. attrition - 
no attrition 
Obs.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.817 -0.063* 
10,889 
 [0.386] (0.029) 
Female 0.485 -0.039* 10,889 
 [0.500] (0.019) 
Age 10.45 -0.118 10,889 
 [2.486] (0.076) 
Number of siblings (0-15) 1.678 -0.078 
10,889 
 [0.974] (0.056) 
Number of children in the HH (ages 0-5) 0.808 0.080 
10,889 
 [0.850] (0.050) 
Number of children in the HH (ages 0-15) 3.537 -0.013 
10,889 
 [1.337] (0.073) 
Household size 7.179 -0.458*** 10,889 
 [2.036] (0.089) 
Unpaid care work (mins/day) 45.95 -2.023 10,889 
 [83.22] [3.441] 
Mother has primary education (or more) 0.048 0.020 
10,889 
 [0.215] (0.013) 
Father has primary education (or more) 0.167 0.037+ 
10,889 
 [0.373] (0.022) 
Never enrolled in school (june 2008) 0.068 0.015 
10,889 
 [0.253] (0.011) 
Currently enrolled in school (june 2008) 0.791 -0.016 10,889 
 [0.407] (0.018) 
Current grade (june 2008) 3.196 -0.064 
8,385 
  [1.632] (0.063) 
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Table A3.2: Summary statistics and balance checks for the unpaid care work activities 
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Time measured in minutes per day. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. 
Sampling weights used. Column (1) reports the mean of the variable listed on the left in the control group, with 
standard deviations in brackets; column (2) reports the coefficient from an OLS regression of the left-hand side 
variable on a dummy for treatment, accounting for strata randomization dummies. 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity 
Mean control 
Diff. 
treatment-
control 
Obs.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Preparing food for a meal (FM) 7.327 -1.124 
9,938 
 [24.15] (0.865) 
Preparing food for another occasion (FO) 0.487 -0.001 
9,938 
 [4.433] (0.142) 
Doing housework (HW) 14.32 0.293 
9,938 
 [42.15] (1.433) 
Washing clothes (WC) 5.144 -0.497 9,938 
 [21.48] (0.622) 
Other domestic activities (OD) 5.730 0.835 
9,938 
 [23.81] (0.784) 
Shopping for the house (SH) 0.732 0.172 
9,938 
 [5.041] (0.171) 
Get water (GW) 10.58 -0.741 
9,938 
 [27.43] (1.350) 
Occupied with children in the HH (CHH) 2.958 -1.238+ 
9,938 
 [21.81] (0.694) 
Occupied with elderly in the HH (EHH) 0.095 0.069 9,938 
 [2.777] (0.084) 
Occupied with other sick/handicapped in the HH (SHH) 0.122 -0.088 
9,938 
  [3.476] (0.091) 
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Table A3.3: Gender differences in means (t-test) in time spent on unpaid care work, by activity. 
Children aged 6-15 who report spending a non-zero amount of time on the activity  
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Time measured in minutes per day. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector 
level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity 
Boys   Girls   Diff. 
Obs. Mean  Obs. Mean  (s.e.) 
Preparing food for a meal (FM) 343 42.87  880 57.17  -14.30*** 
       (2.467) 
Preparing food for another occasion (FO) 32 22.81  100 40.50  -17.69*** 
       (4.775) 
Doing housework (HW) 180 60.90  1,578 88.41  -27.51*** 
       (4.641) 
Washing clothes (WC) 91 39.23  660 66.19  -26.96*** 
       (4.056) 
Other domestic activities (OD) 172 66.94  678 83.27  -16.33*** 
       (4.578) 
Shopping for the house (SH) 159 35.62  105 32.22  3.396 
       (2.382) 
Get water (GW) 620 66.41  878 66.52  -0.107 
       (1.931) 
Occupied with children in the HH (CHH) 48 62.29  215 89.50  -27.21** 
       (9.585) 
Occupied with elderly in the HH (EHH) 13 36.41  23 65.80  -29.39 
       (17.81) 
Occupied with other sick/handicapped in the HH (SHH) 5 34.67  10 47.00  -12.33 
       (17.57) 
Unpaid care work (UCW) 1,172 78.46  2,529 149.1  -70.62*** 
              (3.177) 
 
147 
 
Table A3.4: Model specifications on the pooled sample with a dummy for gender and a treatment-
gender interaction term. Dropout since 2008 (panel a) and timely grade progression (panel b) 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  a. Dropout   b. Timely grade progression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment (CT) 
-
0.055*** 
-
0.058*** -0.044** -0.042**  0.039+ 0.034 0.015 0.024 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) 
Number of siblings  0.006 0.006 0.006   -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unpaid care work 
(hrs/day)  0.008+ 0.008+ 0.015   -0.016* -0.016* 0.016 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)   (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) 
CT x Unpaid care 
work    -0.009     -0.038* 
    (0.012)     (0.018) 
Female  0.046*** 0.074*** 0.070***   0.051*** 0.013 -0.004 
  (0.008) (0.019) (0.020)   (0.013) (0.031) (0.032) 
CT x Female   -0.033 -0.029    0.046 0.065+ 
   (0.020) (0.022)    (0.034) (0.035) 
Constant 0.136*** 
-
0.343*** 
-
0.355*** 
-
0.357***  0.619*** 0.415*** 0.432*** 0.423*** 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.020) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,688 7,688 7,688 7,688   6,981 6,981 6,981 6,981 
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Table A3.5: LPM on dropout by the end of year 2 among those enrolled in school at baseline (panel 
a) and timely grade progression through school (panel b), by gender. Unpaid care work measured in 
categories 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
a. Dropout 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) -0.047** -0.046** -0.038**  -0.073*** -0.082*** -0.079*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Number of siblings  0.002 0.002   0.008 0.008 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.006) 
Unpaid care work (Ref.: None)        
        
          Medium (0-2 hrs/day)  0.019 0.046   -0.011 -0.008 
  (0.012) (0.035)   (0.012) (0.038) 
          High (>2 hrs/day)  0.026 0.072   0.006 0.019 
  (0.022) (0.079)   (0.017) (0.045) 
CT x Unpaid care work (Ref.: CT x None)       
        
          CT x Medium   -0.033    -0.003 
   (0.037)    (0.041) 
          CT x High   -0.056    -0.015 
   (0.083)    (0.048) 
Constant 0.114*** -0.227*** -0.234***  0.171*** -0.444*** -0.447*** 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.034)  (0.015) (0.045) (0.047) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,256 4,256 4,256   3,432 3,432 3,432 
b. Timely grade progression 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.021 0.019 0.021  0.061+ 0.056+ 0.090* 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.043) 
Number of siblings  -0.002 -0.002   -0.022* -0.022* 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.011) (0.011) 
Unpaid care work (Ref.: None)        
        
          Medium (0-2 hrs/day)  0.012 0.010   -0.067** -0.007 
  (0.023) (0.054)   (0.023) (0.059) 
          High (>2 hrs/day)  0.061 0.103   -0.110*** -0.029 
  (0.038) (0.106)   (0.027) (0.067) 
CT x Unpaid care work (Ref.: CT x None)       
        
          CT x Medium   0.002    -0.071 
   (0.058)    (0.064) 
          CT x High   -0.050    -0.096+ 
   (0.112)    (0.058) 
Constant 0.617*** 0.456*** 0.454***  0.620*** 0.381*** 0.351*** 
 (0.022) (0.066) (0.067)  (0.029) (0.072) (0.075) 
Controls No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,936 3,936 3,936   3,045 3,045 3,045 
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Table A3.6: BLGW test for non-random attrition 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
BLGW test Enrolled in school at baseline Current grade at baseline 
 (1) (2) 
Dropout since 2008 (A) -0.230*** 1.037* 
 (0.042) (0.426) 
Female -0.042*** -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.026) 
Female x A 0.037*** 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.111) 
Age -0.038*** 0.593*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) 
Age x A 0.034*** -0.121*** 
 (0.003) (0.035) 
Number of siblings (0-15) -0.039*** 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.014) 
Number of siblings (0-15) x A 0.037*** 0.167** 
 (0.005) (0.061) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day) -0.088*** -0.018 
 (0.004) (0.013) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day) x A 0.087*** 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.055) 
Mother has primary education (or more) 0.013 0.187*** 
 (0.017) (0.054) 
Mother has primary education (or more) x A -0.031 0.098 
 (0.020) (0.221) 
Father has primary education (or more) 0.037*** 0.118*** 
 (0.011) (0.032) 
Father has primary education (or more) x A -0.046*** 0.289* 
 (0.013) (0.128) 
Household size 0.001 -0.012+ 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
Household size x A 0.001 0.027 
 (0.003) (0.028) 
HH owns a cellphone  0.008 0.108*** 
 (0.010) (0.031) 
HH owns a cellphone x A -0.003 -0.024 
 (0.011) (0.103) 
HH has electrical network connection 0.038*** 0.087* 
 (0.011) (0.034) 
HH has electrical network connection x A -0.037** 0.288** 
 (0.012) (0.104) 
HH has one well (or more) 0.037* -0.020 
 (0.015) (0.040) 
HH has one well (or more) x A -0.030+ 0.123 
 (0.018) (0.143) 
HH gets water from individual network connection 0.003 0.050 
 (0.014) (0.040) 
HH gets water from individual network connection x A -0.022 0.045 
 (0.014) (0.144) 
HH gets water from natural source -0.009 -0.048 
 (0.013) (0.032) 
HH gets water from natural source x A 0.009 0.068 
 (0.014) (0.105) 
Pipe to sanitation network for used water in the HH -0.009 0.095 
 (0.034) (0.097) 
Pipe to sanitation network for used water in the HH x A 0.006 -0.718* 
 (0.039) (0.364) 
Constant 1.273*** -2.887*** 
 (0.032) (0.093) 
Obs. 9,938 7,688 
F-test (Joint significance of A and A(x(0))) 110.9 4.48 
P>F 0.000 0.000 
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Table A3.7: Statistically significant baseline predictors of attrition (defined as dropping out of school 
between 2008 and 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongest baseline predictors of dropout 
Boys  Girls 
Age (+)  Age (+) 
Treatment (-)  Treatment (-) 
UCW (+)   
HH has electrical network connection (-)   
HH gets water from individual network connection (-)     
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Table A3.8: LPM on endline unpaid care work, controlling for baseline 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.025 0.026 0.032  -0.051 -0.023 -0.047 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day, baseline)  0.151*** 0.136***   0.199*** 0.088*** 
  (0.032) (0.031)   (0.018) (0.020) 
Number of siblings   -0.001    -0.040 
   (0.012)    (0.033) 
Constant 0.267*** 0.221*** -0.054  1.867*** 1.591*** -0.056 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.071)  (0.076) (0.078) (0.187) 
Controls No No Yes  No No Yes 
Obs. 5,101 5,101 5,101   4,837 4,837 4,837 
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Table A3.9: LPM on ASER endline test scores 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. ASER test administered to one child aged 6-
12 at baseline per household during endline household survey. 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
a. Digits 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.010 0.009 0.013  0.011 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Number of siblings  -0.003 -0.003   -0.003 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.005) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.006+ 0.019*   -0.005 -0.013 
  (0.004) (0.008)   (0.005) (0.013) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.015+    0.010 
   (0.008)    (0.015) 
Constant 0.974*** 0.871*** 0.868***  0.964*** 0.868*** 0.877*** 
 (0.007) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.016) (0.040) (0.039) 
b. Numbers 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.023 0.018 0.015  0.043+ 0.036 0.036 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) 
Number of siblings  -0.011 -0.011   -0.018* -0.018* 
  (0.009) (0.009)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.002 -0.005   0.004 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.020)   (0.007) (0.015) 
CT x Unpaid care work   0.009    -0.000 
   (0.021)    (0.017) 
Constant 0.923*** 0.644*** 0.646***  0.891*** 0.572*** 0.571*** 
 (0.014) (0.052) (0.053)  (0.022) (0.059) (0.059) 
c. Subtraction 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.057 0.045 0.045  0.032 0.014 -0.029 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.046)  (0.050) (0.048) (0.055) 
Number of siblings  -0.011 -0.011   -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.014) (0.014)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  -0.029 -0.029   -0.002 -0.041+ 
  (0.024) (0.051)   (0.010) (0.021) 
CT x Unpaid care work   0.001    0.048* 
   (0.059)    (0.024) 
Constant 0.459*** -0.205* -0.205*  0.474*** -0.223* -0.185+ 
 (0.040) (0.097) (0.097)  (0.046) (0.097) (0.102) 
d. Division 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (CT) 0.065+ 0.060 0.069+  -0.019 -0.031 -0.074 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)  (0.042) (0.041) (0.050) 
Number of siblings  -0.001 -0.001   -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.013) (0.013)   (0.013) (0.013) 
Unpaid care work (hrs/day)  0.003 0.030   -0.002 -0.040+ 
  (0.024) (0.045)   (0.011) (0.022) 
CT x Unpaid care work   -0.032    0.048+ 
   (0.053)    (0.025) 
Constant 0.327*** -0.551*** -0.557***  0.392*** -0.315*** -0.277** 
 (0.034) (0.089) (0.089)  (0.038) (0.089) (0.094) 
Controls No Yes Yes   No Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,694 1,694 1,694   1,562 1,562 1,562 
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Table A3.10: LPM on parental beliefs on children’s returns to education 
 
Source: Endline survey – post-attrition sample.  
Notes: Unit of observation is the household. Standard deviations in brackets. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
clustered at the school-sector level. Sampling weights used. No controls added. Note that respondents were 
not asked for a probability between 0 and 1. They were asked to choose between five categories (no chance, 
few chances, 50 percent chance, lots of chances, and certain chance). Probabilities of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1 
are imputed to these categories, respectively.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Probability of being employed once 
adult for: 
Boys   Girls 
Mean in control 
group 
Effect of the 
treatment   
Mean in control 
group 
Effect of the 
treatment 
Who does not complete primary 
school  0.257 0.004  0.015 -0.003 
 [0.181] (0.008)  [0.069] (0.003) 
Who completes primary school 0.272 0.006  0.013 0.001 
 [0.174] (0.007)  [0.066] (0.004) 
Who completes junior high school 0.323 0.014  0.025 0.012* 
 [0.186] (0.010)  [0.100] (0.006) 
Who completes high school  0.475 0.010  0.129 0.022+ 
  [0.248] (0.014)   [0.243] (0.012) 
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Table A3.11: Endline ASER test scores by levels of unpaid care work at baseline (in hours/day), 
control group only 
 
Source: Baseline and endline surveys – post-attrition sample. ASER test administered to one child aged 6-12 at 
baseline per household during endline household survey. 
Notes: Unpaid care work measured in hours per day. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-
sector level. Sampling weights used. Strata randomization dummies included in the estimation but omitted from 
the table. Test scores are all dichotomous variables. Estimation limited to control units only.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
ASER scores (endline) 
Knows digits   Knows numbers   Knows subtraction   Knows division 
Boys Girls  Boys Girls  Boys Girls  Boys Girls 
Unpaid care work (Ref.: 
None)            
            
Medium (0-2 hrs/day) 0.008 -0.027  -0.046 -0.054  0.034 -0.125+  -0.012 -0.221** 
 (0.016) (0.021)  (0.037) (0.057)  (0.091) (0.070)  (0.081) (0.070) 
High (>2 hrs/day) 0.037 -0.079+  0.069+ -0.036  -0.196 -0.185*  -0.009 -0.204* 
 (0.022) (0.044)  (0.035) (0.067)  (0.163) (0.089)  (0.169) (0.097) 
Constant 0.965*** 0.987***  0.924*** 0.921***  0.459*** 0.546***  0.330*** 0.466*** 
 (0.007) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.026)  (0.034) (0.045)  (0.034) (0.048) 
Controls No No   No No   No No   No No 
Obs. 316 274   316 274   316 274   316 274 
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Table A3.12: Child and household-level predictors of unpaid care work at baseline (in hours/day) 
 
Source: Baseline survey – post-attrition sample. 
Notes: Unpaid care work measured in hours per day. Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the school-
sector level. Sampling weights used. Strata randomization dummies included in the estimation but omitted from 
the table. Age, number of siblings, household size, and the ratio of girls over boys (ages 16-18) in the household 
are continuous variables. The remaining predictors are dichotomous variables.  
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unpaid care work (baseline) 
Boys   Girls 
(1) (2) (3)   (1) (2) (3) 
Age 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***  0.287*** 0.287*** 0.286*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of siblings (0-15)  0.039** 0.037**   0.037 0.035 
  (0.014) (0.014)   (0.028) (0.028) 
Household size  -0.007 -0.007   -0.021 -0.022 
  (0.005) (0.005)   (0.014) (0.014) 
Ratio of number of girls over boys (ages 16-18)  -0.017 -0.013   -0.113** -0.112** 
  (0.015) (0.015)   (0.035) (0.035) 
Father has primary education (or more)  -0.017 -0.003   -0.061 -0.036 
  (0.032) (0.032)   (0.070) (0.070) 
Mother has primary education (or more)  0.003 0.028   -0.188+ -0.150 
  (0.044) (0.044)   (0.103) (0.104) 
HH has one well (or more)   0.006    -0.127+ 
   (0.035)    (0.075) 
HH gets water from individual network connection    -0.075*    -0.042 
   (0.034)    (0.084) 
HH gets water from natural source   0.123**    0.112+ 
   (0.037)    (0.064) 
Pipe to sanitation network for used water in the HH   -0.094    -0.337* 
   (0.058)    (0.151) 
HH has electrical network connection   -0.032    -0.133* 
   (0.028)    (0.060) 
Constant 0.074 0.085 0.070  -1.728*** -1.500*** -1.417*** 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.061)  (0.098) (0.134) (0.137) 
Obs. 5,101 5,101 5,101   4,837 4,837 4,837 
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Figure A3.1: Hours per day spent on unpaid care work by men and women (left) and female-to-male 
ratio of time spent on unpaid care work (right) across different world regions 
 
Source: Ferrant, Pesando, and Nowacka (2014). OECD, Gender, Institutions, and Development Database.  
Notes: The left graph reports the number of hours per day spent on unpaid care work by men (blue) and women 
(red); the right graph reports the female-to-male ratio of time spent on unpaid care work. Regions of the world: 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and Pacific (EAP), Europe, and North America 
(NA).  
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Figure A3.2: Experimental design. 
 
Notes: Shaded boxes refer to the treatment arms considered in the present analysis, while white boxes 
refer to treatment arms considered in Benhassine et al. (2015).  
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For each school sector: 
- Main school unit + 1 satellite school unit sampled for school visits 
- 16 households sampled for baseline and endline survey (12 with enrolled and 4 with dropout children) 
 
